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Local Traditions, Community Building, and Cultural Adaptation in Reform Era Rural China 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the so-called revival of local traditions in reform-era China. It 
compares the different paths of adapting local traditions to market transitions and a changing 
political landscape. Three questions guide this study: 1) given state suppression of tradition, to 
what extent is power and society in localities still structured by traditional practices? 2) What 
determines how a particular community can provide support to individual members? 3) Does the 
cultural legacy of a community constrain how the community can respond to new situations? 
And how easily can a community reformulate the past to suit the present need? 
  This study argues that local communities have actively used traditional practices to build 
community strength and deal with a variety of community issues arising from changes in the 
political landscape and socio-economic situations. Traditional practices are not nostalgia, but are 
the base for collective action and social organization in rural communities. The revival of 
traditional practices constructs community identity, defines how one relates to others, and 
instructs how one experiences the group to which one belongs.  
This study shows that the same sets of cultural practices and symbols with different 
arrangements can produce different degrees of community solidarity and strength. Variation on 
the use of traditional practices for building community in different localities is explained through 
an interactive model with a number of factors jointly shaping the community strength. These are 
the local legacy, the state, the new market economy, and interests of individual community iv	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
members. These factors have different interactive relations in each local community, and result 
in different degrees of community strength.  
  This study adds to our understanding of reform era China in two particular aspects. The 
first is to demonstrate how the collective aspect of traditional practices has worked in rural 
communities. The second is to demystify the effectiveness of Chinese culture on economic 
development. My study does not treat Chinese culture as a holistic system. Rather, it shows that 
in economic behavior there is nothing essentially Chinese, such as using lineage or family 
networks. Cultural utility, such as strong and effective lineage networks, is a result of complex 
interaction among top-down state forces, the market, local culture, and individual interests, and 
cannot be duplicated simply out of functional utility and rational calculation.     
   v	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Introduction
 
China has undergone tremendous changes since the beginning of the reform era in 1978. 
Among these changes, individualization has been identified as one of the most prevailing social 
forces, which has lead to new kinds of social relations and social formations (Anon 2013; 
Hansen and Svarverud 2010; Yan 2009). Scholars have moved away from traditional forms of 
organizations commonly characterized as collective—such as lineages—and from the communist 
form of collective production unit, to look at the rise of the individual in both public and private 
spheres (Yan 2005, 2006, 2011, 2013). Rather than celebrating individuality as in West, these 
authors see the new Chinese individual as the “uncivilized individual” (Yan 2009) and remorse 
the loss of a common moral ground in society.  
  The trend of individualization is not only a consequence of marketization and 
industrialization, but also a result of the state’s hostility toward any non-state-organized form of 
collective activities. Although the state shifted from totalitarian control to relatively open 
policies in economic and social spheres in the reform era, the state has continued monitoring 
activities that might pose threat to the regime, and collective activities have been treated as 
having the risk to develop into social movements to overthrow the regime.  
  While the trend of individualization is irrefutable and irreversible, the counterforce 
coming from society in search for belonging and group affiliation has been observed and 
recorded (Tang and Cheng 2014; Zhou 1993). This counterforce against individualization is seen 
in involvement in religious activities and the formation of religious communities, and has arisen 
as a result of the tolerant attitude from the state (Lai 2006). This is not to say that there is no risk 
involved in religious activities, rather that more space has opened for religious activity. In 2	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
addition, the yearning for religious participation coming out of a background of religious 
suppression in the Maoist period has led to a flourishing of religious activity in the reform era. 
  There are a number of studies dedicated to the so-call religious revivals in Buddhism (e.g. 
Fisher 2012), Taoism (e.g. Dean 1993; Lai 2003), Christianity (e.g. Cao 2011; Harrison 2013; 
Madsen 1998), and popular religion (e.g. Chau 2006; DuBois 2005; Overmyer 2009). This non-
coherent body of literature has enriched our understanding of religious fields in contemporary 
China (e.g. Kipnis 2001; Sun 2010; Yang and Hu 2012), individual religious experiences (e.g. 
DuBois 2005; Tan 2006), and the creation of new religious communities (e.g. Penny 2003; Tong 
2002). The focus of these studies are the communist religious policy (e.g. Keith and Lin 2003; 
Lai 2006; Madsen 2003; Potter 2003), contents and belief of religious practices (e.g. Fisher 
2008), and forms and patterns of religious affiliation (e.g. Jones 2010). These works do more 
than just describe movement: they also search for a better ground for future China. Civil society 
is the most prevalent thesis in these works, which assert that a public sphere, free from the state 
intervention is the base for moving forward to a democratic society.  
  Traditional community organizations—such as lineages and rural villages—are often 
dismissed as a part of China’s future. For scholars of the individualization thesis, market forces 
dissolve the moral ground of traditional community (e.g. Mao 2000; Zhang 2005), and see these 
two things as incompatible. For them, traditional communities are destined to be nostalgia of the 
past. For scholars of the civil society thesis, the traditional forms of ascribed community hinder 
the development and transformation toward a civil society based on voluntary association and 
formal rules (Chamberlain 1993; White, Shang, and Howell 1996).
 1 In these studies, the 
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1 There are alternative models of civility incorporating traditional, ascriptive ties of kinship and religion in creating 
independent civil institutions. In the China field, some scholars have also engaged in alternative models of civility. 
For example, Weller (2004) argues that local religion can play a central role in the realization and consolidation of 
democratic practices, although it has no effect on the transition to democracy. Dean (1997b) illustrates the opening 3	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dichotomy between modern and tradition is taken for granted and reinforced.  
  Despite the intellectual bias against traditional forms of community, other studies show 
that traditional communities not only continue to prosper, but also that they protect individuals 
from the market economy and the state (e.g. Chau 2003; Dean and Zheng 2010; Jing 1997; Wang 
1997). The literature has discussed how Chinese communities use collective memory (Jing 1996; 
Wang 1997), lineage and family network (Basu 1991; Harrell 1985; Oxfeld 1993; Stites 1985), 
and traditional rituals and symbols (Katz 2005; Watson 1996) to adapt to rapid socio-economic 
changes. The literature argues that cultural adaptations are responsible for manufacturing 
collective identity (Jing 1996; Wang 1997, 1997), bringing about direct economic benefits (Chau 
2005; Kuah 2000), and establishing new forms of local government (Dean 2001; Tsai 2002; Xiao 
2010) to the local people.  
  This above list of studies has shown that cultural adaptation has a direct and 
indispensable contribution to the economic transformation in China. These studies, however, also 
provide contradictory pictures on traditional rural communities, as they demonstrate a wide 
range of the community strength and functional utility that rural communities can provide. This 
variation is sometimes used as evidence of the weakening of rural communities, and rural 
communities are treated as an intermediate stage that is destined to fail (e.g. Hansen and 
Svarverud 2010).  
  Instead of treating these rural communities as outliers or as an intermediate stage destined 
to fail, I argue that the persistence of these traditional communities is an important asset to 
facilitate a deeper understanding of the composition of a strong community that supports 
psychological, material and social well-being of its members throughout rapid socio-economic 
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of space through ritual performance, and urges for the reformulation of multiple public spheres beyond Western 
models.  
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changes. In addition, in assessing the base of a strong local community, no better angle can be 
taken than comparing and explaining different strengths of local communities in adapting to the 
market economy and the shifting political landscape. This is what my study focuses on.  
  This research inquires into the extent that Chinese rural communities organized around 
traditional rituals and symbols, namely ancestral worship and deity worship, have collective 
strength to maintain and adapt themselves to socio-economic changes and buffer individual 
members from the direct exploitation by the state and the market. In particular, this research is 
designed to explore and compare diverse paths of adaptation in Chinese rural communities. 
  I chose to compare three rural communities that succeed in using traditional rituals to 
sustain the community in reform era China. These three communities represent three of the most 
basic village types in rural China today: an entrepreneur village, a village of out-migrant 
workers, and a village-in-the-city. To set the base for comparison, these three communities, 
located in the south Fujian, have similar cultural background and traditional practices, namely 
the territorial cult (deity worship) and the ancestor cult (ancestral worship). In addition, these 
three communities all have intensive traditional practices that have been revived and routinized 
in the past thirty to forty years. Despite these culture similarities, however, the community 
strength of these three communities differs.  
  The overarching argument of this study is that local communities have actively used 
traditional practices to build the community strength and deal with a variety of community issues 
arising from changes in the political landscape and socio-economic situations. Traditional 
practices are not nostalgia, but are the base for collective action and social organizations in rural 
communities. The revival of traditional practices aims to construct community identity, to define 
how one relates to others, and to instruct how one experiences the group to which one belongs.  5	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
   The study finds great variation on the use of traditional practices for building community 
in different localities. With specific local contexts in each community, the path of community 
building moves in different directions. The cases range from a solidified, entrepreneur 
community having strong sanction power over individual members, to a weak community having 
no power over individual life other than collective ritual practices.  
  In investigating the contestation of the effectiveness of traditional practices, three 
questions guide the detail exploration of each case. 1) With the state suppression over traditional 
practices, to what extent are the power structures and social composition in the local society still 
structured by traditional practices? 2) What determines how a particular community can provide 
support to individual members? 3) Does the cultural legacy of a community constrain how the 
community can respond to new situations? And how easily can a community reformulate the past 
to suit the present need? 
 
  The traditional forms of community that this study focuses on are communities formed 
and organized around ancestral worship and deity worship. In the late imperial period, these rural 
communities were not only religious and social units but also political units with capacity for 
self-government. In some cases, they were economic units. These traditional communities have 
undergone changes with the emergence of the modern state since 1911. In specific, in the Maoist 
period, the implementation of the production teams attempted to put all dimensions of rural 
community, culture, social, religious and political, under direct state control. All traditional 
practices were banned, and a series of political campaigns actively destroyed cultural objects, 
such as temples, ancestral halls, statues of the local deity and any other forms of historical 
remains.  6	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
  With the end of the Maoist period and the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s, 
two things simultaneously happened in rural Chinese communities. The first: rural villagers 
revived traditional practices after these practices had been forbidden by the state for almost three 
decades. Second: with rapid economic transition and a shifting political landscape in the 1980s, 
local people used cultural resources to cope with changes. Putting these two things together, the 
so-called traditional practices in China were in the process of reconstruction at the same time 
they were employed to adapt to new socio-economic situations and a changing political 
landscape. A more general background of the revival of local traditions will be covered in 
chapter one.  
    
Significance 
The significance of this study can be discussed from three aspects: rural China, the 
Chinese path toward economic development, and sociology of culture. In what follows, I discuss 
these three aspects respectively.    
  First, my work brings back the neglected aspect of rural communities and adds to the 
current sociological work on rural China. For Chinese sociologists working on rural China, the 
trending topics are the transition of the social order toward the legal system (emphasizing the 
effectiveness of the law), the formation and effectiveness of the collective enterprise in the new 
market economy (township and village enterprises), local governance (the level of provincial, 
county and township and village) in the post-Mao period (such as tax and financial reform), 
urbanization of the rural area and land expropriation, and the impact of rural to urban migration. 
  In emphasizing the organizational and collective aspect of Chinese tradition, my work 
brings back local tradition as an indispensible part of the power structure in the reform era in 7	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
rural China. The local tradition is relevant to issues on social order, local governance and 
migration, as the local tradition shapes individual life path, personal opportunity and choices. 
Collective aspect of rural communities is not incompatible with individuality. On the contrary, 
the collective aspects of rural communities could have been the supporting factor for the 
development of a more healthy individuality in Chinese societies.    
  Second, my study contributes to the quest to explain the economic success since the 
1980s in Chinese societies. My study demystifies the effectiveness of Chinese culture by 
presenting various local responses and paths of adaptation to community challenges brought by 
socio-economic changes. My study does not treat Chinese culture as a holistic system; it shows 
that in economic behavior, there is nothing essentially Chinese, such as using lineage and family 
network. By exploring variations among Chinese local communities, I continue the interactive 
approach proposed by Patterson (2000) and demonstrate a dynamic interaction among top-down 
state forces, the market, local culture, and individual interests. Cultural utility, such as strong and 
effective lineage networks, is a result of complex interaction among the above these four factors, 
and cannot be duplicated simply out of functional utility and rational calculation.     
  Third, my study adds to sociology of culture through reexamining the unit of 
reproduction. The commonly assumed unit of reproduction in sociology of culture is the family, 
and the appropriation of culture is determined by one’s position in the class or occupational 
system or ethnicity. The key goal of the field is to explore the intersection among culture (i.e. 
individual taste, meaning making), the capitalist class system, and inequality. This current 
development in the sociology of culture is mostly irrelevant to rural China. 
My study shows that traditional practices, as a cultural model, are the base for organizing 
community members. Symbols, norms, principles and ritual practices are developed as part of 8	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the local tradition in service of providing a base for people to organize, and for socializing 
people into a community. The cultural model is a collective phenomena, and symbols and 
meanings are collectively constructed and publicly shared. In other words, the cultural model 
constitutes webs of significance that orient individuals to one another and their world (Keesing 
1987: 161). 
My study also suggests that communities practicing ancestral worship and deity worship 
do not share the same set of tool kits to deal with the socio-economic transition. The diverse 
adaptation (cultural advantage) is because communities are equipped with different tool kits, not 
because communities choose different tool kits. In addition, communities of similar wealth or 
living standards do not share the same set of tool kits, as the existing literature demonstrates (i.e. 
L. L. Tsai 2007a).  
In short, the cultural model of Chinese local tradition has two features. The first is that 
the basic unit is a local community. The second is that the cultural model provides rules and 
norms to organize people. I do not deny the existence of a semiotic community of people 
practicing ancestral worship and deity worship, but to go beyond the current understanding on 
the interaction between cultural advantages and the economic development I stress the fact that 
not every Chinese community has the same sets of tool kits.   
  My study initiates a conversation through the following questions: How can we 
conceptualize a relationship between culture and the capitalist system in the ways other than 
where culture is the reproduction of the unequal structure of a class society? How can we 
develop a collective approach toward culture to account for differences among communities?  
 
 9	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Chapter Organization 
  This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter one provides a brief introduction to 
specific Chinese local traditions under investigation and reviews the three main themes on the 
revival of local traditions. Chapter two discusses the research design and introduces the three 
cases of this study. Chapters three, four, and five discuss the three cases of this study, 
respectively. Chapter six concludes this study by providing a comparison among the three cases 
based on the three themes identified in the chapter two. 
   10	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Chapter 1: Continuity and Change in the Revival of Local Traditions 
 
  This dissertation examines the so-called revival of local traditions in reform-era China, 
and compares different paths in adapting local traditions to a changing political landscape and 
market transition. This chapter reviews the three main themes in the literature on the revival of 
local traditions and rural communities. The first is whether traditional authority still has the 
power to sanction in rural communities. The second theme addresses to what extent Chinese 
rural communities have collective strength to adapt themselves to socio-economic changes. The 
third theme inquires into the malleability of the past as a service to present interests. Together 
these three themes attempt to examine how much the present situation in rural China is affected 
by the past practices and the past social and cultural structures.  
  The scope of the inquiry of this study is defined by these three themes. I look at how the 
same sets of traditional practices lead to diverse development of community (in terms of the 
traditional authority, the functional utility of traditional practices, and the malleability of the 
past) in different localities. This study sees the revival of traditional practices—namely ancestral 
worship and deity worship—as the ground for the moral community, which provides principles 
and norms for collective cooperation.  
  This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section provides a brief 
introduction of the specific Chinese local traditions under investigation: the lineage and 
territorial cult. The second section discusses the three main themes on the revival of local 
traditions. The third section turns to two analytical strategies applied to the investigation of 
traditional practices of this study.  
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[I] The Historical Development of the Lineage and the Territorial Cult 
 
  To talk about local traditions in rural China requires an understanding of the specific 
context of Chinese rural communities. In the late imperial period, most rural communities were 
formed and organized around sets of ritual and religious symbols, namely ancestral worship and 
deity worship.1 These two organizations and their corresponding practices are the locus of 
tradition in rural China. What is identified as subjects of Chinese culture are either practices of 
ancestral worship and deity worship, or their corresponding organizations, the lineage 
association and the temple association. This section provides a brief background of the historical 
development of the lineage and the territorial cult. First, a brief introduction of basic ideals of 
these two forms of social organizations is given in the next two paragraphs.  
  Rules of the descent line (zongtiao zhidu) constitute the basic principle of the lineage 
(Chen 1984, 1991).2 These rules do three things: create a particular vision of the group, where 
the group has an origins in a common ancestor who gives life to the whole group; define the 
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1 There are two addition kinds of traditional religious organization: the secret society and the sect. These two kinds 
of organizations flourished in pre-modern China and into the republican period. They were both seen as threat by the 
state, and remained under state supervision. The communist stated wiped out all of these organizations in the 1950s, 
and still imposes very strict laws against any such organization. However, there are some continuous practices of the 
sects in China. These continuous practices are integrated into communal religions. For a discussion of surviving sect 
practices see DuBois (2005) and Dean (1993).  
In this study, I do not distinguish among the three religious traditions—Buddhism, Daoism, and 
Confucianism. While these three traditions have shaped ancestral worship and deity worship, the impact of these 
traditions differs in different locations. I examine practices of ancestral worship and deity worship without 
documenting which religious traditions these practices come from, for the origin of a particular practice does not 
change my overall argument. In addition, the three cases of this study do not have significant differences in the 
origin of local traditions. 
 
2 This definition departs from the functional explanation of Freedman and his followers in that it centralizes the 
importance of descent rules in forming a lineage. In contrast, Freedman sees genealogical expression only 
establishing temporary alliances, and thus a lineage needs a structural arrangement (shared common property) to 
sustain the group (Freedman 1958). Social historians (Faure 2007; Szonyi 2002) have shown that there were 
fictitious lineages, and that these lineages formed as a result of state policy in using lineage for local control. As 
Faure points out, “whether the genealogical linkage claimed is real or fictitious is beside the point for the purpose of 
lineage or organization: it matters only that members of the lineage are prepared to accept the lineage as real. (Faure 
1986:2)” Yet these lineages were arranged according to descent rules and after the establishment of lineage; they 
followed rules of the descent lines and are constrained by them. 12	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transmission of ancestral rites and the obligations between father and son; and constitute the 
social structure of the group, whereby the group has a hierarchical continuity between ancestors 
and descendants. 
  In the territorial cult, a certain area or region is believed to have a deity, which possesses 
authority over that area (Dean and Zheng 2010). The group of people residing in this territory 
believe their fates to be bound together, and only the territorial deity has jurisdiction over this 
place to secure it against dangers menacing boundaries and the thresholds within them. Residents 
of a certain spatial territory are obligated to pay respects to local deities and attend communal 
rituals, in which they congregate and act as a corporate body. 
  With no precedent before the tenth century (Szonyi 2000), the lineage and the territorial 
cult are the two most basic forms of social organization in late imperial China. Both of them 
center on ritual practices—ancestral worship and deity worship—and these ritual practices define 
relationships and obligation among members, as well as relationships with outsiders. The Ming 
(1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) governments co-opted these organizations for political 
control, and depended on them for local governance (Faure 2007; Szonyi 2000; Zheng 2001).3 
Ideologically, the state identified itself with the principles of kinship obligation and filial piety 
(Kuhn 1975). As for the political structure, the state penetrated lineages and the territorial cult by 
using them as an adjunct to the local police and census system (baojia) and tax system (lijia) 
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3 Local governance or autonomy of lineage and the territorial cult refers to “the ability of a social unit to govern 
certain spheres of its internal affairs according to its own procedures and using its own people” (Kuhn 1975:258). 
Local governance does not mean that the social organization is independent from the state. Rather, I use this term to 
capture the fact that lineage and the territorial cult are integrated organizations with the capacity to perform ritual, 
economic and political functions. At the same time, I am aware of the fact that these functions were authorized or 
tolerated by the state, and in most circumstances lineage and the territorial cult acted jointly with the state (Faure 
2007; Wakeman 1993; Zheng 2001). In this sense, local governance is different from the claim that these social 
organizations form civil society. This position is different from the claim that equates local government with civil 
society (e.g. Dean 1997a, 1997b; Feuchtwang 2000).  
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(Kuhn 1975; Szonyi 2000).4 State officials were not involved in lineages and territorial cults, 
which gave them autonomy in their internal affairs. These traditional organizations took over 
administrative tasks, including mediating local disputes, collecting taxes, repairing of irrigation, 
roads, and bridges, organizing for the community crop watching, protecting the community from 
bandits, establishing local schools, operating of charitable estates to provide temporary relief for 
disaster and loans for peasants (Overmyer 2009; Wong 1992), and the construction of public 
buildings dedicated to the earth god and other popular deities. By the Qing, the local government 
depended heavily upon lineages and the territorial cults to create the infrastructure of the local 
social order.
  
At the turn of the 20
th century, state-society relations underwent a radical transformation, 
leading to an expansion of state control over lineages and the territorial cult. The state expanded 
its authority over many sectors of social and economic life as a response to the state-making 
needs of the twentieth century. The state extended its administrative power in local society in 
order to penetrate and absorb local resources. As a consequence, officially recognized local 
authority was shifted from traditional organizations—lineages and territorial cults—to local 
bureaucracies (Duara 1988). In 1926, the Republican state launched the first policies to curb 
local autonomy and penetrate villages. Local elite were replaced with “entrepreneurial brokers” 
in managing local affairs and tax collection.5 Religious property and institutions were 
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4 In the Qing dynasty, the lowest link of the regular bureaucratic system was the county seat (xian). Below the 
county seat, the local government depended on realigning bureaucratic units to conform to natural forms of 
coordination. For example, the baojia (police and census) system was an official design to organize local society. In 
theory, a baojia unit was based on a group of a hundred households. However, in practice, a baojia unit was based on 
the natural village (Kuhn 1975:259). 
 
5 Duara used a dual-brokerage model to explain fiscal arrangement in the Qing. Entrepreneurial brokerage refers to 
brokers who acted as agents for a fee. Protective brokerage, leaders of community organizations, collectively and 
voluntarily undertook leadership roles to fulfill tax and other state demands to avoid dealing with entrepreneurial 
brokers. In the state-making process, the heavy taxes made the job of assessment and collection unrewarding for 
village leaders. In the end, the Chinese state depended on entrepreneurial brokerage to extract resources from the 14	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transformed into components of a purely political public sphere. In contrast with the modern 
state, lineages and village temples were labeled traditional or feudal.6 These policies marked the 
beginning of the separation between the formal political structure and traditional social 
organizations.  
After the establishment of People’s Republic of China, the Communist state not only 
continued this policy, but also aimed to demolish lineage and the territorial cult. As a 
consequence, China experienced a rupture from its cultural past in the Maoist period with 
political campaigns that banned all kinds of traditional practices in the public sphere, and 
actively destroyed cultural objects, such as temples, ancestral halls, genealogy and any other 
forms of historical records. The state attempted to replace the traditional social structure with 
new political institutions—namely, the commune, brigade, and the production team.  
  The struggle between the modern state and the traditional organization is not a zero-sum 
game. The state might have greater power in alternating the leadership structure of a locality by 
confiscating the property of lineages and temples and forbidding the practice of public 
commemorative rites. However, as a number of studies demonstrate, the social bases for popular 
practices were not completely destroyed, and lineages and the territorial cult still performed the 
function of self-governance.7  
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locality. The policies of formalizing agencies of the state and heavy taxes alienated rural elite from the state (Duara 
1988: 42-85). 
 
6 My distinction between modern and traditional in this research is not an intellectual issue. This contrast between 
modern and traditional institutions arises frequently in the narratives of local people. From the village perspective, 
modern refers to the recent institution of a secular and positive political government, while traditional institutions 
are how villagers identify their ancestral past and construct their senses of history and identity (also see Feuchtwang 
1998). 
 
7 A number of studies show that traditional sources of authority such as the lineage and the territorial cult 
constituted an indivisible part of power even at the height of the Maoist era (Potter and Potter 1990; Wang 1996). 
Wang Mingming has explored the intersection and interaction between the state and the lineage organization, and 
between the state and the local religious community, in rural southern Fujian from the late 19
th to the end of the 20
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  Social relations based on lineages and territorial cults, and the symbols and ideology of 
these social organizations, persisted through informal and private channels.8 For example, family 
rituals, such as ancestral worship, funerals, and weddings, were continuously performed under 
the disguise of private activities. Beliefs in the spirits of ancestors and local deities were 
preserved through secret worship and storytelling. Instead of class, rural community social 
relations came to be defined by genealogical order. In this stage, some elements of traditional 
social organizations underwent change, while others remained.     
  Because the collectivization period lays the groundwork for understanding the reform era, 
the collectivization period deserves further exploration. In what follows I will draw on existing 
studies to discuss the implications and consequences of agricultural collectivization on lineages 
and territorial cults. 
Instead of being destroyed, traditional social organizations were incorporated into the 
new political system in communist China (Perry 1985; Shue 1988). After a short period of 
experiment, the state discovered that integrating existing social organizations into a production 
unit was the most effective way to reduce the impact of the transition to collectivization and to 
stabilize state control over the locality (Han 2007, Shue 1988, Zhang 1988).9 Under 
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century. In his study, traditional authority was transformed but not destroyed from late imperial China to the present. 
Li Huaiyin’s (2005) research shows that in the same time frame as Duara’s research, local communities were able to 
provide a safety net for community members, while still fulfilling financial obligation to the state.  
 
8 The persistence of traditional social organizations in the Maoist period might have regional variation. The south, 
particularly Fujian and Guangdong provinces, has most evidence in the persistence and continuity of the lineage and 
the territorial cult from the Maoist period to the reform era. In contrast, data from regions other than the south 
displace ambivalent trends. Some studies show the continuity of the lineage and the territorial cult (e.g. Chen 2009; 
Han 2007; Mao 2000; Zhang 2005), while others show discontinuity of these traditional practices (e.g. Qian and Xie 
1995; Ruan, Luo, and Huo 1998).    
 
9 In some places, there were attempts to ignore the original population fabrication and reorganize the basic 
administrative unit. However, studies show that these attempts ended up in chaos, and the local state had to resume 
their original groupings (Han 2007). Yet, we do find that members of the weaker lineage might be appointed to the 
leader of a brigade in order to overturn the stronger lineage (Chan et al. 1992, Huang 1998). Either way, this does 
not change my point in saying that original groupings were maintained in the collectivization period.  16	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collectivization, a production unit (the production team, brigade, and commune) was assigned a 
territorial jurisdiction. Land was redistributed to the adjunct production unit, and leaders of a 
production unit were chosen from local party members. As kinship groups often clustered 
together, a production unit sometimes coincided with kinship affiliation. In other words, the new 
political system created a perfect congruence among the unit of taxation, the ownership of land, 
and the structure of authority. The new administrative unit in the collectivization period still 
corresponded to the general pattern of aligning the bureaucratic unit to the forms of social 
organizations of the late imperial period. 
There were two main influences of agricultural collectivization, one negative and one 
positive. The negative one is that by the end of the collectivization period, higher-order lineages 
were dissolved. This situation was caused by land reform that confiscated collectively owned 
property, the suspension of the formal organization of the lineage,10 and a restriction of people’s 
interaction outside of the production team. In addition, leaders of lineages were replaced by party 
cadres who prioritized their loyalty toward the communist party over the local community.11  
The positive impact of the agricultural collectivization on lineages was the intensification 
of identity and importance of cohabitant agnatic groups. Under agricultural collectivization, 
villagers were forced to give up their previous careers and became peasants assigned to 
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10 In reality, this period of time is not blank. Local people still built temples or practiced commemorative rites (e.g. 
Huang 1998; Wang 1996; Yang 2006). Yet, commemorative rites on a large scale were not held as a regular event, 
as they had been in the Republican period. Some public commemorative rites transformed into secret activities that 
were hidden from local cadres. Furthermore, in some cases, local cadres took up the responsibility of leading the 
commemorative rites of a descent group, such as paying a visit to the graves of the common ancestor of the group.   
  
11 Whether prioritizing loyalty towards the communist state was a discursive move or a reflection of true ideology is 
a complex question. In most cases, local cadres had conflicting loyalty. In order to be promoted by higher officials, 
they had to dedicate themselves to the state. However, to gain support from the locality, they were confined by 
community norms. Thus, it is not uncommon to see local cadres engaged in activities of the lineage or deity worship 
in the collectivization period. Some of them did end up losing their jobs for participating in these activities (e.g. Jing 
1996; Zhu 2011). 
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production teams without the freedom to move. Individuals were, therefore, forced to attach to 
an ascriptive agnatic group, usually in the unit of the descent group.12 Activities of the descent 
group with territorial affinity were tolerated by the state.13 These descent groups retained the 
character of self-governance. Lineage identity became fragmented and restricted, and yet small 
range agnatic affiliation still dominated social life.  
Members of a descent group were obliged to help in life cycle rituals, such as funerals 
and weddings. Life cycle rituals were defined as private, and the state never attempted to forbid 
these rituals. The most the state did was make rules to simplify these rituals. In practice, local 
cadres limited themselves from too much intervention in these rituals, because they were family 
members as well. In practicing life cycle rituals, interpersonal relations based on genealogical 
order were retrieved and reiterated, and belief in the past was preserved. The economic side of 
the lineage, which was an important function of the lineage in the late imperial period, was 
absorbed into the new political institution: the collective.  
  The other important social organization, the territorial cult, faced different political 
constraints, and underwent a different transformation during the collectivization period. As the 
formal organization was dissolved and commemorative rites were suspended, activities related to 
local deity worship became secret and sporadic. It is harder to trace any systematic effects of 
deity worship on the political structure during the collectivization period. Nonetheless, ordinary 
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12 I do not mean every rural resident had an ascriptive agnatic group. The description here is restricted to individuals 
who had an ascriptive agnatic group. In some part of China, especially in the north, there were local communities 
that were not based on agnatic groups. My description here does not necessarily apply to these communities.   
 
13 By definition, a lineage is a group of people who claim common ancestry. It does not require cohabitation. Thus, 
a lineage can be a group of people who regularly gather together to memorialize their common ancestors. However, 
this kind of alliance was prohibited in the collectivization period. Localized lineage—a descent group that resides in 
the same local area—was the only kind of lineage that still mattered in daily life. The descent group is the 
fundamental unit of the agnatic group. Five-generations is a common cultural idea to define people who are relatives 
and share ritual responsibility toward each other’s life cycle rituals, especially weddings and funerals.  
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people retained a strong belief in supernatural power, which became the primary motivation to 
initiate a revival at the end of the Cultural Revolution.14 In contrast, the most important effect of 
lineage on people’s life was to instruct interpersonal relations and social interaction.15 By the end 
of the Cultural Revolution, lineages were better preserved and more active than the temple 
institution. 
 
[II] Overview of Three Main Themes 
 
  This section provides a brief overview of the intertwined themes on studies of revivals of 
lineage and the territorial cult: A) the fate of traditional authority; B) adaptation of the local 
community in the face of political and socio-economic transition, and C) the malleability of the 
past. These three main themes guide the basic inquiry of this study. The concluding chapter will 
draw on cases of this study to make interventions in these three themes.   
 
A) The Fate of Traditional Authority 
  With dramatic changes in political institutions and economic organization since the turn 
of the twentieth century, the persistence of the authority of lineage and the territorial cult has 
been a persistent inquiry in China field. Revivals of lineage and the territorial cult further 
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14	 ﾠHere I emphasize the effect of the lineage and the temple on the formal political structure. This does not mean 
that deity worship was less important in people’s lives. One of my informants said, “being a peasant who relies on 
the weather makes it impossible not to believe in spirits and gods. When all religious practices were forbidden, we 
still found ways pay our respects to Heaven.” Deity worship formed no less important a worldview than ancestral 
worship. These two beliefs are complementary to each other.   
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15 This is not to say that the lineage institution has no supernatural power. Ancestral worship and beliefs in the 
supernatural power of deceased ancestors, as some scholars claim, are a central component of the lineage institution. 
However, because the lineage institution had both secular and sacred sides, in the collectivization period the lineage 
at the local level was preserved by using a secular discourse. The sacred side was avoided in public discourse to 
avoid further political persecution.  19	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contribute to this inquiry. How much are individuals embedded in the traditional networks of 
family, kinship, and community? To what extent, do the symbolic values and behavioral norms 
of lineage and the territorial cult still guide individual behavior and belief of the present day? To 
what extent, can lineage and the territorial cult provide legitimacy for local leadership? Do 
lineage and the territorial cult have any impact on the economic organization in the new market 
economy?  
The debate has focused on the transition from traditional society to the modern world, 
and whether lineage and the territorial cult will lose its authority and retreat to have only 
symbolic meanings. Or will these two traditional organizations persist and continue to be an 
inevitable, integrated part of political and economic spheres? This question of the continuity of 
the authority of lineage and the territorial cult is not just a simple question about culture, it is a 
question about the capacity of the modern state to penetrate local society. Does the socialist state 
replace the traditional source of legitimacy with the new socialist political institution?  
  Since the reopening of China for scholarly research in the reform era, a number of studies 
show that Chinese rural communities are still organized around traditional norms, rituals, and 
symbols (e.g. Madsen 1984; Parish and Whyte 1978; Shue 1988). The socialist state has not 
destroyed lineage and the territorial cult, and the new political institution coexists with these 
traditional social organizations and Confucian values. In specific, four core concepts of Chinese 
interpersonal relations are often identified as the guideline for individuals to navigate in Chinese 
societies: xiao (filial piety), renqing (literally means human emotion), guanxi (social relations), 
and reciprocity. Xiao (e.g. Ikels 2004) and renqing (e.g. Hwang 1987; Yan 1996a, 1996b) were 
the two major concepts that defined obligations and regulated interpersonal relationships, with 
filial piety regulating family relationships, and renqing regulating relationships outside the 20	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family. Guanxi, the Chinese term for social relations, encompassed both relationships within the 
family and outside the family. Reciprocity, characterized by the norm of giving, receiving, and 
returning gifts in the long run, and was the basic norm guiding all kinds of Chinese social 
relations. Guanxi and norms of reciprocity, therefore, were the organizational medium through 
which Chinese societies were constituted (Chen 1994; Fei 1992; King 1991; Kipnis 1997; Yan 
1996a, 1996b; Yang 1989).   
  The persistence of the traditional authority is particularly evidenced through studies on 
southern China (e.g. Chen 2004; Dean 2001; Pan 2006; L. L. Tsai 2007a; Wang 1996, 1997). In 
specific, southern China refers to Fujian and Guangdong province and in some cases is expanded 
to include Guangxi, Zhejiang and Jiangxi (e.g. Xiao 2001, 2010) provinces. Historically 
speaking, these areas had the strong lineage organizations and the territorial cult, compared to the 
rest of China in the late imperial period. These areas not only were the first to revive lineage and 
the territorial cult in the reform era, but also have the intensity and scale of revivals that cannot 
be matched by the other part of China. This phenomena is furthered referred as the southern 
model, based on the south-vs.-north model.16 The north model refers to the absence of land-
holding cooperative lineages that exist in the south.  
  In the south and north comparison of the traditional authority, historical legacy is 
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16 The south-vs.-north model comparison has been the thrust of historical and anthropological research. Cohen’s 
article on “Lineage organization in North China (1990)” offers the best summary on the contrast between the north 
model and the south model. He calls the north China model “the fixed genealogical mode of agnatic kinship.” By 
which, he means “patrilineal ties are figured on the basis of the relative seniority of descent lines so that the unity of 
the lineage as a whole is based upon a ritual focus on the senior descent line trace back to the founding ancestor, his 
eldest son, and the succession of eldest sons.” (ibid: 510) In contrast, the south China model is called “the 
associational mode of patrilineal kinship.” In this mode, all lines of descent are equal. “Access to corporate 
resources held by a lineage or lineage segment is based upon the equality of kinship ties asserted in the associational 
mode.” (ibid: 510)  
However, the distinction between the north and the south model is somewhat arbitrary. Some practices of 
the south model are found in north China. Meanwhile, the so-call north model is not exclusive to north China. The 
set of characteristics of the north model (a distinctive arrangement of cemeteries, graves, ancestral scrolls, ancestral 
tablets, and corporate groups linked to a characteristic annual ritual cycle) is not a system. In reality, lineage 
organizations display a mixture between the south and the north model.  21	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commonly singled out as the main factor in determining the departure of these two regions. An 
unspoken implication of the southern model is that lineages and territorial cults in the south are 
expected to continue having authority over local people’s lives, and in shaping the path of the 
local economic development and local governance. This simplified southern model has a strong 
implication for the mechanism of continuity of the local organization. This is to say, historical 
legacy matters most in explaining the continuity of the local organization. (Communities with 
stronger local organizations in the late imperial period are more likely to revive strong local 
organizations in the reform era, while communities with weaker local organizations in the late 
imperial period are less likely to develop a strong local community in the reform era.)   
  Scholarship on southern China does acknowledge diverse paths of the development of the 
traditional organization (e.g. L. L. Tsai 2007a; Xiao 2001). A wide set of factors are indentified 
to jointly determine the outcome of the particular path a community takes, such as local 
economic and political conditions, the complexity of local social groups and their interactions, 
the depth and variety of localized ritual traditions, and the role of local elites in negotiating space 
for growth from officialdom (for detailed discussion see Dean 2003). Lacking a more 
generalizable formula, the complexity of south China, which also boasts rural communities that 
lack these traditional organizations, is often overlooked when it comes to the north and south 
comparison, or it is used as evidence of the general trend of the decline of the traditional 
authority.  
  In contrast to the southern model, another trend of research argues for the loss of the 
traditional authority over individuals with the penetration of the modern state, in particular the 
communist state and the spread of the market economy in the reform era. Although this view has 
prevailed since the 1980s (e.g. Duara 1988; Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden 1991; Siu 1989), 22	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Yunxiang Yan presented the best-theorized argument in explaining the basic characters of 
Chinese society. He argues that in the second half of the twentieth century, the rise of the 
individual was a reflexive part of China’s state-sponsored quest for modernity, beginning with 
the establishment of PRC in 1949. This state program, he says, led to the individualization of 
Chinese society (Yan 2009, 2010). The process toward individualization, according to Yan, has 
been further accelerated with the market force in the reform era.  Rural-to-urban migration 
uproots the foundation of the traditional organization, as villagers are no longer bound by the 
natal village they were borne into. Individuals can leave or break the collectives, and therefore, 
the traditional authority is completely dissolved. Tradition can no longer provide moral ground 
or pose moral constraints on individual behaviors. Although tradition does not die out, it is left 
with nothing more than tool kits that individuals draw on for their own benefit (Yan 2009). In 
this perspective, there is no community in present-day China that retains traditional authority, for 
even remote rural communities are well integrated with the market economy through the 
provision of cheap labor. Some studies targeted the southern model and showed that rural 
villages have undergone the process of individualization that Yan described (e.g. Hansen and 
Pang 2010).  
  Through further examining the criteria of evaluation on the power and effectiveness of 
traditional authority, I find that the individualization perspective employs the individual level 
analysis and examines the behavior of individuals and individual’s values and belief to 
demonstrate the absence of traditional authority and the loss of shared moral ground in rural 
China. The traditional authority is only considered effective when individuals obey the moral 
teaching and norms of the community, and when individuals value and interpret traditional 
symbols as in the old days (e.g. Hansen and Svarverud 2010). For example, Mao (2000) and Siu 23	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(1989) both argued for the decline of the traditional authority by showing that the younger 
generations do not hold the same understanding of traditional symbols and do not obey the same 
community norms as the older generations.  
  With this understanding in mind, my take on the substances of the individualization 
perspective is that it correctly points out the change of the understanding of morality and the 
change of the moral sanction power in rural communities. Nonetheless, I have reservations about 
the conclusion of the dissolution of the traditional authority. I contend that changes in the 
strength of the moral sanction and the individual’s understanding and interpretation of morality 
are not equal to the complete dissolution of traditional authority. Furthermore, individualism 
might coexist with collectivism, as Ikegami (1995) demonstrated in the case of Japanese 
samurai.  
  The wide variety of literature on traditional authority in contemporary China shows, on 
the one hand, the persistence of lineage and the territorial cult in shaping villagers’ daily life and 
structuring the local community. On the other hand, the traditional authority, no matter how we 
define it, has no unified or consistent force across rural communities. Therefore, I argue that we 
need to develop a framework to explain the diverse force of lineage and the territorial cult on 
local communities.  
 
B) Adaptation of the Local Community 
Research on revivals of lineage and the territorial cult is relevant to a second theme—the 
adaptation of rural communities to socio-economic changes. To what extent do rural 
communities based on ancestral worship and deity worship have collective strength to adapt to 24	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
the new market economy and buffer individual members from the direct exploitation by the state 
and the market?  
A variety of studies demonstrate different functions that these traditional organizations 
provide to their members in response to the retreat of the communist state from totalitarian 
control of daily life and the emerging market economy. Their focus is symbolic, political, and 
economic resources generated by these traditional organizations. In what follows, I discuss the 
provision of these three kinds of resources respectively.  
  Ancestral worship and deity worship provide ground to form a symbolic community to 
deal with local communities beyond regularly residing together. For example, the symbolic 
community can link members living in the village with members working in the urban factory 
(e.g. Xiang 2005; Zhang 2001), or it can link members living in the ancestor village in mainland 
China with oversea Chinese (e.g. Kuah 2000). 
As for political resources, these traditional organizations can supplement some major 
functions of the local government in securing the welfare and interests of the local populace, 
such as mediating local disputes, taking charge of communal affairs, providing care for 
marginalized groups, and providing public goods for the community (Dean 2003; Tsai 2002). 
The moral community formed around ancestral worship and deity worship also held the local 
cadre more accountable to their administrative performance at the level of the administrative 
village (Tsai 2002; Xiao 2010:201; Yang 2006).  
  In addition to the political aspect, the traditional organization also contributed economic 
resources. Kinship ties are widely known as a powerful model for business adventure and capital 
accumulation in the form of private loans (e.g. Chen 2004; Xiang 2005). Temple donation from 
individual worshippers—could be villagers, non-villagers of nearby neighborhood, and overseas 25	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Chinese with kinship ties to the village—is important economic resources not only for practicing 
ritual and building temples, but also to direct local infrastructure projects and support charity 
program (Dean 2003; Kuah 2000). In addition, kinship ties also brought in investments from 
oversea Chinese. Most recently, tourism and pilgrimage that were attracted by the local temple 
generated prosperity for the local economy and income for the local state (Chau 2005: 245).  
  With evidence of functional utility of traditional practices in the reform era, a 
fundamental question of studies arguing for functional utility of Chinese tradition is left 
unanswered: what makes a local community build a stronger and effective traditional 
organization, while thousands of hundred of communities lack any traditional organization? This 
unanswered question also points to a characteristic of studies in this theme: they are mostly case 
studies of a descriptive nature rather than explanatory. Not much explanation is given on the 
various level of the revival of the local tradition and on the different functional advantages of the 
territorial cult and lineage in different localities. Lily Tsai (2007a, 2007b), who provided the 
most systematic exploration of the local community by comparing over three hundred villages in 
four provinces, also took the strength of the local community as given. She made a good case 
that the local community can benefit from a strong traditional organization. Nonetheless, she left 
the question unanswered of why not every community builds a traditional organization if it is so 
effective. My study attempts to take on this question of what makes a local community build a 
stronger and effective traditional organization.  
 
C) The Malleability of the Past 
  A third theme that is relevant to revival of lineage and the territorial cult is the 
malleability of the past. To what extent is the past constructed based on the needs and concerns 26	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of the present? Halbwachs gives a classical statement, “the past is not preserved but is 
reconstructed on the basis of the present. … Collective frameworks are, to the contrary, precisely 
the instruments used by the collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past which is in 
accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society (1992: 40).”  
  Hobsbawm and Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition (1983) is particularly influential on 
the theme stressing the malleability of the past. They illustrate how new traditions and rituals are 
invented in the sense of being deliberately designed and produced with a view to creating new 
political realities, defining nations and sustaining national communities. After the publication of 
The Invention of Tradition, the phenomena that traditions can be newly constructed for political 
and social function of the state have been of interest to all fields of social science. This term also 
impacts the China field. In particular, China underwent a period of cultural rupture in the Maoist 
period and the term appears often in studies relating to culture and economic development.  
In particular, studies on commodification of cultural heritage for tourist industry in China 
are concerned with how the state creates or appropriates cultural heritage (could be fabricated, 
cultural remnant or living practices) for economic development and to maintain discursive 
control over the realms of cultural production and national identity construction (Oakes and 
Sutton 2010). The politics of cultural production, the key to these studies, involves state 
organizations of various levels, and international/global institutions. The state here refers to a 
number of different organizations, such as China International Travel Service, the Nationalities 
Affairs Council, and the state Cultural Bureau and different levels of the government (central, 
provincial, county and township) (Airey and Chong 2010; Oakes 2000). The most influential 
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 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
(UNESCO) and the World Heritage Project of UNESCO, and the World Bank (more discussion 
of these international organizations see Hevia 2001; Shepherd 2006).                
  Cultural heritage, whether genuine or invented, tends to become a frozen cultural object 
(Oakes 2010) that is deprived of a dynamic expression of faith or belief. Along this line, another 
concern for studies on cultural heritage is the impact of commodification of culture on local 
cultural practices (MacCannell 1994:99–102). Examining existing literature, the response from 
the local people is polarized. In some studies, local people are almost treated as passive receivers 
of the cultural appropriation, although they might benefit economically. Local residents consume 
the official narrative of the relationship between the locality and the nation as much as tourists 
(e.g. Hevia 2001; Huang, Wall, and Clare J.A. Mitchell 2007; Shepherd 2006). In contrast, some 
other works record complicated social processes in negotiating display, interpretations and 
reconstruction over the local tradition, such as an old community temple (e.g. Flower 2004; 
Kang 2009; Sutton and Kang 2009). 
  The overemphasis on instrumental and functional aspects of the past on these studies 
raises the questions concerning the degree of malleability of the past and variation in what 
respects and under what conditions the past is malleable. A recent theoretical position advanced 
by collective memory studies states that the construction and reproduction of the past is an 
ongoing process of negotiation and is limited both by the context in which it is undertaken and 
by the available past (Olick 1999; Olick and Levy 1997; Olick and Robbins 1998; Schwartz 
2000; Zelizer 1995). While typically recognizing the constructed nature of history, Schudson 
(1989:106–7) argues that the past is “highly resistant to efforts to make it over” and that the 
structures of available pasts, of individual choice, and of social conflict limit our abilities in the 
present to alter images of the past.  28	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  The common character of Chinese tradition is that tradition is employed with permutation 
of older forms and relationships in new situations, no matter if the cultural object or practices are 
a continuation of the past,17 is recycled from the cultural past,18 or a fabrication.19 This character 
is better capture by the term “inventiveness of tradition (Sahlins 1999:408)” than the term 
“invented tradition,” which is commonly associated with free malleability of the past. In this 
understanding, the question for the China field on the malleability of the past is to explain why 
some pasts are suppressed while others are recovered or even invented, why some pasts persist 
little changed while others are altered beyond recognition. The collective memory studies that I 
just mentioned above could provide new insights to develop an analytical framework toward 
these questions.  
 
Conclusion 
  A recurring issue in these three themes is the dynamic relation between continuity and 
change. The first theme on the persistence of traditional authority involves the question of how 
the authority of lineage and the territorial cult can continue in a changing political and socio-
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17 Citation 17, 18, and 19 are three categories of genealogy of cultural object and practice, according to their 
relation with the past. The continuous category refers to cultural practices and objects having continuation from the 
past, such as the minority nationality regions, like Tibet (see Shepherd 2006), historic and religious sites, such as 
Mount Tai (such as Mount Tai, see Dott 2010), and ritual practices, such as Dixi (such as Dixi, see Oakes 2010). 
The term continuous here does not mean what is presented to tourists is genuine and was previously practiced. All 
studies I mention here show the makeover of the local culture by the state and UNESCO. Yet, the local culture does 
have a continuation from the past, although it might have been under serious revision. 
 
18 The second category of the genealogy, recycling, refers to the cultural object that had once been part of the local 
practice but was stopped or abandoned, and was rediscovered as a tourist attraction in the reform era. The most 
famous example is the Chrysanthemum festival studied by Helen Siu (1990).  
 
19 The third category of the genealogy, fabrication, refers to the cultural object or practice that is newly invented as 
part of the local or national past. This category includes cultural objects that are falsely said to have a past (such a 
building a new Buddhist temple), and cultural objects that are newly conceived as part of the past. The communist 
revolutionary history and the construction of red tourism premised on the commemoration of sacred sites of the 
Communist revolution are examples of the latter kind (e.g. Yu 2010). The fiction of local practices are well known 
by locals, and are often not even disguised from tourists. 29	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economic landscape. The second theme on the adaptation of local communities relates to the 
question of what changes lineages and territorial cults have undergone to reorder their internal 
social relations and power structure and to pursue strategies for surviving and continuity of the 
group (Cohen 2005; R. Watson 1985). The third theme on the malleability of the past relates to 
the question of how much the past can be changed to still claim to be the past and to suit the 
present needs.  
   This research does not engage in the debate on the continuity or discontinuity of local 
tradition, and takes the position that there is no question about the continuity of local tradition. 
This continuity is what Patterson called “qualitative continuities” (Patterson 2004:79). He 
explained, “What we observe at any given moment will be a bounded complex of inter-related 
qualities, but it is only a socio-temporal stage, a sampled occurrence of many closely similar, 
adjoining occurrences of this complex along the historical line that constitutes, in its entirety, the 
identity of the cultural object in question (ibid).” In other words, nothing needs to be exactly the 
same for the local tradition to claim its continuity. We do not need to prove the form of the 
organization, nor the level of the traditional authority, nor norms and rules to be identical to 
claim the continuity of Chinese culture from pre-modern society to the capitalist system. Change 
and continuity is two sides of a coin, instead of an either-or category.  
 
[Ill] Toward an Explanation of Diversity 
 
  Through reviewing a variety of studies on revivals of lineage and the territorial cult in the 
previous section, I demonstrate that it is impossible to come to a unified conclusion on the 
traditional authority, functional utility and the malleability of the past. I argue that we need to 30	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take the diverse development of traditional practices seriously and develop a framework to 
explain diverse development in local communities regarding revivals of lineage and the 
territorial cult and the political, social and economic consequences of these revivals. For this 
angle, I also aim to deepen our understanding on the dynamics between change and continuity. 
In this section, I identify two analytical strategies in this goal. Before starting the discussion, I 
first define local tradition.    
  I see ancestral worship and the territorial cult as “communal religion” (Dean 2003; Faure 
2007; Feuchtwang 2001; Yang and Hu 2012). That is, the fundamental effect of these 
traditional/religious practices is to produce collective solidarity and group cohesion. In other 
words, people who practice ancestral worship or deity worship together not only form a semiotic 
community, but also attempt to form a moral (real) community: meaning that the participants 
more or less agree about their moral and emotional evaluations of given symbols, and they are 
bounded by solidarity.  
  In addition to forming a moral community, lineages and territorial cults provide the base 
for organizing people. They provide principles for social interaction and norms of organization 
(e.g. Freedman 1958; Gates 1996; Oxfeld 1993; Sangren 1984). Symbols, norms, principles and 
ritual practices are developed in service of providing a base for people to organize and cooperate, 
and of socializing people into a community. In other words, the aspect of lineage and the 
territorial cult of my concern is not about individual belief, taste, or cultural objects. It is about 
how one relates to the others and how should one relate to the others.  
  In contrast to an individualistic view of cultural utility, I emphasize the collective aspect 
of ancestral worship and the territorial cult. The above description of the collective aspect of 
traditional practices might overstate the unity and harmony of the group, but it is an ideal. In 31	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practice, tradition can also be used as a means for suppression and social control. For example, it 
is common that in a lineage, branches are differentiated by wealth and political power (e.g. 
Watson 1985). In addition, tradition does not always lead to the consolidation of a group identity, 
for inappropriate or outdated symbols, norms, principles and ritual practices can lead to the 
dissolution of a group. With all these possible failed situations, however, I emphasize that the use 
of tradition must be collective action, not individual action.  
Practical function is a necessary component of lineage and the territorial cult, according 
to some scholars (e.g. Faure and Siu 1995; Szonyi 2002; Watson 1982), and is used by powerful 
individuals in the group to benefit themselves. However, I argue that the instrumental aspect of 
local traditions is only effective in the unit of a community and needs to be reproduced within 
the community. An individual cannot make use of a local tradition without the other members’ 
involvement and cooperation. When individuals strategically use local tradition, it means that the 
local tradition is reproduced, although not necessarily in the most ideal situation as a strong and 
solidifying community. When a local tradition loses its community ground it becomes irrelevant 
to individual in all regard. There is no such thing as the local tradition losing its community 
ground; but individuals can still use it for their benefit, as the individualization perspective 
claims. 
In sum, this study uses the general term “local community” to refer to a group of people 
that conceive of themselves as a group, no matter their base of community, be it ancestral 
worship, deity worship, or a mixture of these two practices.20 I do not look for local communities 
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20 There are Christian communities going back the fifteenth century in rural China, which have similar functions as 
communal religion. To simplify my discussion, I do not touch on this kind of Christian communities, given that the 
number of Christian communities formed before the twentieth century were relatively low compared to local 
communities based on ancestral worship and deity worship. However, note that these Christian communities also 
underwent a similar process of revival. For an example see Harrison (2013). 
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that must fit into a certain scholarly definition of lineage or the territorial cult. In practice, these 
two sets are usually mixed together in a community, as recorded by a few studies (e.g. Jing 1996; 
Szonyi 2002; Wang 1996). We know little about how these two sets work together, or contradict 
each other in forming a local community. It was possible that a lineage was formed according to 
a set of standards in the Qing dynasty, when lineage was an official category of taxation at the 
local level. In contemporary Chinese societies, however, a lineage is a self-identified group that 
is not regulated by a universal set of standards.  
  Given this situation, revivals of ancestral worship and deity worship are attempts to build 
strong local communities (Han 2007; Wang 1996, 1997, 2000). Functional utility is a side 
product in service of maintaining the moral community. Jun Jing has a convincing example of 
this community building process (1996, 1999) in the revival of the Confucius lineage temple in a 
village in Gansu province. In his case, the Kong-surnamed villagers sought political, moral, and 
cultural redress for their suffering and mistreatment in the collectivization period by rebuilding 
the lineage temple and other deity temples. One the one hand, the process of rebuilding temples 
effectively generated political resources for addressing and confronting problems of the present. 
On the other hand, at the center of rebuilding temples, a moral community was constructed by 
retrieving memories of the lineage. 
  In literature on community building in Chinese rural communities, community building is 
expressed as an abstract concept of community identity. This treatment assumes that traditional 
practices have same effect on the sense of community across communities. I, however, argue that 
we need to disaggregate the concept and process of community building. There are different 
approaches, understandings, and ritual arrangements of community building in local 
communities. The diverse development in local communities regarding traditional authority, 33	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functional utility, and malleability of the past is caused by different approaches toward 
community building. For the rest of this section, I discuss two analytical strategies to approach 
traditional practices: A) forms of traditional practices and B) the work of traditional practices.   
 
A) Forms of Traditional Practices  
  The traditional practices of concern in this study are lineage and the territorial cult. In 
theory, these two forms of social organization have different sets of symbols, employ different 
sets of communicative media, and set social relations in different ways. In practice, groups 
employ both forms of social organizations in a rather unsystematic and arbitrary way. The choice 
might be limited by the past historical trajectory, it might reflect the current social structure, or it 
might simply be a random factor. Therefore, the first step toward understanding the link between 
traditional practices and community building is to examine what are different forms of traditional 
practices that community members can choose from.  
  I summarize traditional practices into three complementary forms according to existing 
studies (Connerton 1989; Glassberg 1996; Olick 1999; Schwartz 1982, 1996): mnemonic 
objects, historical inscription, and commemorative rites.21 Shared meaning and shared emotion 
are symbolized as actual mnemonic objects, such as temples, ancestor halls, and ancestor shrines, 
graves and statues of local deities, to store the community’s memory and collective sentiment on 
a person or a group of people or an event. In addition, mnemonic buildings are a space to 
conduct commemoration, perform rituals, and gather to address community issues. Historical 
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21 There is a fourth type, the simple act of traditional practices, including a wide variety of activities that are 
excluded from commemorative rites, such as performing folk dances, retelling proverbs and stories, singing old 
favorite songs, and eating traditional foods. These activities are viewed as the proper traditional ways of doing thing 
and may be self-consciously selected over more “modern” ways. In doing so, the past has an intimate relation with 
practitioners. But this type of media is not as important as the other three types in shaping the general path of 
community building at the collective layer. This type is private activity made the past visible in daily life, but has 
less force in altering the direction of the collective at a short period of time. Therefore, I will skip this type in my 
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inscription, such as inscriptions on steles, genealogies, and local gazetteers, provides documents 
for the collective, records community property and ritual processes, and inscribes regulation and 
agreement on the rules of social interaction. Commemorative rites, such as temple festivals, 
ancestral sacrifices, commemoration at graves, are performances in which people define 
community boundaries, practice social interactions, and affirm inscribed rules and regulations. 
Table 1.1 lists different sets of communicative media employed by lineage and the territorial 
cult.  
[Table 1.1] Three Sets of Communicative Media of Lineage and the Territorial Cult 
  Lineage  The Territorial Cult 
Basic ideas  Rules of the descent line  Jurisdiction of the local deity over a 
certain locality 
Communicative media      
A. Historical inscription  Inscriptions on steles, and genealogies  Inscription on steles and local gazetteers 
B. Commemorative rites  Death ritual, ancestor worship, and 
commemoration at graves 
Temple festivals, procession and 
pilgrimage 
C. Mnemonic objects  Ancestral halls, ancestral shrines, tablet, 
graves and the old house built by the 
common ancestor 
Temples and statues of local deities 
 
  Different forms of traditional practices make up an integrated expression of the 
community: the community in objects (mnemonic objects), the community in words (historical 
inscription), and the community in practices (commemorative rites). Usually an event involves 
two or all three forms of traditional practices. For example, to practice the annual sacrificial rite 
involves ancestral hall/temple (place), ancestral tablet, ritual manuals, and the sacrificial rite. 
  It is not uncommon that messages conveyed in these three forms of traditional practice 
are incoherent. Possible explanations for incoherence are that purposes of making these 
traditional practices are different, or that these practices were made in different periods of time. 
For example, groupings in ritual practices reflect the demographic process of lineage history. In 
contrast, genealogical records are concerned more with genealogical continuity, thus 35	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genealogical order is the only guideline for grouping. As time goes on, groupings in ritual 
practices might not be identical with groupings in genealogical records. The discrepancy among 
different media is a result of the changing present, when some groups might be too prosperous 
and need to further divide into two or more groups, while some weaken or even die out.  
  In addition to discrepancy among different practices, different practices might have 
different weight in shaping members’ cognition and action. As shown in ritual studies and 
collective memory studies, ritual or so-called commemorative rites might out-weigh other forms 
of practice in shaping participants’ cognition and action. I will pay attention to this question in 
my analysis of different forms of traditional practices and will come back to it in the concluding 
chapter.  
 
B) The work of traditional practices  
This last part categorizes traditional practices into three different forms and discusses 
how different forms represent different aspect of the group. This part turns to three different 
dimensions that traditional practices work in building a strong community: through arousing 
individual’s affective state (psychological dimension), through reproducing framework of 
expressive symbols and community norms (cultural dimension), and through promoting 
particular social patterns (social dimension). These three dimensions are summarized from ritual 
studies. In what follows, I discuss how traditional practices work in these three dimensions 
respectively. Note that, as the purpose of this category is to help us to understand how 
community building could have been structured and arranged differently given the same sets of 
cultural resources, I will not engage in the debate on the foundation and function of ritual in 36	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Anthropological study. I only discuss the surface application of the three dimensions of the work 
of ritual.  
The first dimension of the work of ritual is to arouse individual’s affective state to serve 
as the base of collective identity. According to Durkheim (Durkheim 1995), experiencing 
sensation of the divine—“collective effervescence” is Durkheim’s original term—members 
develop the conscience collective, and the group is intersubjectively perceived as a single entity. 
In addition, this sacred sentiment is attached to the ritual symbols, and these symbols preserve 
intense collective emotion to everyday life. To sustain the sentiment, however, group members 
have to gather periodically to engage in ritual to recharge with collective effervescence and to 
renew the ritual symbols that represent the group. Along the line with Durkheim, scholars 
emphasize the importance of common participation and emotional involvement over the specific 
rationalizations by which participants account for rituals (Collins 2004:200; Kertzer 1988; 
Summers 1986). For example, Kertzer argues for the power of ritual to produce bonds of 
solidarity without requiring uniformity of belief (Kertzer 1988:68). 
The second dimension of the work of ritual is that ritual models ideal relations and 
structures of expressive symbols (Geertz, T. Turner, Douglas, and Lukes). Ritual defines social 
norms and presents them for participants to internalize (Bell 1992:175). Ritual also organizes 
people’s knowledge of the past and present, as well as their capacity to imagine the future. 
Ritual, Lukes argues, “helps to define as authoritative certain ways of seeing society: it serves to 
specify what in society is of special significant, it draws people’s attention to certain forms of 
relationships and activity. At the same time, it deflects their attention from other forms, since 
every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing” (1975:301-2). 
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regulates social relationships. Ritual can become an important means to structure and maintain 
power relations, as shown in Lane’s study on the USSR (1981). She concludes that ritual in the 
USSR is used as a tool of cultural management and as a means of glossing over conflicting social 
relations. Ritual can be seen as a type of social strategy to model valued relationships or promote 
legitimation and internalization of those relations and their values (Bell 1992:89).  
  In addition to the three dimensions of the work of traditional practices, I also see the 
work of traditional practices in an accumulative process. In particular, I emphasize that patterns 
of social interaction and framework of expressive symbols and community norms have 
undergone an ongoing process of production and reproduction. For the convenience of 
discussion, I use the term social process (of traditional practices) to refer to “the ongoing process 
of interactive behavior” (Geertz 1993:145) that is practiced, rehearsed and performed in the act 
of making ritual possible. The cultural process (of traditional practices) is used to refer to the 
ongoing process in using and modifying the existing framework of expressive symbols and 
community norms to represent the ideal community in traditional practices. These two processes 
are highly interrelated—they are two separate processes that could work against one another.  
In conclusion, traditional practices in local communities might emphasize different 
dimensions of the work of traditional practices, and the social and cultural processes might relate 
differently to each other in different local communities. Together these two aspects of the work 
of traditional practices guide my analysis of the effect of traditional practices on community 
building.   
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Chapter Two: Research Design and Three Cases 
 
This study asks how traditional practices enable and constrain local people in adapting to 
new socio-economic changes. In particular, I focus on diverse paths of development in Chinese 
rural communities. As discussed in chapter two, existing studies have shown that communities 
with similar local traditions are not necessarily equipped with the same cultural resources, and 
can have diverse developmental paths (in terms of the traditional authority, cultural adaptation 
and the malleability of the past). The reproduction and adaptation of the local tradition involves 
complex social and cultural processes, which cannot be reduced to self-calculating strategies. 
These social and cultural processes are what my study aims to explore.  
This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section discusses the research 
design. The second section explains how data was collected and what kind. The third section 
introduces the three cases of this study.  
 
[I] Research Design: Case Selection and the Unit of Analysis 
 
  This section discusses the research design, including the rationale behind the case 
selection and the unit of analysis. This research attempts to establish a systematic understanding 
of diverse paths of cultural adaption in local communities—namely, what cultural and social 
processes led a local community to adapt in a particular way? Chapter one argued that we have 
limited knowledge on patterns of functional advantages of the local tradition. What we do know 
is a list of functional advantages that the local tradition can provide. Given the limitations of the 
existing theory, I designed a study of small-case comparisons based on ethnography. An 39	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ethnographic approach aims for an in depth understanding about the cultural logics that are hard 
to get at with survey research approach. The comparison approach enables a sorting out of 
patterns that are harder to notice in a single case study.  
  As for case selection, in theory, any rural community in China with some traditional 
practices could serve this project. The interpretation and comparison of findings, however, 
should correspond to existing studies. Furthermore, given that this research aims to understand 
patterns of various functional advantages of local tradition, cases with intensive traditional 
practices were required. This design does not exclude my findings as having implications to a 
community losing traditional practices, which I will explore in the conclusion chapter.  
  The case selection was biased toward cases of local tradition, and imprecise in the type of 
village selected. Nonetheless, this bias and imprecision does not undermine my argument, which 
is presented in the form of mechanism/processes rather than causation.  
  With the background of rapid economic transition, and an emphasis on the strong force of 
the market in the current trend of China study, I single out economic conditions as the criterion 
for comparison and select cases with similar characters corresponding to aspects that I discuss 
below. The following explains the criteria of case selection.  
  Economic conditions are often understood to have a strong impact on the continuity of 
the local tradition and the functional advantages of the local community (Bell 1973; Inglehart 
1990, 1997). There are two criteria to judge the impact of economic conditions: the wealth of the 
community and types of work. In the market economy, one’s relation to the market determines 
the demographic process a community undergoes. The local tradition is more likely to be 
approached differently with different demographic processes of the local community. One’s 
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cases.  
  With this criterion in mind, I chose to study three types of village: Village-in-the-city, the 
village of out-migrant workers, and the entrepreneur village. This is not an exclusive list of 
village type in rural China, although these three types of village are found all over China. In what 
follows, I introduce the three village types.   
  The village-in-the-city is a village type that emerged in reform-era China. With the rapid 
industrialization and urbanization, the government and the industry were in need of land to 
expand the industrial zone. Rural communities adjacent to the city were developed into industrial 
zones under state planning. In most villages of this village type, arable lands were expropriated 
by the state, and villagers received a one-time compensation. In addition to the compensation, 
villagers can rent out rooms to migrant workers who work in village factories. The income is 
often significant to the degree that villagers do not need to work. The downside of this kind of 
village is that the local community is left with the burden to deal with non-villagers living in the 
village, and non-villagers living in community territory usually outnumber registered villagers. 
In addition, villagers usually suffer from structural unemployment due to the loss of arable lands.  
  The village of out-migrant workers is the most common type of village in the inland. 
These are villages based on agriculture. These villages relate to the market by exporting cheap 
labor forces to the city. Adult villagers leave the village for blue-collar jobs in the city, while 
they are still officially registered under their natal village. These migrant workers are at the 
bottom of urban social structure and economic system. The household registration system, which 
segregates citizens from villagers, and imposes strict restriction for villagers to become citizens, 
further discriminates villagers from social benefits and welfare in the city, such as the eligibility 
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household registration system keeps migrant workers connected to their natal villages; they also 
rely on villages to cut down their costs in the city and cope with the instability of their work 
(such as leaving kids to their parents in villages, and leaving aging parents in villages). This type 
of village is commonly known as a village of elder and minors, as all working adults have left to 
work in the city.    
  The entrepreneur village is the most successful type of village of reform era. Villagers 
either open family factories in the village or neighboring areas, or open shops in other part of 
China. The main character of this type of village is that of solidarity and trust. Furthermore, the 
networks among villagers are important assets that contribute to economic success. Villagers rely 
on each other to make private loans, gather business information, learn business skills, and 
acquire political leverage for business. Villagers focus on one or a limited number of businesses, 
and cluster their businesses in the same part of a city. Structurally speaking, entrepreneurs are 
discriminated by the household registration system as migrant workers. However, with more 
money and social networks, in contrast to migrant workers, entrepreneurs are usually more 
successful in navigating their life in the city (such as acquiring urban citizenship, and putting 
their kids in schools in the city). Their natal villages also provide them with childcare and elder 
support. The village of the entrepreneur is also commonly left with elders and minors as regular 
residents, while the communal affairs and public facilities are well taken care of with monetary 
contributions made by entrepreneurs.     
  I targeted one of each type of village. Although it is impossible to control variables in a 
qualitative study, I tried to find cases with characteristics as similar as possible. This setup aims 
to put the study in dialogue with existing literature providing a base for explanation and 
comparison. First, to explain variation in functional advantages of local communities, I chose 42	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cases from similar local traditions and limited my choices to communities showing signs of a 
strong presence of the local tradition. A common way to detect the strength of the local tradition 
is to look for the existence of the temple committee or the lineage committee and for regular 
annual communal rituals (as employed in Tsai 2007). In addition to this criterion, I also looked at 
the scale of annual communal rituals—the more magnificent and more money spent, the 
community might have stronger presence of the local tradition.  
In addition to the economic and political conditions, Dean (2003)points out that the 
complexity of local social groups and their interactions, and the depth and variety of localized 
ritual traditions are factors that impact the development of the traditional organization in a 
particular locality. I hence chose cases from similar cultural and ritual backgrounds. In addition, 
I chose to study communities of single lineage type, or that are predominated by one lineage, as 
studies point out the group dynamics of the single lineage and multi-lineage community are 
different in shaping the local tradition (e.g. L. L. Tsai 2007a). I further chose to study 
communities with longer inhabitation history. This criterion is also a response to the southern 
model that I discussed in chapter one (e.g. Wang 1996). Under this perspective, the local 
tradition tends to be stronger in the areas where it was historically strong.  
The communist state has made the formal political structure uniform across the country. 
For informal state behavior, Tsai found that the temple committee and the lineage association 
hold the local state at the village level more accountable than these communities without the 
temple committee and the lineage association (Tsai 2007a). I limit the study to communities with 
a strong local tradition, and Tsai’s finding does not apply to my case selection.   
With all these village characters in mind, I further limit my scope to south Fujian. Fujian 
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and the territorial cult in late imperial China (Faure 2007). In addition, the earliest wave of 
revivals of traditional and religious practices began in this part of China (Dean 1993). These two 
provinces are also the first and most industrialized and capitalized part in China. Although 
traditional organizations have been reported all over China, no other area can match the intensity 
and the scale of the revival of these two provinces. Yet the reason to settle in south Fujian rather 
than in other part of Fujian or Guangdong is a personal reason. That is, I can speak southern 
Fujian dialect. The background introduction of each selected community will be introduced in 
the finding section. In what follows, I discuss the unit of analysis.  
 
The Unit of Analysis: Multi-layers of the Community 
  In chapter one, I argued that the basic unit for the local tradition is a local community. 
The boundary and formation of a local community is shaped by at least three forces: communal 
rituals, the state, and the market forces. For the cases that I study, communal rituals, namely 
ancestral worship or deity worship, are the bases of local identity. Therefore, I emphasize that the 
basis of a local community is ritual alliance. The ritual alliance is multi-layer, from a 
neighborhood or an agnatic group to natural village and then to multi-village alliance. Alliances 
of the lower layer cooperate together to form the alliance of the higher layer, and individuals are 
ascribed to the lowest layer in the unit of family according to patrilineal logic or residence. As 
for the higher layer of alliance, membership is in the unit of the lower layer, not the individual or 
individual household.  
  To explore the strength of a local community, all layers of the ritual alliance must be 
taken into account. My research shifts among four different layers: multi-village alliance, the 
administrative unit, natural village, and the descent group. In what follows, I briefly introduce 44	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each layer. The top layer of grouping in this study is the multi-village alliance. These are groups 
of villages performing regular common rituals, such as ancestral worship or deity worship. A 
community temple or lineage temple is built accordingly to host community deities or common 
ancestors. In addition, these villages hold festivals and parades in honor of their local deities, to 
receive blessing from local deities, and to strengthen their alliance. Multi-village ritual alliance is 
the most popular method in rural China to ally several surnames. It is also common that villages 
within a ritual alliance belong to a single surname.  
The next layer is the administrative unit that is imposed by the state for administrative 
purposes. Literally, this layer is called the administrative village, or xingzheng cun. However, in 
order to make a clear distinction from the natural village, throughout this research I refer to this 
layer as the administrative unit, and reserve the term village only for the natural village. An 
administrative unit usually includes a number of natural villages. For large surname groups, an 
administrative unit could include natural villages of the same surname group. The administrative 
unit is an artificial category for political control, and in itself does not create a community with 
collective identity. Because it determines resource distribution and political relations among 
natural villages, this layer does affect the grouping dynamic of natural villages and cross-village 
ritual alliance. Furthermore, the party secretary of the administrative unity (cun zhishu) and the 
head of the administrative unit (cun zhang) are usually key players in the local community. 
Therefore, this layer is mentioned when it is necessary for the understanding of the power 
dynamic in the locality.      
The lower layer of the administrative unit is the natural village, or ziran cun in local 
people’s common usage. The natural village is the basic residential unit, and it forms the basic 
territorial local community. The natural village in south China is often composed of a single 45	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
surname. It is a hamlet that is developed through voluntary habitation, and becomes a historical 
unit involving settlement rights, and original settlers are distinguished from later immigrants. 
Settlement rights involve more than residence. Settlement rights—“the rights to exploit common 
resources defined within a territory” (
⁠Faure 2007: 4)
 1⁠—define memberships of a village. Usually 
memberships manifest through a participating community of commemorative rites.  
The most fundamental grouping in this study is the decent group. In common usage, the 
decent group refers to relatives of five generations of a common ancestor, and it is the 
fundamental unit of the agnatic group. Five-generations is a common cultural idea to define 
people who are relatives and share ritual responsibility toward each other’s life cycle rituals, 
especially weddings and funerals. In practice, however, the five-generations is not absolute. In 
fieldwork, I have seen as few as three or four generations, or as many as eight generations. 
Affairs within this group are considered domestic, in contrast with publicity of affairs involving 
whole lineages. Historically speaking, a lineage sometimes prospers and sometimes ends, 
according to the external environment or the internal development of the group. However, the 
descent group seldom stops performing corresponding rituals. This is true during the 
collectivization period, as people were able to frame it as a private or domestic sphere and be 
free from direct state intervention.2 It is not surprising to find that the basic unit to revive 
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1 In a greater detail, settlement rights include the right to open up land that was not privately claimed for cultivation; 
the right to build houses on wasteland; the right to gather fuel from hillsides; to collect fish and mollusks in small 
quantities from streams or the seaside to supplement one’s diet; to go to market; and to be buried on land near the 
village (Faure 2007: 4). 
 
2 Take Du village as an example. In the collectivization period, the ancestral temple and ancestral halls were 
demolished, common property of these organizations was confiscated, and all rituals in these organizations ceased. 
Here the communist state did succeed in destroying higher-level lineage structure. Under the name of feudal 
superstition, public rituals and commemorative places (such as temples and ancestral halls) were under strict 
regulation. Social relations grounded by this structure became less and less important and began to fading away 
from memory. As graves were removed and destroyed in the name of regional development in the late 1950s, 
higher-level lineage alliances received a mortal blow.  46	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traditional practices after the end of the Cultural Revolution started from the decent group.  
This study works to understand the adaptation and reproduction of local tradition, the unit 
of analysis has to be multi-village ritual alliance and the analysis has to include the lower layers 
of groupings. It pays particular attention to the dynamic among these sub-groupings.   
 
[II] Data Collection 
 
This section explains the collection of data. First, I explain how data was collected. 
Second, I explain what kinds of data were collected. To explain the data, I have to mention the 
population of three communities of this study. The three communities vary: Zhu stronghold has a 
population of 18,000, and includes three administrative units with twenty-three natural villages. 
West Mountain has a population of 9,000, and includes six administrative units with about forty 
natural villages. Du village has a population of 2,300, and is a natural village belonging to an 
administrative unit with five natural villages. With such a population in each community, I had 
to be more strategic in data collection. In each community, I chose a lower layer of ritual alliance 
as the base of the local community from which to do ethnography. The choice of the unit of this 
ritual alliance shifts according to the local context. I tended to choose stronger units of the lower 
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In contrast, the descent group and the ancestral hall were retained as the fundamental unit in community 
life. The change of a political regime could not change people’s fundamental belief in death, afterlife and the past. 
These cultural beliefs were strong; they had been preserved and passed down even at the height of state ideological 
intervention. In all of the three cases in this research, private commemoration and life rituals had never been 
forbidden even through the Cultural Revolution. When I asked why this was the case, a former party cadre of Du 
village said, “life and death are still of private concerns. The state could not and was not willing to intervene. Even if 
the state wanted to forbid people from practicing life rituals, the state did not know where to start.”  
The descent group was the basic unit to collaborate in daily life and to deal with life rituals, especially 
death. No one family could accomplish it by itself. To perform a life ritual properly, the family needed intensive 
labors, the knowledgeable elder to instruct the procedure, collective funds, and a patriarch to host rituals. A life 
ritual is collaborative by definition. The very idea about lineage is preserved in the descent group, and this group 
was also the most important foundation of the revival movement in the 70s and 80s. 
There were some subtle impacts of state regulation, however. For example, the death anniversary was 
called jiri (忌日), which has connotations of spiritual life. At this time, local people called it jinianri (紀念日), 
which is translated as “memorial day,” and lacks the spiritual connotation. 47	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layer of ritual alliance because these units were where the major local leaders live; staying with 
these leaders helped me to enter the field easier. Nonetheless, the choice of the lower layer of 
ritual alliance should not affect my findings, as the general state found in the lower layer of ritual 
alliance is representative in the whole community. In what follows, I describe the situations in 
each community.  
The Plateau descent group of Downhill village is a lower-unit ritual alliance of Zhu 
Stronghold. Downhill village has a population of approximately 2,100 persons, and the Plateau 
descent group has a population of 500. Downhill village is one the two strongest villages of Zhu 
Stronghold and the Plateau descent group is the most coherent descent groups of Downhill 
village. I stayed with a family of a wealthy businessman of Downhill village. I chose the Plateau 
descent group as a focus is because residents of members of the Plateau descent clustered 
together, while the rest of the descent groups of Downhill village did not cluster together. In 
addition to Downhill village, I also stayed with the president of Zhu Stronghold temple when 
there were events at the temple. The president’s village is next to the temple, and I stayed there 
out of convenience to observe late night and early morning rituals. In addition, the living room of 
the president of Zhu Stronghold temple was the place for the local leaders to gather at the time of 
ritual events. Thus, staying in his place helped me to observe the interaction among local leaders 
and to interview them.    
As the lower unit of ritual alliance in the West Mountain I chose Puddle village of the 
Eastside administrative unit, one of the six administrative villages of the West Mountain. The 
Eastside administrative unit has seven natural villages and all members share the Lu surname 
along with their spouses. The Eastside administrative unit has a population of 1800, and Puddle 
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switched from the local patriarch to the local cadres, especially the village head and the party 
secretary. I got to know the village head of the Eastside administrative unit through a temple 
event, and he kindly offered me accommodations. His family lived in Puddle Village of the 
Eastside administrative unit.   
The Melon sub-branch of Du village is a lower-layer ritual alliance in Du village. The 
Melon sub-branch has a population of 200. It is one of the most coherent agnatic groups of Du 
village. When I did my fieldwork, the Melon sub-branch was reconstructing their sub-branch 
hall. Some members of the Melon sub-branch hall gathered together everyday at the sub-branch 
hall to supervise the project and held meetings regularly to discuss the reconstruction project. 
With all these activities, members of the Melon sub-branch were more accessible than any other 
agnatic groups in Du village. One of the patriarchs of the Melon sub-branch kindly offered me 
accommodation with his family.  
My data collection can be divided into two parts. The first part is the village life of the 
lower unit where I stayed. In addition to attention to ritual practices, private and public, I also 
talked to people about their daily concerns, ranging from making money to child-raising and 
domestic life. The second part is ritual alliance. I attended as many public rituals as possible; the 
scope included all public rituals of the community. Ritual events were the occasions to meet 
local leaders, some of whom became my key informants, and I conducted unstructured or semi-
structured interview with them. 
I gathered five data sets. First, I gathered general community level information, such as 
local socio-economic history, geographic feature, political structure, and local social structure 
through interviewing local officials, local intellectuals (such as elementary and high school 
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region. Second, I collected stories of the revival movement—both of success and failure—in 
each community. I traced sequential activities that were revived in the name of the local tradition 
and sought to know the key advocates and leaders—why they wanted to revive certain activities, 
how different groups of people in the community came to participate in the activity, what 
resources they mobilized to host the activity, and what problems were solved. Third, I collected 
fifteen life stories in each community (from people in their twenties to elders in their eighties, 
both male and female), and participation observation on local people’s daily life. Fourth, in each 
lower unit of choice, I did a survey on the residents’ current occupation, proximate income, 
educational background, and marriage status. Fifth, I collected available products and records of 
cultural representations, such as genealogy, CDs of community festivals, conference records, 
stone inscription, historical records and individual diaries on community activities. 
  
[Ill] Three Cases: General Background 
 
  This section provides the general background of each community. Figure 2.1 locates the 
three villages on the map of Fujian province. To help organize important categories for three-
case comparison, table 2.1 summarizes the general background of the three cases. 
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[Figure 2.1: Map of Fujian province and the three villages] 
(source: Johomaps) 
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[Table 2.1] General background of three communities 
  Du village    Zhu Stronghold  The West Mountain 
Village type  The-village-in-the-city  The entrepreneur village   The village of out-migrant 
workers  
Location  In South-east Fujian coast, 
close to Xiamen city 
In middle south Fujian, in east 
coast 
In west Fujian of mountainous 
area 
Population  2300  18000  9000 
Community 
composition 
A natural village belongs to an 
administrative units with five 
natural village 
23 natural villages of three 
administrative units  
Six administrative units 
Surname  Single surname of Du  Single surname of Zhu  Dominated by Lu lineage with 
seventy percent of the 
population, and there are nine 
other surname groups 
Changes of live 
mode 
1. 1980s: fishing and oyster 
cultivation 
2. 1988: special industrial zone 
of Taiwanese factories 
3. 2000s: rents from migrant 
workers living in the village 
Emergent business class since 
1970s 
1. 1980s: Craftsmanship  
2. 1990 to the present: low 
skilled migrant workers in 
cities 
Regular 
residents 
Other than collage students 
most people live in the 
community. In addition, non-
villagers live in the community 
is between five to ten times 
more than the villagers.  
One third, the rest is doing 
business spreading all over 
China 
One third, the rest only comes 
back on Chinese New Year 
and the annual ritual event 
 
A) Du village 
  Du village is a successful case of rebuilding solidarity and collective identity through the 
revival of traditional practices in the reform era. The success of Du village is attributed to the 
overseas Chinese council of Du village (OCC), which was transformed from a semi-official 
organization into a grass-roots organization that hosts traditional practices. In addition, OCC 
took over the responsibility of the local state, such as maintaining social order in regards to 
outnumbered non-villagers living in the village, and consolidating its authority in managing 
community affairs. The authority of OCC is restricted to cultural and social domains, and the 
state still controls the boundary of theses two domains.   
  Du village, a natural village, is located at Cape Crab and is the smallest community of the 
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Chen surname, the rest of the officially registered residents are of the Du surname. The Du 
family migrated to Cape Crab in the 14
th century and has become one of the strongest lineages in 
the local area. With population growth, descendants of the Du surname expanded to nearby areas 
and formed eight other villages of the Du surname.    
  Du village is located at the coastal area facing Xiamen island, one of the major cities in 
south China, and part of the frontier facing Taiwan. With this geographical location, Du village 
has been under the strictest state control among the three cases and benefited from state planning 
since the 1950s. The political, cultural and economic domains have been closely monitored and 
developed under state planning. Among the three cases, traditional practices in Du village 
suffered from the most serious disruption in the Maoist period, and the lineage structure was 
broken down.  
  Villagers of Du village have been working under a limited cultural sphere defined and 
permitted by the state to revive traditional practices and reestablish traditional authority. The 
regional government established an overseas Chinese council (OCC) in 1982. The purposes of 
the OCC were to receive and communicate with overseas Du people and help them realize their 
projects for Du village, usually in forms of reconstructing ancestral halls and recovering 
ancestral worship. Later on, with further release on the governmental control over traditional 
practices, villagers started to revive deity worship publicly and the OCC of Du village became 
the organization taking charge of both ancestral worship and deity worship. The OCC of Du 
village became a strong grass-root organization that was capable of monopolizing community-
wide religious activities and providing public goods to the community.  
  Socio-economic changes in Du village started from the decollectivization in 1984, and 
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the area was developed by the state into an industrial zone for Taiwanese factories in 1988. 
Eighty percent of land in Du village was expropriated by the government. Villagers were 
transformed from farmers into workers and landlords, and some of them, especially middle-age 
people suffered from structural unemployment. The very last of the agricultural land was 
expropriated in 2003, and in 2006 Du villagers officially became an urban population. The most 
stable income of villagers in the new economy is rent from migrant workers working in local 
factories. (Unofficial estimation of workers living in Du village is between fifteen thousand and 
thirty thousand.)  
 
B) Zhu Stronghold 
Zhu Stronghold is an extraordinary case, as its lineage authority was not undermined in 
the Maoist period, and it was ready to manage community affairs in all regards, including 
economics in the reform era when the state released its control over local politics and economic 
organizations. The community strength of Zhu Stronghold is further intensified with ritual events 
in the reform era; traditional practices are intertwined with not only local politics but also 
business practices. In other words, political and social domains are largely structured and ordered 
by local cultural logic.   
  Zhu Stronghold developed into a community of entrepreneurs in the reform era. It was 
one of the wealthiest communities in the county. Relying on lineage networks, local people do 
business all over China and of the Republic of Kirgizstan. Their major businesses include tire 
repairing business in all mining fields all over China, renting steel tubes in Shenzhen, running oil 
stations in Xinjian, cell phone retailing business in Xingjian and the Republic of Kirgizstan, and 
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ages of twenty and fifty have an education equivalent to high school or below, started to work 
between the age of fifteen and eighteen, and got married around twenty. They worked at their 
relatives’ shops or companies and tried to save enough to startup their own business. Every adult 
male sees himself as a businessman or a businessman in the making.               
  The success of lineage networks for doing business is due to the strong traditional 
authority and communal solidarity throughout the Maoist period. The implementation of new 
administrative structures and new economic and social organizations—the production team—did 
not result in undermining the lineage structure in Zhu Stronghold. The inner politics and social 
structures mirrored lineage politics and the lineage structure of the republican period. The major 
difference in the Maoist period was that public rituals were forbidden, and the local people were 
forbidden from freely moving outside the community. Nonetheless, private rituals, particularly 
spirit possession, continued to be practiced throughout the Maoist period. 
  With continuity of traditional authority through the Maoist period, the revival of public 
traditional practices at the end of the Maoist period is not about rebuilding the local community 
that was weakened in the Maoist period, as the case of Du village. Instead, it is about using 
traditional practices and cultural resources to make the best use of new opportunities. In the 
reform era, community building in Zhu Stronghold equals economic development. On the one 
hand, a strong lineage network is the main resource that local people relied on to start a new 
business. On the other hand, the economic benefits of strong lineage network further solidify the 
lineage network. Therefore, being a wealthy community equals a strong community in the case 
of Zhu Stronghold.  
 
 55	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
C) West Mountain 
  West Mountain represents a case where a new collective is built in the reform era to 
adjust to the new social structure. The new community is put into practice when the procession 
of the Temple of Benevolence (hereafter, the Procession) was revived in 1993. The practice of 
the Procession was modified with the new context of the locality, which was a transformation 
from highly stratified groups based on land holding to a community emphasizing egalitarianism 
among different surnames and different villages. Nonetheless, the construction of the new 
community was still a process, and traditional authority was only held in ritual practice. This 
limited success of the new community provided a new hometown identity that was particularly 
important for community members, who are mostly migrant workers in the new market 
economy.    
  West Mountain community, located deep in the mountainous region of western Fujian 
province, is a newly formed ritual alliance—with a population of nine thousand residents—
through the revival of the eighth day and the fourth month procession (the Procession) in 1993. 
This newly formed alliance aims to construct a new collective identity, although most residents 
and their ancestors moved to the area no later than the late nineteenth century. Not to mention 
that Lu lineage, the dominant lineage in West Mountain area, settled in the thirteenth century.    
  The West Mountain area underwent a rapid socio-economic transition in the reform era, 
transforming into the hometown of migrant workers. Without much natural resources or any 
other economic advantage, local people previously migrated out to other areas. With de-
collectivization in the 1980s, local people once again had opportunities to work outside the local 
area. Other than being farmers, in the 1980s, the most prevalent outside community work was 
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could travel back to their home every day. Two or three months in a year, they traveled to other 
areas to work and were temporary absent from the village. Later on, in the 1990s and toward 
2000s, working as unskilled factory workers in the industrial zone in south China province 
became the primary path for local people. People of working ability are mostly absent from the 
local area, and the local area is left with children and elders.   
  In this transition, individual networks narrowed and broadened at the same time. The 
importance of blood ties is narrowed to include only one’s direct relatives and their families. 
Relatives sharing the same ancestor beyond five generations, termed the descent group, no 
longer means anything to individuals. Furthermore, lineage identity, which was weak to begin 
with, was further weakened. Nonetheless, friendship based on affection and shared hometown 
identity became more important for individuals to provide material and emotional support to deal 
with difficulties and hardship in the city. Friendships from youth, such as playmates and 
classmates in elementary and high school triumphs blood ties. This shift in personal relationships 
went hand in hand with the formation of the new collective in 1993 through the use of an old 
temple ritual in the republican era—the Procession.   
  This transition would not have been completed without the effort of local cadres. Local 
cadres were not concerned with the past history and the authenticity of traditional practices as 
were the local elites. Instead, their primary concern was the social and political order. In the de-
collectivization period, the local cadres were short of means to mobilize local people, and at the 
same time, they discovered that by encouraging and leading deity worship, they gained 
legitimacy and moral ground for their ruling. Furthermore, with changes in the demography and 
structure of the local community under the new market economy, the local cadres found that 
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its registered residents lived outside the community. Participating in deity and ancestral worship 
strengthened individuals’ emotional ties and social networks to the local community. Stronger 
social ties allowed local cadres to better know of activities among community members, even if 
they reside outside the community. (This method is particularly important for local cadres to 
enforce the birth control policy, as most married women live outside the community.)  
 
Conclusion 
  As discussed in the first section on research design, I chose cases with similar lineage 
structure and characters (single lineage, long inhabitation history, and a strong presence of 
traditional practices). With these similarity, and based on the existing literature, I expected to 
find variation in functional advantages according to the mode of living in each community; 
meanwhile, I expected to find similar strength of the traditional authority, for I was able to 
control most other aspects that the existing studies suggested being the cause for the variation in 
the community strength. In addition, I also expected to find similar power relations among the 
traditional authority, the local state, and the economic sphere. Furthermore, as these cases were 
chosen from similar local traditions, I expected no major difference in the cultural ideal of the 
community. 
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Chapter Three: Zhu Stronghold—A Strong, Solidifying Community 
 
Zhu Stronghold represents successful adaptation of local tradition in the market economy. 
Lineage networks were transformed into intensive business networks, and the Zhu Stronghold 
temple council mediates community issues and internal disputes of all aspects: religious, social, 
economic and political. The economic, political, and social domains are structured and ordered 
by local cultural logics. The strong community with clear social order and capacity for 
mobilization is the base for community members to get ahead in the market economy.  
This chapter shows that the integration among different domains—economic, political, 
religious, and social—is arranged and achieved through a sophisticated system of traditional 
practices. This sophisticated system of traditional practices is discussed from two sets of 
practices: ritual practices and a system of spirit possession. Ritual practices emphasize 
demonstrating a high level of community solidarity through complex and extravagant rituals. In 
contrast to the secular aspect of community mobilization of ritual practices, the system of spirit 
possession emphasizes the sacred force by demonstrating the magic power of the local deity. 
Through the shared experience of fear of the local deity, spirit possession creates the base of 
shared emotion for community members and provides the ground for community morality.  
These two sets of practices, although demonstrating different aspects of community, 
secular and sacred, jointly present a coherent understanding of the community and one’s 
obligation to the community. The core of the ideal community includes the following three 
aspects: the pre-existence of the community emphasizing the limitation of individual; one’s 
obligation toward community building; and one’s fate and success in market economy 
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that one can only prosper when the community is strong, and that one has to work as hard as 
possible to make the community strong. 
The success of Zhu Stronghold as an entrepreneur village since the turn of 1980 has deep 
roots in its traditional practices, and it is also advantageous from the continuous lineage authority 
and the preservation of the practice of the spirit possession in the Maoist era. With the intact 
cultural practices and structure, when the revival movement began in the early 1970s, cultural 
resources were ready to be used to respond to economic situations that community members 
faced at the time.  
This chapter focuses on analyzing traditional practices and explaining the link between 
traditional practices and the economic success of the community members. The chapter is 
organized into four sections. The first section examines the logic and arrangement of ritual 
practices. The second section examines the system of the spirit possession. The third section 
subtracts the collective ideal of community from the first section and the second section. The 
fourth section discusses a system that developed from traditional practices and structuring one’s 
responsibility, obligation, role and status in the community. I call this the honor system, and it 
covers economic, political, social and religious aspects.  
The chapter is not organized chronologically, but analytically. Due to the limited space, I 
do not cover the development of traditional practices in the reform era. Instead, I explore the 
complexity of traditional practices, and only mention past examples to demonstrate the analytical 
points. The development of traditional practices is mostly linear in Zhu Stronghold. There are no 
transitions in the use or practice of traditional practices, as for the other two cases. As a result, 
the explanation of the case will not be undermined by not recounting the details of the 
development of the revival movement.  60	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[I] Collective Action of Ritual 
 
  This section shows how ritual contributes to the high level of solidarity in Zhu 
Stronghold. The construction of high level of solidarity demonstrates community coherence in 
ritual and allows a subgroup to lead ritual practices. On the one hand, ritual is a demonstration of 
community unity. On the other hand, subgroups are not equal in community leadership or their 
representation in ritual. Strong groups dominate the temple committee council and hold more 
important ritual positions. The status as a strong group is not pre-determined. Each group has to 
demonstrate the strength of the group and maintain the status of the group by making greater 
contribution to community ritual, such as providing people to take part in the temple procession 
or by donating more money.  
Competition for leadership leads to more and more complex and extravagant communal 
rituals, as every subgroup wants to increase their importance in ritual practices. The increasing 
complexity of the ritual then makes all social groups of different villages, of different descent 
groups, and of different social status (i.e. the political elite, the patriarchs, the ritual specialists, 
and the businessmen) interdependent to each other. Due to the intricacy of the ritual practice, no 
one social group can host the ritual without cooperation from the other social groups, which 
includes twenty-three villages with a population of 18,000. Ritual expenditures amounts to 
300,000 RMB or more for a ritual event, and necessitates external community communication 
with the township and county government and more than forty neighboring villages. 
Furthermore, secret rituals need to be arranged. To pull all this off, different social groups must 
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  This chapter shows that solidarity is not a psychological state resulting from a ritual that 
has nothing to do with secular life. Rather, solidarity is built into the social process of ritual 
practices, and this social process is recognized, designed, and modified by members of the 
community. In demonstrating this point, this section discusses two guidelines of traditional 
practices that direct the development of the revival movement in Zhu Stronghold; it examines the 
ritual arrangement that makes the coexistence of community coherence and subgroup 
competition possible. The section begins by outlining the basic community structure in Zhu 
Stronghold.  
 
A) Basic Community Structure 
  Zhu Stronghold has twenty-three natural villages. In Communist China, Zhu stronghold 
is divided into three administrative units: the Seashore unit, the Sea-peace unit, and the 
Mountain-surrounded unit. The Seashore unit has eight natural villages, and all the residents are 
of the Zhu surname. The Sea-peace unit has nine natural villages, with some non-Zhu residents. 
The Mountain-surrounded unit has eight natural villages, and six of these eight villages are from 
the Zhu family. These three administrative units are dominated by the Zhu lineage. In the 2000s, 
the population was around 18,000. 
In illustration of the basic social structure and composition of Zhu Stronghold, this part 
introduces two main kinds of social groups. The first is where one is ascribed when one is born. 
In this ascription category, one is attributed according to village and descent group affiliation. 
The second is that of social status; the four dominating groupings are the political elite, ritual 
specialists, patriarchs, and businessmen. In what follows, I introduce these two kinds of social 
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   The first kind of social group is a combination between territorial affinity (namely, 
village) and agnatic affinity. From bottom to top, the levels of the community are a descent 
group within a village, a village, an administrative unit, and the Zhu lineage. Within a village, 
the agnatic affinity is the primary criterion for grouping, and the descent group is the basic unit. 
The importance of the genealogical order is restricted to the boundary of the village. There is no 
substantial alliance among a lineage branch of different villages. In addition, what allies descent 
groups of a village is the village temple, not ancestral worship. The village temple is also the 
base for multi-village alliance. The Zhu Stronghold temple leads twenty-three village temples.  
  The second kind of social group is the leadership in Zhu Stronghold. This is the political 
elite, the patriarch, businessmen, and the ritual specialist. In what follows, I discuss who they are 
and what they do for the community. The political elite includes current party cadres, retired 
party cadres, retired managers from state-owned enterprises, retired school principles, and retired 
officials from provincial or district governments. Their leadership skill and political connections 
with the local government, which they have accumulated throughout their career, is the asset for 
the community. They specialize in external community negotiations, including the local 
government and villages nearby Zhu Stronghold. Because these local leaders all share a similar 
experience of serving in the communist party, this group forms the most coherent entity of the 
four kinds of local leaders.  
The second kind of leadership is the patriarch of strong descent groups of each village. 
Politics in each village is based on descent groups. The strongest descent group represents other 
descent groups of the same village in community affairs. In other words, the patriarch of the 
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his position toward community affairs is structured by the power and interests of his descent 
group and village.  
The third kind of the local leader is the wealthy businessmen. Businessmen have been 
involved in the revival movement and local social welfare programs since the beginning of the 
formation of this class in the turn of 1980. By providing financial support, wealthy businessmen 
shape the path of the revival movement, and they lead local social programs in activities such as 
building elementary schools, roads, and public graveyards. Because they are away from Zhu 
Stronghold for most of the year, they are not involved in managing the Zhu Stronghold temple as 
much as the other three kinds of local leaders.  
The fourth kind of leader is the ritual specialist, who controls knowledge of the practice 
local tradition. The majority of the ritual specialists in Zhu Stronghold are spirit mediums. Spirit 
mediums control the means to communicate with the local deity, and they are the voice to 
announce decisions made by the local deity. The secret power that they possess can undermine 
the other kinds of leaders, even if they cannot rule the community without other leaders. Most 
ritual specialists are illiterate and poor, and come from a lower social class in the community. 
Ritual specialists do not form a coherent entity. They compete with each other and no one can 
claim to control the group. The other three kinds of leaders have an ambivalent attitude toward 
this group. A large part of the story of the revival movement in Zhu Stronghold is about the 
control over ritual specialists by the local elite and patriarchs, which I elaborate in the section on 
the spirit medium.  
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   Two guidelines can be identified for the development of the revival movement in Zhu 
Stronghold since the 1970s. These two guidelines, which I induce from informants’ practices and 
their interpretation of their practices, demonstrate the high level of community solidarity, and 
deal with the uncertainty of the market economy. Under these two guidelines, the revival 
movement develops into ritual practices emphasizing the coexistence of community coherence 
and subgroup competition. This part discusses the two guidelines, which have been clearly 
articulated since the beginning of the revival movement.   
 
Guideline 1: Demonstration of Community Solidarity 
When asked about the goal of ritual, informants of Zhu Stronghold pointed to the 
importance of demonstrating a high level of communal solidarity through ritual. This point is 
best summarized by my conversation with a leader of the Zhu Stronghold temple, who answered 
questions of why Zhu members are so enthusiastic in deity-related rituals. The temple leader 
said, 
The development of Zhu Stronghold shows the magic power of the local deity. Our deity is more 
efficacious than those of neighboring communities, and this is why we are wealthier. On the request of the 
local deity, we revived deity-related activities much earlier than the other communities, and this in return 
brought us more economic opportunities and made the wealth of Zhu Stronghold… We as humans cannot 
know and control the magic powers. But our collective action as a community affects the local deity. The 
more cohesive we are, the more power the deity possesses… For example, we spent so much money on a 
pilgrimage, and there are so many tasks involved in making a pilgrimage possible. What do you think we 
are doing? We are demonstrating our solidarity to the local deity. Through demonstrating our solidarity, the 
local deity is also empowered and more capable of blessing us.  
  This articulation points to solidarity demonstrated by the ritual work. It must be 
emphasized that what is seen here is that solidarity is not seen as the product of ritual. Instead, 
solidarity is the motive and drive of ritual practices. Given this situation, how to demonstrate 
solidarity? According to my informants, there are two ways. The first is to revive traditional 
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and complex ritual as possible. The first action is what led to the initial revival movement in 
1973. Among neighborhood communities, Zhu Stronghold was the first community to revive the 
community wide procession—the Lantern procession—in the 1970s. When the Lantern 
procession was first revived, it required strong leadership and coherence of the community to 
make it possible, especially because of the political risk. Although the route and order of the 
procession was claimed to be identical to the Republican era practice, it was not easy to facilitate 
the smooth running of a procession involving more than ten thousand people and twenty-three 
villages. Therefore, the act of holding the Lantern procession is a demonstration of solidarity.  
  After the revival of the six regular annual community-wide rituals in the 1970s, the 
revival movement entered the second stage in the 1980s of making ritual as expensive and 
complex as possible. Under this method, the most difficult and complicated ritual—pilgrimage—
is revived. A pilgrimage, which is held once every few years by request of the local deity, 
exposes a community’s capability of fundraising, inner community coordination, ritual 
arrangement, and extra-community communication. In the reform era, the community held four 
pilgrimages: 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2006.   
 
Guideline 2: Dealing with the Uncertainty of the Market Economy 
  The other important guideline of the revival movement is to respond to new economic 
opportunities through traditional practices. Since the early 1970s, there was an understanding 
that individuals can only survive and prosper with a strong community in the face of uncertainty 
under the market economy. A strong community provides a variety of resources, such as political 
leverage, economic capital, and human capital, to help individuals with economic opportunities. 
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revival movement, and it is reinforced as the community becomes wealthier and wealthier. In 
what follows, I provide examples to show how the concern of economic well-being links to 
traditional practices.  
  I start from examine the root that led to the announcement of the local deity for open 
revival of deity worship in 1973. Recalling the situation in the turn of 1970, informants 
commented that they sensed an opportunity of change for their lives. One of my informants said, 
“The political atmosphere was mitigated, especially after 1971. In the slack season, we engaged 
in illegal trade for locally produced seafood. We carried these products to a nearby town and sold 
it there. This was not just us. Villagers in nearby areas were all engaged in this kind of small 
trade.” There was a booming of the underground economy in the early 1970s. However, most 
informants cannot explain the rational behind the change of the national economy or politics. It 
was a living experience based on trial-and-err. One of my informants commented, 
Life was tough in the collectivization period. Zhu Stronghold had little good land to farm. We were all very 
poor. We took every chance to improve our life. Illegal trade existed in the collectivization period. When 
you got caught, the police confiscated everything. You not only lost cargo, but also your transporting tools. 
A handcart or a bicycle was a huge fortune at the time… In the beginning of the 1970s, the success rate for 
illegal trade increased. Few police were on the road. I don’t know why this was the case, but I knew that if I 
succeed two times out of three times, then I was making some money. If I was only caught one time out of 
five times, I was making a good fortune. 
In speaking about the early 1970s, locals expressed a sense of opportunity coupled with a 
sense of uncertainty. Individuals had been trying to make sense of it and make the best use of the 
opportunity. The 1973 revival activity, therefore, was not a sudden, unexpected event, but rather 
an attempt to make the use of the new opportunities through collective action. Political risk was 
high in the revival movement, and economic risk was not any lower. Constructing the omnificent 
local deity and a strong community were ways that built confidence for members in dealing with 
uncertainty. When informants talked about the early economic success of Zhu Stronghold, they 
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informant commented, 
Before 2000, we were the wealthiest rural community in the county to which we belonged. The reason for 
this was because we revived public ritual practices much earlier than the rest of communities. Being able to 
revive ritual practices at the time when all the other communities were afraid of the political risk showed 
the high level of solidarity of our community. This high level of solidarity helped us to go through the 
difficult time… Thus, our economy success was not just a blessing from the local deity, but was also a 
result of being a strong community.  
The importance of having a strong community and how a strong community served as the 
base for economic venture repeatedly appeared in my conversation with Zhu members. I did not 
find this kind of self-consciousness and clear articulation of a strong community in the other two 
cases. The economic situation is one of the main community issues that the local deity is 
responsible for, and which traditional practices deal with. In what follows, I will illustrate this 
point through the example of the public opinion on the ritual decision of the coming year in 
2009. 
In the eleventh lunar month of 2008, the year when South China was hit by a financial 
crisis, the issue that I overheard villagers talking about most was the economic performance of 
Zhu members that year and how it would be in the next year. People were pessimistic about the 
national and international economy. By the time of the twelfth lunar month of 2008, villagers 
anticipated the local deity would likely announce a pilgrimage for the coming year. To my 
question on the logic behind the speculation, an informant replied:  
Businessmen are not making as much money as they were a year or two ago… People are losing their 
confidence and this is when we need a pilgrimage. A pilgrimage costs a great amount of money, and it is a 
task that cannot be accomplished without high solidarity within the community… We believe that in the 
economic downturn, we need to spend more money on religious practices. The more we spend on religious 
activities, the more we earn back from our business… With the economic downturn, we thus think that it 
might be appropriate to call for a pilgrimage in 2009. 
This quote shows the sequence to deal with public issues through traditional practices. 
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concern in the year of 2008 was that businessmen were losing money. Then, after evaluating the 
public issue, community members proposed a ritual solution. In 2008, community members 
requested a pilgrimage. Third, the reason for the ritual solution was to strengthen solidarity and 
create sentiment of shared fate to cop with the difficulty. 
 
  These two guidelines together form a strong belief in community strength to cope with 
uncertainty in the transition period. In addition, community strength needs to be demonstrated 
and enhanced through extravagant and magnificent ritual practices. The development of the 
revival movement has followed these guidelines since the 1970s.  
  As I pointed out these two guidelines had already formed since the beginning of the 
revival movement, one might ask the origin of these understandings of community. The first 
guideline is continuity from the republican period, while the second guideline is more likely to 
be an adaptation in the reform era. Zhu Stronghold was involved in armed flights with 
neighborhood communities for control over natural resources since the eighteenth century. The 
local deity was used as the symbol of the community and the temple procession was used to 
declare the territory and to demonstrate the community strength. Although these practices were 
stopped in the Maoist period, the collective identity and the community structure did not 
fundamentally change. So does the guideline link traditional practices with the demonstration of 
solidarity.  
  As for the second guideline, the link between community strength and the economic 
situation, there was some continuity from the past—however, what was practiced in the 
republican period was not exact the same. Some subgroups of Zhu Stronghold were businessmen 
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deities were closely connected to their business decision. The efficacy of a local deity of 
subgroups was judged by its capacity to bless the fortune and prosperity of the subgroup. I did 
not collect any example in the republican era showing that the Zhu Stronghold temple activities, 
especially pilgrimage, was responsive and responsible for the economic well-being of the whole 
community, as is the case now. The emphasis on the extravagant expenditure also seemed to be a 
new phenomenon in the reform era, as my informants suggested. In the republican era, according 
to my informants, solidarity was most closely linked with the number of people attending deity 
related activities, rather than the money spent. The linking of the strength of the community and 
the local economy is a new phenomenon in the reform era. This is a result of the members of Zhu 
Stronghold sharing the same economic opportunities in the reform era. In contrast, in the 
republican era, people were restricted by natural resource of the village in which they resided.  
 
C) Coexistence of Community Coherence and Subgroup Competition 
  The above showed that under the guidelines of demonstrating community solidarity and 
responsiveness to economic situations, the revival movement is moving toward more 
complicated and expensive ritual practices. To make such ritual possible, the community has to 
have strong leadership and the ability mobilizing human labor and money. Zhu Stronghold’s 
effective approach is to encourage subgroup competition for leadership of the Zhu Stronghold 
temple. Together with the emphasis on solidarity, ritual practices show coexistence of 
community coherence and subgroup competition.  
  Below I discuss two sets of community norms that facilitate subgroup competition: that 
of villages, and that of leaders. Among villages, the strongest villages, defined by the number of 
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villages do not have any representative in the Zhu Stronghold temple council. To be the strong 
villages controlling the temple council, the villages have to take on more obligations over the 
success of traditional practices, such as contributing more money and providing more human 
labor.  
There is a clear division of labor among the four leadership groups—the political elite, 
the ritual specialists, the patriarchs, and the businessmen. The political elite is in charge of 
external community communication, including with the local government and neighborhood 
villages. The patriarch of the strongest descent group of a village represents their village in the 
community leadership. He is the one who executes the preparation of the ritual event in the 
village, such as collecting money from villagers, encouraging participation in the ritual event, 
communicating with the ritual specialists for sacrifices in the name of the village. The ritual 
specialist controls the know-how of local tradition. They arrange the religious aspects of 
traditional practices, including how to use spells to protect the troupe, how to hold the statues of 
the local deity on the pilgrimage, the special tools and costumes participants should hold and 
wear, and what to offer on the alter. Businessmen are not involved in the administrative process; 
instead, they are responsible for financially supported extravagant rituals.  
The balance among the four social groups and the clear division of labor do not come 
without a struggle. There was a time that the political elite, the ritual specialists, and the 
patriarchs struggled to dominate the Zhu Stronghold temple council by excluding the other 
groups from the leadership. The complex ritual practices, however, kept any of these groups 
from claiming domination. In the end, they recognized each other as all irreplaceable for the 
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task further irreplaceable and more important to define the strength of the community, which 
resulted in more and more complicated ritual practices. In what follows, I show how this worked.  
Because of the political risk, the political elite, especially retired and current party cadres 
were ambivalent toward traditional practices in the 1970s and 1980s. They did not hinder ritual; 
neither did they actively take part in ritual. Nonetheless with the growth of ritual practices, the 
local elite used the 1995 pilgrimage as a platform to assert their irreplaceable role in ritual 
practices. In order to legitimate their own participation, they criticized the previous event and 
defined tasks for themselves, which was the external communication. One retired party cadre, 
who joined the 1995 pilgrimage, discussed how a struggle over local politics stands behind the 
organization of ritual practices: 
After the first pilgrimage in 1990, we (retired and current local cadres) became less and less satisfied with 
how the leader of Zhu Stronghold temple handled the community affairs. People who dominated the Zhu 
Stronghold temple were mainly ritual specialists and vulgar patriarchs who lacked negotiation skills. They 
failed to convince the neighboring villages to receive the procession properly. A proper reception includes 
having non-Zhu surname villages on the pilgrimage route form a group to receive the procession at the 
entrance of the village, to offer a red envelop to the local deity of Zhu Stronghold, and to perform opera to 
honor the local deity of Zhu Stronghold. Villagers in the neighboring villages commented on these failures, 
and undermined the reputation of Zhu Stronghold…In 1995, when the local deity called for another 
pilgrimage, a number of retired party cadres, including myself and party cadres at the time, agreed that we 
could not stay silent anymore…This was why we ended up stepped in by leading the task in external 
communication.  
Ritual is seen as a space to contest local politics among four leadership groups and each 
group defined the goal of the ritual differently: they saw it as a way to emphasize their own 
contribution. Ritual specialists are interested in showing the magic power of the local deity. 
Retired party cadres focus on maintaining the reputation of Zhu Stronghold (in comparison to 
other neighborhood communities) as a strong community through secular methods, such as the 
number of people who participated in the pilgrimage, and the difficulty of the ritual. The 
patriarchs are concerned with the maintenance of the communal and lineage order, and 
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extravagant ritual forms to show off their wealth. In brief, the responsibility for each social group 
is not assigned arbitrarily by a higher authority, but rather each group creates it.  
Although there are many stories about the competition among these four groups, what 
needs to be stressed is that competition among the groups does not lead to break down of the 
community. Instead, it further strengthens the community as each group realizes that they cannot 
do without the others. Interdependence among these social groups is enhanced in the 
development of the revival movement as well, and all the stated goals of each social group 
become inevitable for ritual practices in Zhu Stronghold.  
  The situation that encourages subgroup competition works well in the community where 
the strength of subgroups varies, and the specialty of each group is distinctive and irreplaceable. 
There are three preconditions for this approach to work without resulting in factions and a 
breakdown of the community: an open structure for mobility, no economic subordination among 
subgroups, and external adversary. The first precondition—an open structure for mobility—
means that subgroups can envision the possibility to move up the ladder. With clear community 
norms for subgroup competition, members of Zhu Stronghold believe that they can gradually 
move forward with the collective effort of village members, such as working hard to increase the 
wealth of villagers and contributing to traditional practices. From the past history, including the 
republican period and the reform era, there are examples where villages in the middle move 
forward with the collective efforts of the village members.  
The second precondition is that differentiation among subgroups is not determined by the 
control of economic resources that can cause group suppression, such as land ownership. In the 
republican period, there were small landlords in each village, and tenants were mostly from the 
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control a great amount of land resulting in subordination of the other social groups. Needless to 
say, in the reform era, the main economic opportunities are doing business outside the local area. 
There is clear hierarchy among villages, in terms of the wealth of the village. However, there is 
no economic suppression among villages.        
  The third condition is that there is external adversary unifying the community. As I 
pointed out earlier, Zhu Stronghold was in violent competition for natural resources, especially 
control over ports and water in the late imperial China and the republican era. Traditional 
practices were used to organize members of Zhu Stronghold to fight against adversary in 
communities. In the reform era, although there is no longer much to fight over, the past memory 
continues. Members of Zhu Stronghold are consciously in competition with neighborhood 
communities over who revives the procession first, who spends most money for a deity-related 
activity, and who can host the most complicated ritual.    
  The existence of an external adversary gives competition two facets: one external and the 
other internal. For example, in the Lantern process, the competition for fireworks and 
firecrackers has two layers: a competition among Zhu Stronghold and other communities, and a 
competition among the villages of Zhu Stronghold. This is how community coherence and 
subgroup competition coexist. In what follows, I will further explore how the coexistence of 
community coherence and subgroup competition is arranged in ritual practices.  
 
D) Arrangements that Produce Solidarity 
To further analyzing how the coexistence of community coherence and subgroup 
competition is realized in ritual practice, I identity three interrelated, yet analytically separable 
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disposition among social groups, and space for conflicts. This part discusses these three sets of 
ritual arrangement respectively.  
 
Interdependence among Social Groups 
The first arrangement is interdependence among social groups. This includes social 
groups of different social status, social groups of different villages, and descent groups in a 
village. The interdependence is arranged with two facets: the symbolic facet and the facet of 
collective mobilization. The symbolic facet is to symbolically represent the group as unified. 
Take the Lantern procession for example. According to local customs, each married male has to 
hold a lantern to represent the household he started. Linking households in a village and villages 
of the entire Zhu Stronghold together represents the endless offspring and prosperity of the 
lineage. In this demonstration, the task—to represent the whole lineage—can only be 
accomplished with every male member’s participation, this symbolizes the interdependence 
among villages and among members of each village.  
  As for the facet of collective mobilization, ritual practices need every social group to take 
responsible for its tasks. For example, as I already mentioned, a pilgrimage needs all four groups 
of leaders to take on specific tasks. The political elite negotiates with neighborhood communities 
to ensure the route of the pilgrimage in the nearby region, and the proper receiving ritual from 
community temples of neighborhood communities. The ritual specialist arranges the ritual 
procedure, while the patriarch mobilizes villagers to take part in the pilgrimage and maintain 
order in the activity. Businessmen donate money to support the pilgrimage. The above list shows 
that the pilgrimage cannot be held without the contribution from all four social groups.    
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A Ritual Order Reflecting Power Disposition  
  The opposite side of interdependence is power disposition. The second arrangement is a 
ritual order reflecting power disposition among social groups. The display of power disposition 
also has two facets: a symbolic facet and the facet of collective mobilization. Order in procession 
is a symbolic display of power disposition among villages. Power disposition among villages is a 
combination among a few factors: wealth, the number of male members, political capital 
possessed by members who serve in the government. In the marketization period, the first 
criterion, wealth, outweighs the other two criteria. Although order in the procession is harder to 
change, hierarchy among villages can be symbolically illustrated through extravagant ritual, such 
as the length of the line of lanterns that represent the amount of male members in each village, 
and money spent on fireworks and firecrackers that represent the wealth of the village.  
  As for the facet of collective mobilization, power differentiation is displayed through 
different obligations and responsibilities toward ritual practices. For example, wealthier villages 
have to contribute more money to ritual practices and provide more human labor to participate in 
the ritual. In addition, among different social groups of leaders, it is arranged through task 
division in preparation for, and carrying out, the ritual event. Groups of different social status, as 
listed above, have a specific role and responsibility to make the ritual succeed.  
 
Space for Conflicts 
The third arrangement is the possibility to interrupt or transgress the existing order. The 
second set of ritual arrangements present the community as a highly stratified and ordered. 
However, the importance of the coexistence of coherence and competition is to provide room to 
interrupt the established structure, so that those at the bottom can envision a possibility for 76	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
change, and those on the top have to work hard to maintain their status. In Zhu Stronghold, 
ritualization of conflict is the main mechanism to channel discontent and accommodate change. 
In what follows, I use the incident in the Lantern procession of 2009 to illustrate how conflict is 
ritualized.  
  The other facet of the stable power differentiation in ritual is the fact that once in a while, 
a weaker village could try to challenge the hierarchy by changing the order of a procession. This 
kind of action, as observed in Zhu Stronghold, is not exceptional or abnormal. Instead, I argue it 
is tolerated and becomes part of the ritual. The illustration of conflicts among villages through 
ritual practices costs less than other means, such as an armed flight, as once happened between 
two villages of Zhu Stronghold in the middle of the nineteenth century, and resulted in three 
deaths. All attempts to challenge the order of procession since the revival of the procession have 
failed. The settlement of conflicts in the ritual demonstrates the strength of the community and 
the power structure is reinforced afterward. However, I argue it is also important for weaker 
social groups to have a way of challenging the existing hierarchy. This possibility motivates Zhu 
people to work harder and considers them as equal participants.  
Since the revival of the Lantern procession in the early 1970s, the route and order of the 
procession was based on that in the Republican period. The Plateau descent group was the 
second of the procession, but it was the first group that lit fireworks and firecrackers. Grey 
village was the first one of the procession and the last one to light fireworks, meaning that they 
passed by Zhu Stronghold temple twice and only lit fireworks the second time when they passed 
Zhu Stronghold temple. In 2009, Grey village violated this order by lighting fireworks the first 
time it passed by the Zhu Stronghold temple. “Villagers have been discontent with the order of 
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of Grey village—Laizu—said the day after the incident. He continued,  “Villagers of The Plateau 
descent group left after they lit fireworks. It is unfair that they only spend one hour in the 
procession, while my villagers have to spend six hours.” As for the charge that it was Laizu’s 
plan, he said, “There was no plan. I do not know who ordered to lighting of the fireworks. I did 
not attend the procession. I was in Zhu Stronghold temple to make preparations for the 
procession for the next two days. I think it was just an accident.” Laizu was a representative of 
the Council and a ritual specialist. He was in charge of ritual arrangements for activities of the 
Zhu Stronghold temple from 1975 to 1995, and again from 2006 to the present. 
This incident was seen as a challenge to existing power disposition in Zhu Stronghold. 
The Plateau descent group was furious, and they threatened to beat Laizu to death. They saw this 
act as a challenge to the community order and the status of the Plateau descent group. The 
Plateau descent group is the most cohesive descent group of Zhu Stronghold, and is one of the 
strongest descent groups. “Being the first one to light the fireworks symbolizes our status in the 
community. We are the number one,” one villager of the Plateau descent group said. He 
continued, “The incident was a humiliation for our group, and it was unforgivable.” Right after 
the incident, an emergency meeting was held at the home of the president of the Council, 
Shicheng. Representatives of the Council and patriarchs of strong descent groups showed up for 
this meeting. Finally, the next day morning, before the start of the deity procession, an agreement 
was reached based on the understanding that the deity procession of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth day of the first lunar month affected the well-being, safety and prosperity of Zhu 
stronghold in the new year. Any violence that might occur in these two days would bring not 
only bad luck, but also shame to Zhu stronghold as a whole. Leaders of the Plateau descent 
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when Laizu’s youngest son died in a car accident a few days after the Lantern procession. 
Rumors circulated that it was a punishment from the local deity. Members of the Plateau descent 
group agreed that this was a more severe punishment than any violence against Laizu. The 
community order returned to what it was, and local people saw this event as a failed challenge to 
the community order. 
Conflict only happens in limited ways when people take action in the realm of the ritual 
event. Changing the route of procession, changing the order of the troupe, and changing the order 
of lighting fireworks are the actions of conflict. When conflict happens in the realm of ritual 
event, a time to honor the deity, certain behaviors are strictly restricted as a common 
understanding, such as armed fight and killing. Another common understanding is that the ritual 
event cannot be interrupted. These rules and common understandings gain time for local leaders 
to settle the conflict, prevent the event from becoming more serious, and help cool down parties 
involved. In the incident of the 2009 Lantern procession, after the two-day deity procession, the 
immediate threat for violence against Laizu was mitigated, although members of the Plateau 
descent group were still upset. If it had not been for the death of Laizu’s son, the settlement 
could have been an open apology from the side of Grey village to the Plateau descent group in 
the form of a banquet.   
 For the community, this was an attempt from a weaker, yet strengthening village to 
assert its rising power in the community. Grey village was counted as one of the bottom villages 
in the Republican era with poor performance in the economic field. In the past three decades, 
however, a number of villagers gradually succeeded in doing business. Although none of these 
businessmen were among the top businessmen in Zhu Stronghold, the wealth of the village rose 
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Zhu Stronghold, and since 2006, he has established his status in the Council as irreplaceable with 
his knowledge and familiarity with ritual practices and his personal connections with ritual 
specialists, especially spirit mediums. Although no evidence has shown that Laizu plotted the 
incident and no one from Grey village admitted the incident was planned, this incident channeled 
the discontent accumulating in the village over the years.   
 
  This section has pointed out two principles guiding traditional practices in Zhu 
Stronghold since the beginning of the revival movement in the early 1970s. These two principles 
demonstrate the high level of community solidarity and means for dealing with the uncertainty of 
the market economy. Under these two guidelines a particular group dynamic is constructed in 
traditional practices—the coexistence of community coherence and subgroup competition.  On 
the one hand, traditional practices aim to demonstrate the group solidarity through complicated 
and extravagant ritual practices. On the other hand, the community encourages competition for 
leadership and status in ritual order among different groups of leaders, among twenty-three 
villages and among descent groups of a village. The case of Zhu Stronghold shows that conflict 
and competition are not incompatible with group unity. This coexistence ensures the success of 
Zhu Stronghold in building community strength.  
 
[II] The Local Deity and the Spirit Medium 
 
  The above section discusses the social process in ritual practices, and emphasizes the 
secular aspect of community mobilization. This section turns to the other side of the community 
mobilization—the sacred force, in the name of the local deity. These two sides are interrelated 80	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and inseparable in villagers’ minds. One of the above informants stated, “ We are demonstrating 
our solidarity to the local deity. Through demonstrating our solidarity, the local deity is also 
empowered and is more capable of blessing us.” The conscious construction of solidarity through 
traditional practices cannot be mistaken as a pure secular action. Instead, the collective effort to 
construct community strength is based on sacred force.  
  Zhu Stronghold has a system of spirit possession representing the local deity and 
controlling the secret power. Sophisticated systems of spirit possession like the one in Zhu 
Stronghold exist throughout rural China. The system of spirit possession in Zhu Stronghold is 
claimed to be a continuation from late imperial China. The uncommon development of the Zhu 
Stronghold spirit medium is the fact that it did not get destroyed nor interrupted in the 
collectivization period. Spirit mediums were still active at this time, although their performance 
moved to private spaces and responded to private issues, such as sickness and the well-being of 
individuals. Not only were local cadres aware of the activity of the spirit mediums, but some also 
participated in these activities. Xie, a party secretary from the 1950s to 1976, for example, was a 
spirit medium beginning in the 1940s, and he had never stopped serving the local deity until he 
passed away in 2007. None of the spirit mediums had faced political persecution. There were 
particular social, cultural and political arrangements that made this possible. This is out of scope 
of this thesis, however, and will be discussed in a separate paper.  
This section will address two main questions regarding the spirit mediumship: how it 
works? And how does the community control the group of spirit mediums? Before answering 
these questions, I introduce the basic setting of spirit mediumship by looking into the task of the 
spirit medium and who they are. 
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A) Who is the spirit medium? 
 The spirit medium is the representative of the local deity. Each deity picks his own spirit 
medium, and has only one spirit medium. The person that is picked by a deity will experience a 
sickness until he agrees to serve as the spirit medium. The spirit medium picked by a deity is 
able to perform the appropriate rituals in the trance without much training or learning. Most spirit 
mediums are from a lower social class and have little education. It is said that the local deity can 
more easily occupy the body of this kind of person because he or she is less contaminated by a 
literate culture. Unless this spirit medium misbehaves and is deprived of the gift, he serves the 
deity until he dies. Spirit mediums cannot take any material reward from the local people, and 
the punishment for violation of this rule is death. They are responsible for their own living, but 
they cannot freely use their time or move. They need to stay in the village and be on call at all 
times for the use of the local deity. Most spirit mediums remain poor or become further 
impoverished after serving the deity.1 
The task of spirit mediums is two fold. The first is of community nature. The spirit 
medium communicates the local deity’s orders and comments on the community affairs, such as 
how to practice a community ritual, when to hold a pilgrimage, and the prediction of the fortune 
of the community. There are regular possession sessions that the spirit medium announces to the 
local deity’s order, such as the occasion of greeting the return of the local deity on the fourth day 
of the first lunar month. In addition, local leaders can call an emergency sessions when there are 
urgent issues that need advise from the local deity. The above two kinds of sessions are held in 
the temple and everyone can observe. The second task of the spirit medium is private sessions 
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serving local people. People call a spirit medium in trance when they need advice from the local 
deity. It can be held in a community temple or in private home. The most common questions 
range from health and medication of ill people, to the prediction for an investment and the luck 
of the household for the coming year.  
  The group of spirit mediums forms a self-monitoring group, although the group is not 
coherent. The group is structured by seniority but has no leader. The new comer has to be 
approved by the group. When a person claims to be possessed by the deity, it is always 
questioned if he was possessed by a deity or by a wild ghost. After watching the new comer in 
trance, senior spirit mediums can tell if the new comer is truly possessed by the local deity, and if 
so which deity it is. Each deity has his specific gestures and way of talking. It is through these 
gestures and way of talking that the judgment is made. The first few instances of the new 
comer’s possession need to be verified based on the correctness of the prediction. If senior spirit 
mediums still have doubts, they will ask the local deity who they themselves represent.2  
Spirit mediums form a special group that controls secret power. This power can benefit or 
damage Zhu Stronghold as a community, and the secret part of the religious knowledge is 
transmitted within the group. Junior spirit mediums are socialized into the group by hanging out 
with senior spirit mediums and learning the way they handle secret power in their leisure time. 
There is no one coherent group of spirit mediums, however. By the time I did my research, there 
were two main groups of spirit mediums and some other mediums that were peripheral to both 
groups. As for the question of the division between these two main groups, one spirit medium 
said,  
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In our spare time, spirit mediums usually hang out with other spirit mediums. We talk about everything, 
and there are things that are specifically shared only among spirit mediums. This is why we need to 
socialize together. There are about two dozen spirit mediums in Zhu Stronghold. We hang out with those 
who we like more. Some people just have a hard time getting along well... It is just a personal choice, 
nothing about faction. These two groups are certainly not adversaries…Spirit mediums from both groups 
work together when the community needs us. A couple of senior spirit mediums go between these two 
main groups. We know each other very well even we do not hang out with members of the other group 
often.   
I did not sense factions between the two main groups of spirit mediums. In my 
observation, they worked, thought, and talked in a similar way. And I found no evidence of 
conflicts of interests in these two groups. The only thing that can be identified is residential 
affinity. A group is with most mediums living in the north side of Zhu Stronghold, and the other 
group is with most mediums living in the south side of Zhu Stronghold. Mediums from the same 
group cooperate in performing spirit possession more than the others who do not belong to the 
same group. In addition, these two groups of spirit mediums ally with different groups of secular 
leaders, basically leaders of their own villages and descent groups.   
This division of the social group of spirit mediums is a good thing for the local 
government from the other secular leaders’ point of view. In this way, the power of spirit 
mediums is divided because they are not a coherent group with a clear leadership. If a leader’s 
authority is challenged by one spirit medium, he could use a spirit medium from the other group. 
This is a common method that the secular leader of Zhu Stronghold uses to check and balance 
the power of spirit mediums. I will discuss the mechanism to monitor spirit mediums in greater 
detail shortly. In what follows, I turn to the effectiveness of spirit possession, and how and why it 
works. 
 
B) The effectiveness of spirit medium 
When asked why they believe in the efficacy of the local deity, Zhu members all told me 
in almost identical terms that the local deity predicted the future and made orders to preserve and 84	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maintain the vitality of the community. In addition, they also stressed that the local community 
would not have developed and members of Zhu members would not have been economically 
successful without the blessing from the local deity. When I further pressed them on why they 
believed so, most people told me that they had witnessed the efficacy of the local deity through 
spirit possession sessions.   
The community of Zhu Stronghold is based on shared emotion and experience of the 
local deity through the spirit possession session. In contrast to the theory on shared emotion, 
which emphasizes the psychical presence in ritual events, I observe that shared experience of the 
local deity through spirit mediumship does not require the psychical presence as a condition. 
Villagers reported that they experienced the local deity in a similar way through a variety of 
spirit possession sessions. Contrary to Durkheim’s study, however, they did not actually take part 
in the same ritual. To further understand how shared experience is produced without shared 
psychical presence in the same spirit possession session, I analyze the shared experience through 
two layers: individual experiences and the public spirit possession session.  
 
Individual experience of the spirit mediumship 
In Zhu Stronghold, every family has at least one spirit medium that they regularly seek 
for advice. This ranges from curing sickness of a family member to major life decisions, such as 
choice of the future daughter-in-law, career choice, and investment. Through private spirit 
possession sessions, individuals establish a close and intimate relation with the local deity. In 
addition, the participation of the possession session can be indirect by appointing a family 
member, usually parents, to call for a private spirit possession session while the person is away 85	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from home. Informants believed that the local deity is omniscient in knowing everything about 
their life and investments no matter where they are.  
  The spirit possession session is no less an important occasion than the ritual event in 
constructing shared experience. This method is particularly important when people are away 
from home for most of the year. It is not uncommon for young men who just started a business to 
not come home for more than two years in row. The imagined community of Zhu Stronghold is a 
virtual community including all Zhu members no matter where they are and what they do. “Our 
deity stays at home, but he knows the market better than those of us who do business,” one of my 
informant commented.  
In addition to psychological effect, advice given by the local deity is essential in 
formulating an understanding of the relationship between individuality and the collective. 
Personal advice is given that stresses the connection between communal norms and individual 
well-being. This kind of advices defines particular understanding of individuality. An individual 
cannot live without the collective is the message repeatedly emphasized in deity advices. In 
addition, advice further defines one’s social role and responsibility. For example, Marshal 
Huang, the famous local deity who is said to bless the extraordinary success of businessmen of 
the tire repair business, charged nothing from his believers. Instead, in exchange for his advice 
and as a way to accumulate one’s good karma, Marshal Huang instructed his believers to give 
money back to the locality by making donations to other local deities. He gave specific 
instructions to his believers of which particular deity they should donate their money to each 
time, and sometimes even the amount of money they should donate. By not asking anything for 
himself, Marshal Huang defined the act of supporting deity-related activities as one’s 
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obligation as a member of the community. With the example and definition set by Marshal 
Huang, the link between donating money to deity-related activities and economic success cannot 
be interpreted simply as a utilitarian one. It is recognition of an individual limitation and the need 
for a strong community to support an individual. Ritual is a collective effort to build a strong 
community, as I have showed in the previous section.  
  This method also encourages individuals to take responsibility for their own well-being. 
The deity asks for individual contributions to the community before he answers one’s request. In 
this way, the failure of the deity to answer an individual request is usually attributed to the failure 
of the individual to fulfill his communal responsibility. Ones’ fate ends up in one’s hand, as he 
has to work hard enough to fulfill his communal responsibility at the deity’s request.     
 
The Public Spirit Possession Session 
Although my informants emphasized the efficacy of the local deity, after I stayed in the 
community long enough, I realized that no order is made randomly. As I will show below, the 
orders given by the local deity always addresses community issues that have been discussed by 
different social groups. Issues include changes of the political atmosphere, uncertainty about the 
future, changes in the local and national economy, new economic opportunities and disruption of 
the communal order. Furthermore, orders given by the local deity never contradict the 
mainstream opinion on the issue concerned. The sense of effectiveness is produced by 
responding to public concerns through announcements and orders made in the public spirit 
possession session. 
How the public spirit possession session works is the focus of this part. I further divide 
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before the session, and the stage of the possession session. The first stage is a social process that 
different social groups engage in producing consensus and common understanding over public 
concerns. The second stage is to produce a sense of effectiveness that demonstrates the magic 
power of the local deity and to consolidate consensus over public issues. In what follows, I use 
the occasion of greeting the return of the local deity on the fourth day of the first lunar month as 
the example to illustrate two stages of the public spirit possession session. 
 
Stage 1: the Formation of Public Ppinion 
The speculation of the possible announcement on the occasion of greeting the return of 
the local deity, the most important annual public spirit possession session, facilitates the 
formation of public opinion. On that event, the important decision of communal affairs for the 
coming year is announced. With this ritual cycle, the intense discussion of public issues and 
speculation on the possible announcement starts two months before the event. Social groups of 
leaders not only pay close attention to opinions of ordinary villagers, but also engage in shaping 
and forming the public opinion. Furthermore, the primary public concern in the community is the 
well being of the community in the new market economy. The content of the public opinion is an 
attempt to cope with the uncertainty of the market economy through ritual.   
Evaluations of the issues facing the community and speculation on the possible 
announcement commonly vary between different social groups, as they have different concerns 
and different priorities. The weight of the importance of opinions in different groups also differs. 
Informants of spirit mediums and other secular leaders emphasized the heavier weight of the 
opinion of their social groups in shaping the up-coming announcement. For example, the 
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villagers, because their social groups speculated about a pilgrimage to cope with the economic 
downtime. Nonetheless, the announcement was not a surprise for local leaders, especially the 
political elite. On different occasions, different informants from the political elite expressed their 
disagreement that a pilgrimage would be held in the coming year.  
Although the annual announcement is presented through a spirit possession session, I 
observed intensive networks of information and opinion exchange among four dominating social 
groups. Right before the announcement, spirit mediums were busy visiting the political elite and 
the patriarch of the same village and descent group to learn the opinion of the group of the 
political elite and of the patriarch. Spirit mediums also spent more time hanging out with each 
other to exchange information they each collected from their own social network. The intense 
discussion and speculation on the possible announcement in the coming year ceremony serves as 
an important platform for local people not only to express their concerns and opinions, but also 
as activities that arouse strong emotional energy and a sense of solidarity, by viewing their fate 
tied with the fate of the community.  
 
Stage 2: the Public Spirit Possession Session 
The sense of effectiveness is not about the deity responding to the local situation 
according the mainstream opinion, if there is one. Instead, it is a feeling that the local deity is 
concerned about the local situation and guarantees that the community will be fine no matter 
what issue is at stake. Let me continue with the announcement in the ceremony to greet the local 
deity’s return to the community in 2009. Despite the popular speculation for a pilgrimage, in the 
ceremony the local deity did not mention anything about a pilgrimage. Instead, the deity said, 
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each other get through it.” Although this was not exactly what most people expected, the 
announcement did address to concerns and offer a guideline to deal with the issue.  
The spirit possession stage can also be understood as a stage to make a collective 
decision. At this point, one might wonder, would it have made any difference for the 
development of Zhu Stronghold if the community had not used spirit possession as a way to 
make decisions on communal issues? I think so. This process after all is not a transparent, 
democratic one, and the effect of this stage is to make the local deity omniscient and produce a 
sense of the formidability of the local deity. This psychological effect from a spirit possession 
sessions was effective in dealing with uncertainty in a non-democratic political system. 
 
C) Checks and Balances 
  After discussing the effectiveness of the spirit medium possession in reproducing 
community solidarity, this part turns to examine the mechanisms that act as checks and balances 
on the power of spirit mediums. The mechanism of checks and balances is very crucial to 
maintain the order of spirit mediums. Without checks and balances, spirit mediums with 
unconstrained power can not only overturn the other secular leaders in the name of the local 
deity, but can also create chaos in the community, as everyone can claim to be a spirit medium 
and make announcement in the name of the local deity.3  
Zhu Stronghold has three mechanisms to limit the power of spirit mediums: the 
asynchronous cross-examination, the synchronous cross-examination, and the task division 
among spirit mediums. These three mechanisms were part of the local practices of spirit 
possession and were introduced to me by my informants as proof of the efficacy of the local 
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deity. After careful examination, I realize that they are mechanisms to control the magic power 
of spirit mediums. In what follows, I discuss these three mechanisms, starting from the most 
commonly used, the asynchronous cross-examination. 
 
The Asynchronous Cross-examination 
The asynchronous cross-examination is a method to constrain the power of a single spirit 
medium. When a secular leader doubts the order of the local deity, he can call for an emergency 
spirit possession session from another spirit medium that he trusts to see if the answer is the 
same. If the answer is not the same, the original one can be dismissed.  
Note that in this approach the spirit medium who is dismissed does not lose his 
credibility. In addition, in local people’s eyes, dismissing an order by another local deity does not 
hurt the authority of that local deity in general. Instead, the dismissal of the original order just 
means that there are different voices of local deities. To the question about the efficacy of the 
local deity if it speaks in different voices, Laizu answered, 
There are sixty or more deities of different names worshipped in temples in Zhu Stronghold… Without 
doubt all of these local deities are efficacious. But some deities are more powerful than the others in their 
capacity to foresee things. In addition, local deities might have different views on a communal issue. This 
is just like humans having different personalities. Some deities are more aggressive and willing to take 
more risk, while others are more conservative… When they do have a uniform position on a communal 
issue, we know their position must be right. We thus wait until they have a unanimous decision.   
  This understanding of the efficacy of the local deity represents the basic understanding of 
Zhu Stronghold as a community. That is, this is a community of cooperation, not only among 
twenty-three villages, among different social groups of leadership, and among villagers, but also 
among local deities and spirit mediums. Zhu Stronghold temple has two to three spirit mediums 
at a time, and each of village temple has one medium. All the spirit mediums are part of the 
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temples; spirit mediums of Zhu Stronghold temple are not considered in any way more powerful 
than the rest. Under this structure, no one spirit medium could claim to dominate the community.  
  In addition to constraints on the power of a single spirit medium, the asynchronous cross-
examination is also a method to guarantee that voices of different villages and descent groups 
can be heard. Different voices of local deities sometimes can be interpreted as different opinions 
from different social groups over a common issue. In this kind of scenario, dismissing the order 
allows more time for community members to form a view on the issue of the concerned. In no 
way does it challenge or undermine the authority of the local deity, as I will discuss below. For a 
controversial event, it might take years for a unanimous opinion to form, and in the course of 
these years, a couple of orders might have been given and dismissed. This is an important 
process of ritual, as the first order gives people confidence, and the second order acknowledges 
general concerns with the first order. An example from the first request for a pilgrimage 
demonstrates this point.  
 The first request for a pilgrimage was made by a local deity worshipped in Zhu 
Stronghold temple in the mid-1980s, and was turned down by a leader of the Zhu Stronghold 
temple, Laizu. Laizu said that he witnessed the request, and he told the deity that he needed time 
to think about it. He thought that the political risk of holding a pilgrimage was still too high and 
the community was not economically ready for a pilgrimage. He went to ask the spirit medium 
of the Plateau descent group, and the spirit medium said that the time had not come. Laizu went 
back and relayed to the deity that they needed to wait. The deity agreed.  
In this story, a careful reader might ask if Laizu’s going to ask the spirit medium of the 
Plateau descent group meant anything. It does means something. In Laizu’s own words, he said, 
“it was because the deity of the Plateau descent group was very efficacious and if he also agreed, 92	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it must be a right decision.” Yet, if we look into the lineage structure, we will come to another 
interpretation. The Plateau descent group was the strongest and most coherent descent group at 
the time. The efficacy of a descent group deity reflects the power position of the descent group in 
the whole lineage. In addition, in my interpretation, by asking the spirit medium of this particular 
group, Laizu intended to see if the group supported the order. Group members usually backup 
the local deity of the group, even when group members do not unanimously agree with what the 
local deity announces.   
The link between the efficacy of a group deity and the power of the group, and the link 
between the voice of a group deity and the opinion of the group is not my own speculation. In a 
conversation with a spirit medium I commented that a lot of people told me the deity of the 
Plateau descent group was very efficacious and decisions on important communal issues, if not 
announced by this deity, had to be double checked by him. This spirit medium commented, 
The deity of the Plateau descent group is a small deity [meaning, it is not an important god in the Chinese 
pantheon], but the voice of the Plateau descent group is very loud. The group is very tyrannical. The status 
of this group was established in the Republican era, when one of the group members was a middle rank 
governor of the other province. The group since then has a lot to say over public issues and they use their 
deity to make the announcement… I cannot deny that the Plateau descent group is the most coherent 
descent group in Zhu Stronghold, and this is why they can continue stressing the effectiveness of the 
decisions by their deity.    
I found that strong descent groups have deities that people rate as more efficacious, and 
that their spirit mediums are more active than those of weaker groups. Even so, the cross-
examination mechanism still provides room for weaker groups to voice their opinions. 
 
The Synchronous Cross-examination 
The synchronous cross-examination is a means to get a unanimous decision from a 
number of local deities. When there is doubt over an important issue, the Zhu Stronghold temple 
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the decision if it is unanimous. This method is rarely used today. It was used more often in the 
1980s and 1990s when a number of villagers claimed to be a newly possessed spirit medium. It 
was used to expel some new mediums. One senior spirit medium said,  
At that time, almost every week there was a villager who claimed to be possessed by a local deity. Some 
were very persistent and stubborn, even after we told them that they were not possessed by a local deity, 
but by a ghost. To deal with these persistent persons, we called a synchronous cross-examination session. 
When the new medium gave an answer that was different from the rest of us, he lost his credibility, as the 
session was a public performance and everyone was welcome to watch. Afterward, even if he still insisted, 
no villagers would believe in his words and the person had quite.  
From this point on, the important position for the established spirit mediums to maintain 
the order among communal spirit mediums can be observed. As pointed out earlier, spirit 
mediums do not form a coherent group, and there are self-monitoring mechanisms to control the 
group. Synchronous cross-examination is one of them. 
 
The Task Division among Spirit Mediums 
  The division of tasks was first introduced by my informants as a demonstration of the 
magnificence of their deities. It was said that when there was an important ritual event, such as a 
pilgrimage, a number of deities spontaneously took charge of different aspects of the ritual. Their 
were corresponding spirit mediums announced and the arrangement separately. These mediums 
did not talk to each other beforehand, but the arrangements made by different deities fit together 
as a whole plan for the ritual. The mystical aspect of the task division was unveiled when I got to 
know the group of spirit mediums better. A particular local deity had a convention he used to do 
for a particular ritual. This knowledge was not a secret among spirit mediums, and one learned it 
through socializing with senior spirit mediums. The task division is a method to achieve some 
degree of inner coherence among spirit mediums. They have to cooperate with each other, and 
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reaffirms the idea that all local deities of Zhu Stronghold add up to the whole of Zhu Stronghold. 
No one deity and no one spirit medium can claim to monopolize the community. This idea 
constrains the power of single spirit medium and emphasizes cooperation. This is an important 
idea that shapes the concept of the relationship between individuals and the collective. I return to 
this point in the next section.    
 
  This section looked at the system of spirit possession in Zhu Stronghold. The success of 
Zhu Stronghold especially at the beginning of the revival movement in the 1970s has to thank the 
intact system of spirit possession preserved throughout the Maoist period. Individuals learn and 
experience the community through their personal relations with a local deity of their choice 
(usually the deity of one’s natal village). At the collective level, the practice of spirit possession 
generates shared emotions among community members, and is also an important mechanism to 
produce group consensus toward community affairs. In addition, the practice of spirit possession 
also contributes to dynamic process of social interaction that encourages unity and competition, 
as discussed in the previous section. Spirit possession, together with the ritual practices discussed 
in the previous section, form a coherent and consistent understanding of the ideal community. It 
is to this last part that I now turn.  
   
[Ill] The Collective Ideal of Community 
 
  In Zhu Stronghold, the collective ideal of community, commemorative rites, and symbols 
are consistent, and developed jointly in the reform era. The above discussion on ritual practices 
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and symbols. This section gives an overview of the collective ideal of community and symbols, 
as they are part of the major argument and the base for comparison with other two cases. In what 
follows, I briefly list the key concept of symbol and the central ideas of the collective ideal of 
community.   
 
A) The Symbol of Community 
  This part examines how the local deity symbolizes Zhu Stronghold. Conversations with 
my informants over the local deity show two images of the local deity: the omnipotent deity and 
contesting deities. When my informants talked about the spirit possession session in general 
terms, they all said that the local deity of Zhu Stronghold was efficacious and omnipotent, in 
almost identical terms. The spirit possession session was presented as a homogeneous process 
where people of Zhu Stronghold only accept and follow the deity’s orders. When my informants 
started telling stories of the spirit possession session, that of refuted orders, expelled spirit 
mediums, and different degrees of magic power of local deities, the image of one omnipotent 
deity was replaced by a number of deities that might contradict themselves, have different 
personalities, and compete for the domination of the locality. For my informants all these aspects 
of the local deity did not undermine their vision of the omnipotent local deity that they first 
presented to me. 
  In the beginning, it was odd that the contesting image of the local deities did not 
undermine the homogenous version of the omnipotent deity. After having a deeper 
understanding of the community, I realized that these two images of the local deity are the dual 
side of the community that local people experience. On the one hand, community members 
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usage is a general term that includes all deities worshipped in the territory of Zhu Stronghold, 
which amounts to at least sixty deities. No one deity can monopolize Zhu Stronghold, and Zhu 
Stronghold is the summation of all of them. On the other hand, a power struggle among different 
social groups is the experience of the community life, and the contesting image of the local 
deities reiterates this experience. Each deity has its own name, has its own place to be 
worshipped, is represented by a particular spirit medium, and has different magic power.   
  In addition to the duality of community, the symbol of the local deity gives weaker 
groups an opportunity to be heard and to transgress the existing order. The rise of the Plateau 
descent group in the Republican period is a good example. The Plateau descent group was 
formed in the late nineteenth century and it did not come to power until the 1930s. The dominant 
power of the Plateau descent group in the local politics is mainly portrayed through the magic 
power of the group deity, which was said to be worshipped by the group since 1888. Since the 
1930s, important communal issues had to be double checked with the group deity of the Plateau 
descent group, and the group deity was included in the communal ritual. The struggle over 
secular domination was little mentioned in today’s recount to the rise of the Plateau descent 
group. The transgression of the communal ritual was better accepted in the symbol of the local 
deity, as humans had little power to intervene and predict mysterious power.  
 
B) The Collective Ideal of Community 
  This part outlines the collective ideal of community in Zhu Stronghold. I first divide the 
collective ideal of community into two categories: symbolic relations and social relations. 
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means to individuals and one’s responsibility to the community. Social relations refer to how one 
relates to the others in the community.   
  I start from outlining two ideas on what the community means to individuals: the virtue 
community of morality and the pre-existence of the community. The first idea is that Zhu 
Stronghold is not only a community with actual territorial boundaries, but also a virtuous 
community of morality. This virtuous community includes all Zhu members no matter where 
they are or what they do in their life. No matter what one does outside the community, everyone 
in the community has to obey the same rule. “Our deity stays at home, but he monitors our 
behavior no matter where we go,” one of my informant commented.    
The community of morality, however, is particular and exclusive, and the moral rule does 
not apply equally and universally to outsiders. Although there is no evidence to show that the 
local deity encourages or approves amoral behaviors of members outside the community, the 
local deity does not say a word about these behaviors. A small businessman in his late fifties 
once talked about the early experiences of Zhu businessmen, especially those with low social 
ranking.  
There were not very glorious stories of the beginnings of Zhu businessmen. Back in the 1980s, some of us 
were poor and wondering on the street of industrial cities. They ended up robbing passengers on the street, 
and this was the first step of their accumulation for capital. With some money, they went and bought 
counterfeit products, such as watches, and sold them on the street. They changed their selling location 
everyday so customers could not come back and hold them to be responsible for their products. After a 
while, when they accumulated enough money, they rented a small shop in a mall and started a real 
business. For example, they sold real watches at a fair price… This is the story of my generation…   
What struck me most when I learned this story was not the content but the neutral voice 
of this informant. There was no apology, and he was not ashamed of telling this story. It was just 
a story about how things worked in the 1980s, and he thought that I should know it. The story 
shows that Zhu members were not concerned with transgressing the law, especially operating in 
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  The comment on Zhu businessmen by Shicheng, the president of Zhu Stronghold temple 
Council and a retired elementary school teacher, who has never engaged in doing business 
outside the community, further demonstrates the exclusive nature of this virtuous community of 
morality.  
Zhu members could be very brutal and uncivilized when they did business outside the community. Over the 
years, I heard stories about the misbehavior of Zhu members outside the community. When I met these 
people, however, no matter in the community, on the conflict-solving meeting, or on the fundraising trip to 
cities where Zhu businessmen cluster, they respect me, and treat me very well… This is one characteristic 
of Zhu businessmen. They always remember to obey community norms when they are in the community.  
Shichen’s comment might over exaggerate the level of obedience of Zhu members to the 
community rules, but it does illustrate the particularity of morality in Zhu Stronghold.  
The second idea on what the community means to individuals is the pre-existence of the 
community. The community pre-exists before any individual in the community. One cannot live 
without the community. An individual has limitations, and can only prosper with the support of a 
strong community and the protection from the efficacious local deity.  
As for one’s obligation to the community, the idea is that one is obligated to build 
community strength and one has to make contributions according to his social status and 
capacity. One’s contribution to the community will come back and affect one’s fate and social 
status in the community. Therefore, one’s fate and prosperity is in one’s hand, even though the 
community has the obligation to protect it members. 
  As for one’s relations to the other community members, there are three ideas. The first 
idea is that social relations are based on power disposition. The person with higher social status 
is entitled to more power and privilege in the community. The second principle is the 
interdependence among every community member. Although the community encourages power 
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social group and individual, no matter how weak or poor, is included. The powerful and 
wealthier persons and groups have more responsibility toward the community and toward the 
weak groups and poor persons. Being in the group can in itself be a contribution that these weak 
groups and poor persons make. The weak groups and poor persons might contribute more in the 
future as they grow stronger. This last point brings out the third idea: social status is not 
unchangeable. One should work for his family and the social groups that he belongs to.  
 
[IV] The Honor System 
	 ﾠ
The perfect match among the collective ideal of community, commemorative rites, and 
symbols, which I just illustrated above, has developed into a system that structures one’s 
responsibility, obligation, role and status in the community. This system covers economic, 
political, social and religious aspects. I call this the honor system, for the community order is 
structured around reputation. People compete with each other for higher social status by 
engaging in communal affairs. Zhu businessmen’s behavior and business model is underpinned 
by the motive for a better reputation by making donations to community affairs, especially deity-
related activates. What one has done for the community is translated into reputation, and one’s 
social status is ranked according to the amount of momentary contribution he makes to the 
community. In return, one’s social status defines responsibility, obligation, and role to the 
community and his following villagers.  
  The honor system formed when the first few businessmen of Zhu Stronghold were 
involved in deity-related activities through monetary contribution in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The formation of the honor system is related to the spirit mediums. The advice given by 
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activities. Gradually, the honor system has developed into an independent, sophisticated system 
that centers on the business class. This section will first discuss practices and logics of donation 
to temple activities, the foundation of the honor system. Next, I will turn to the business class, 
their involvement in communal affairs, and the current honor system.  
 
A) Donation of Temple Activities 
  To understand the ranking of social status in Zhu Stronghold, one only needs to go to the 
community temple and look at the list of donations. From the top to the bottom, names are 
arranged according to the amount of money one donated to the temple, from the most to the 
least. The social status of community members and the ranking of the wealth among Zhu 
businessmen correspond to this list. Comparing lists of donation from the 1980s to the present 
for various deity related activities, the ranking of donations has been consistent in the way that 
none makes a large one-time contribution. People move forward and backward gradually in their 
business performance. Building on one’s reputation is a long-term investment that requires 
constant and consistent effort. It is this kind of consistency that makes the social structure of Zhu 
Stronghold stable and predicable. In contrast, in the other two communities of this study, people 
make a large one-time contribution. In these scenarios, a donation is a reflection of personal 
belief, and a show-off of personal wealth in some cases. Social status is not as closely 
determined by the amount of the donation one contributes. The amount of money one donates to 
the community temple can vary from year to year without consistency and predictability. In what 
follows, I use the list of donations of the Pure Mountain temple, the new temple that was 
dedicated to Marshal Huang in 1997 to demonstrate the operational aspect of the donation.  101	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The expenditure of the new Pure Mountain temple exceeded one million RMB (in a 
village of 2000 population). The patriarch, Bao, who managed the construction project of the 
Pure Mountain temple explained to me how one knows how much he needs to donate: 
First of all, as leaders of the construction project we needed to budget how much the project needs. We also 
had an idea knowing how much the common household can afford at the time. The common household was 
expected to donate somewhere between one thousand RMB and five hundred RMB. Subtracting the 
estimated project expenditure and the amount of money we expected from the common household, we then 
knew the expected contribution from the wealthier persons of the village. After that, I first went to talk to 
Tamei (the wealthiest businessman of the village) and tell him how much we need from the rich. He very 
quickly promised to give 220,000—about one-third of the money I told him. After talking to him, I went to 
talk to his younger brother, Tanong (the second wealthiest businessmen of the village). Tanong asked me 
how much his older brother, Tamei, donated. I told him 220,000. He then said he would donate 200,000. 
This is always how things work here. The sibling order is important. Tanong would never dare to donate 
more money than Tamei.  
I donated seventy thousand RMB. My four sons, who were in the tire repair business paid for it. This set 
the bar for the other businessmen. It was about ten to twenty thousand RMB per businessman, which I 
thought was a reasonable amount given the good fortune they had at the time.  
As for the problem of offending the other by donating money more than one’s social statues, Bao 
explained,   
This problem is usually taken care of by the patriarch who is in charge of fund raising. He should tell the 
person not to do so and he should tell the person the appropriate amount of money he can contribute. This 
issue can be very sensitive when it comes to lineage politics. Usually people from strong descent groups 
more easily feel offended than people from weaker descent groups. As a leader, I will go and ask people 
from strong descent groups first.  
In the honor system, there are social and economic consequences for individual not acting 
accordingly. As Bao put it, 
Villagers would gossip if one paid less than he was expected. Villagers would speculate that that person is 
not doing well in his investment. You do not want people to speculate, especially when you need to take 
out a loan and invite your fellow businessmen to have a share in your business. Therefore, we sometimes 
even say that you need to donate more when you are losing money. It is not only to ask for blessing from 
the deity, but also to convince your fellow villagers to continue loaning you money, which you would need 
for the next year. 
Social and economic consequences explain individual strategic adherent to the honor system. 
Nonetheless, the most formidable consequence of not following the honor system is punishment 
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honor system, the opposite side of individual strategic use of the honor system. This expresses 
the pre-existence of the community before the individual and the sacredness of the community.  
 
The Pre-existence of the Community 
  The pre-existence of the community is the base of the honor system. Reputation only 
matters in the community. No matter how great a reputation one accrues, it means nothing if the 
community collapses. This point has been noticed by Zhu members, especially by Zhu 
businessmen. This is why Zhu members devote considerable effort in building strength and 
solidarity in a community-wide effort. In addition, this is the very reason that enables Zhu 
members to compete in the same business and still be a community.  
Looking at the stele in the Pure Mountain temple, Shu, a middle-age businessman of tire 
repair business, explained his business relations with the names on the stele. There were people 
who took advantage of him because he came from the weakest branch of Downhill village, the 
Five-son branch. He did not hesitate to express his resentment toward these people. He continued 
with stories of conflicts between the Seven-son branch and the Eight-son branch over the tire 
repair business. Listening to his stories and hearing of his resentment toward his fellow villagers, 
I asked him how, if they hated each other so much, could they construct the Pure Mountain 
temple together as a community. Shu was shocked by this question, for it never occurred to him. 
After pausing for a moment, he said,  
After all, we are a community… No matter how much we flight with each other, we, as Zhu members, 
never forget that we are a community. When it comes to things that demonstrate our community, we are 
more than willing to put aside our resentment toward each other and present our community as a strong 
one. 
The honor system has individual and the collective sides. The donation stele is the best 
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in stone reminded Downhill villagers that they are a community. Nonetheless, names inscribed in 
an order that reflects social status reminded them of each others’ social position and reputation. 
Everyone is both an independent individual that is responsible for his own achievement, and a 
member of the community that is responsible for the success of the community. As an individual, 
one competes to be ranked as high as possible. As a member of a community, it is one’s duty to 
promote the rank of Zhu Stronghold in neighboring communities. Resentments and old 
adversaries are not forgotten or forgiven. Resentment motivates an individual to work hard to be 
as rich as he can. Meanwhile, the pre-existence of the community before the individual mitigates 
the resentment when it comes to community affairs.   
This honor system applies to everyone in Zhu Stronghold. The logic of the honor system, 
weighing more on economic achievement than the others, promotes a particular life path of Zhu 
members. More than seventy percent of the local people between the ages of twenty and forty 
have an education equivalent to high school or below. They started to work between the age of 
fifteen and eighteen, and got married around twenty. They worked at their relatives’ shops or 
companies and tried to start up their own business upon collecting enough money for the start-
up. “Everyone’s ultimate goal is to be the boss,” a number of different Zhu members repeatedly 
said. 
The honor system has developed from a ranking system of donations for temple activities 
to a system of social status that determines the life path of every Zhu member and structures 
communal activities, whether it is related to deity worship or not. It works by actualizing the 
collective ideal of the community that I discussed in the last section. The center of the honor 
system is the businessmen, and the top businessmen emerge as a particular class of local leaders. 
In what follows, I turn to the business class and the current honor system.  104	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b. The Business Class 
The business class refers to the group of businessmen who are leaders of the rest of 
businessmen, and who lead the local development. This is a self-identified group that is made 
explicit in practice through extravagant rituals of eating, drinking, and gift exchange. On the 
dinner table, they exchange business information and gossip about local politics, and they talk 
about initiation of public projects and temple affairs of Zhu Stronghold. In recent years, all the 
public project ideas originated at the dinner table, and the business class is new emergent leader 
of Zhu Stronghold.    
  How can one be included in the business class? This is a social group that one can start to 
participate by inviting other established Zhu businessmen for drinks and dinner. In return, they 
would invite this person next time when they host a gathering. However, the money one can 
afford determines one’s popularity in this group. In local standards, the host must spend at least 
one to two thousand RMB per guest in a gathering. A few businessmen suggested to me that a 
minimum amount of ten million RMB (of net worth) is the threshold to be able to afford the 
expenditure. About three hundred Zhu members have assets more than ten million RMB, and a 
Zhu member having total assets of hundred million RMB ranked himself somewhere between 
the fifty and sixty richest in Zhu Stronghold. The business class is not a uniform group and there 
are sub-grouping in these businessmen. The grouping transcends the descent group and village 
boundary. Toward the core of the group, wealth is the most important criterion.  
  The leadership of the business class started from their involvement in public good 
provision projects. Fundraising of these projects relies on the same operational logic as 
fundraising for temple activities. One project leader explained how he raised funds, 
I first estimated the budget for the project and then called a fundraising meeting, inviting wealthy Zhu 
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about the fundraising meeting to which they were invited. We agreed on the amount of money that they 
would contribute, and on the fundraising meeting when I asked people to voluntary donate money for the 
project, these two businessmen were the first two persons who shout out the money that they would donate. 
This method is used in all public projects in Zhu Stronghold. The two businessmen must be persons who 
rank in the middle of all businessmen. They serve as standard for the rest to determine how much they are 
expected to donate… Everything has an order in Zhu Stronghold. It is never a question of whether the rich 
want to participate in the public project. But, it is a question of how to act according to your social status. 
As a project leader, you have to help set up standards for members.  
  Their involvement in public good provision projects started in the mid-1980s, and started 
from building local elementary schools. Not long after, the business class was involved in local 
development projects, and since then local development has become the most important task the 
business class assigned to themselves. Unlike most rich in China who rush to leave their rural 
hometown and move to the city permanently, Zhu members return to invest after earning their 
initial economic capital elsewhere. A township official commented that compared to neighboring 
communities,    
Zhu businessmen invested to develop local industry. The local area lacked the condition for industry. There 
were little flat lands, and most lands were small hills. Zhu businessmen invested in flattening the land and 
reclaiming land from sea. In the past twenty years, they gained more than three thousand acres. 
Although the project was of a business nature, local people understood it as a social welfare 
project for the community. These projects were completed through stock sharing. Every member 
was eligible to attend, while businessmen were expected to invest. The project of land 
reclaimation from sea in 1987 was high risk because of the technological backwardness at the 
time, and the major shareholders were in the tire repair business. Later on, with more mature 
technology and experiences in developmental projects, it was deemed less risky and about one 
fifth of the household joined. The new industrial zone in the territory of Zhu Stronghold is set in 
these lands.  
  The business class manages the local community as both a charity for local people and a 
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and have yearly returns after the project is making money. In addition, every community 
member, no matter if he is the shareholder of the project or not, can use the service at a price far 
lower than the market value. For example, an ongoing project is to develop a mountain area into 
a giant cemetery that can accommodate one thousand graves. Community members can buy in at 
a low price, while outsiders are charged at the market rate, which is about five to ten times more 
than what local people pay. In addition, a new project circulating among the business class is to 
build a nursing home to take care of aging community members at a low price and to charge 
outsiders the market price.  
  The business class is significantly different from leaders of temple activities, the patriarch 
and the spirit medium. Party cadres of younger generations do participate in the activity of the 
business class, and most of them also self-identify as businessmen. Note that although 
businessmen have close relation with the spirit medium, they do not participate in temple 
activities. Their main contribution is financial support for temple activities. Therefore, as they 
become more and more important in leading community affairs through public good provision 
and local development projects, the honor system is adjusted accordingly. 
  The main adjustment is the loss of primacy of the spirit medium in the honor system. The 
spirit mediumship is becoming less important in helping to decide community affairs. It is also 
no longer visible in fundraising process. As I pointed out earlier, at the initial stage, through the 
spirit medium, the local deity directly requested individual businessmen to make donations to 
temple activity, and also suggested the amount of money they should donate. Currently, the spirit 
mediumship and the local deity no longer part take in the fundraising process, especially public 
projects led by the business class. Neither does the business class ask the local deity about the 
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logics of social status, and the public project is designed according to the vision of the 
community by the business class.  
  Although I just pointed out that the spirit mediumship is losing its primacy in determining 
public projects and public affairs irrelevant to temple activity, the collective is not losing its 
primacy. The symbol of the local deity and the idea of the pre-existence of the community are 
still at the center of maintaining the honor system. The collective ideal of the community is by 
and large the same as what I outline in the last section, although local people no longer need the 
frequent involvement of the local deity through the spirit possession session to provide 
confidence in their secular activities. I argue that this is because the honor system in itself can 
produce and reproduce their collective identity and confidence. Businessmen, therefore, find 
more freedom in responding and adjusting to rapid changing economic situations by relying less 
on the spirit medium.   
 
Conclusion 
The case of Zhu Stronghold demonstrates the effectiveness and utility of traditional 
practices in the new market economy. This case shows that the utility of local tradition is based 
on cultural logics and ideas that cannot be easily formed or overturned. Cultural logics and ideas 
of the community are realized through ritual practices. Based on local cultural logics and ideas, 
the key goal of ritual practices in Zhu Stronghold is to demonstrate community solidarity and 
particular social processes. Ritual realizes this goal. The coexistence of community unity and 
subgroup competition is at the center of the social process, and it is what gives community 
members vitality in responding to new economic opportunities.  108	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
The perfect match between traditional practices and business patterns in the reform era 
Zhu Stronghold raises the question of what is required for a local tradition to be effective. Can 
Zhu Stronghold serve as the model to explain failure of other cases? I will come back to this 
question in the concluding chapter. Here I would like to end this chapter by summarizing three 
main characteristics of Zhu Stronghold that distinguish it from the other two cases: the 
integration between the social and cultural processes of traditional practices, the built-in 
solidarity in the social process of traditional practices, and the coexistence of group unity and 
subgroup competition.   
The social and cultural processes of traditional practices develop hand in hand. As this 
chapter shows, the collective ideal of community, commemorative rites, and symbols are 
consistent and coherent. Furthermore, the social process of traditional practices is an integrated 
part of the social structure. In particular, the honor system developed out of traditional practices 
structures social relations and forms the base for successful business patterns in Zhu Stronghold.  
In the case of Zhu Stronghold, solidarity is produced and reproduced through conscious 
construction by community members. Solidarity is built into the social process of ritual practices, 
particularly through complex and extravagant practices that require full collective mobilization 
in the community. Solidarity is not a psychological state resulting in a ritual that has nothing to 
do with secular life. The social process contributing to group solidarity extends outside the ritual 
event, and includes the formation of consensus of community affairs, as well as the preparation 
of the ritual event (such as raising the funds and arranging routes of a pilgrimage).   
The case of Zhu Stronghold also shows the coexistence of community unity and 
subgroup competition. The chapter shows the effectiveness of this kind of group dynamic in 
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networks for business results in intensive inner conflicts as group members cluster and compete 
in the same business. With such intensive inner conflicts, the group is very like to face the threat 
dissolution. However, Zhu Stronghold has never faced this kind of crisis in the reform era. I 
argue that three factors result in the vitality and stability of the community: first, the coexistence 
of community unity and subgroup competition is promoted and internalized with sets of cultural 
logics; second, group tension is balanced and channeled through arrangement in ritual practices; 
third, the honor system formalizes this particular kind of group dynamic in daily life.   
 Within the single case of Zhu Stronghold, the above three characteristics—the 
integration between the social process and cultural process of traditional practices, the built-in 
solidarity in the social process of traditional practices, and the coexistence of group unity and 
subgroup competition—explains the success of Zhu Stronghold. The other two cases lack these 
three characteristics and are less successful in term of their community strength and wealth of 
community members. I will revisit these three characteristics in the concluding chapter and 
discuss if they are the necessary conditions for a strong community or for a community to 
successfully adapt to the market economy.  
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Chapter Four: West Mountain—A New Community in the Making 
 
  This chapter tells a story about a community reviving and modifying an old 
commemorative rite to form a new community in the face of new challenges in the reform era. 
Historically, West Mountain was a fragmented region without unified identity. Starting from the 
decollectivization in 1983, within thirty years, a new collective identity, including villagers of six 
administrative units, was well established. In addition, traditional practices, namely deity 
worship and ancestral worship, were the base to maintain social order in the community. For out-
migrant workers, the majority of the community today, local tradition provides a hometown 
identity that has symbolic meanings for their daily struggle outside the local community. 
Hometown identity, represented by the local deity and the common ancestor, had little effect in 
preventing locals from breaking with the community. Decisions to move in and out of the local 
community are based on a rational calculation of economic interests and opportunities in the new 
market economy.  
  The case of West Mountain is an example of local tradition having no utility in the 
economic sphere. Economic decisions are based on rational calculation; local tradition provides 
no specific instruction on economic behavior. In addition, lineage networks are of little use in 
economic ventures. Other than locating a job at factories, there is little collaboration among 
relatives. Furthermore, traditional organizations, such as the lineage organization and the temple 
council, have nothing to do with economic activities.  
  To understand the limitation of cultural utility—the main inquiry of this study—this 
chapter examines the social and cultural processes of the religious revival in the West Mountain 
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 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
migratory force of the new market economy, hollowing out the community; and the collective 
ideal of community that contrasts lineage identity against collective identity thus weakening the 
community strength.  
  The first cause of the limitation—the migratory force of the new market economy—is 
common in rural communities. Market forces have been driving people out of the villages to the 
cities in order to look for work. The result is a hollowing out of the village populations, and the 
transformation of these villages from places of residence to symbolic hometowns. Others have 
argued that this results in the dissolution of rural communities, for villagers are no longer 
confined and live regularly in their natal villages (i.e. Chen 2009; Yan 2009).  
  The second cause of limitation is a problematic ideal of community. In West Mountain, 
the collective ideal of community criticizes group differentiation and treats it as incompatible 
with the collective identity. This framework makes community integration harder, for group 
differentiation is undeniable and impossible to eliminate in the short run. In addition, this 
framework also leaves the community symbols—the community deity Lord Grace—open to 
interpretation, and results in little connection between the symbol and community order. 
  In the case of West Mountain, I argue that it is the combination between the market 
economy and a problematic ideal of community that leads to weak community solidarity and 
limited cultural utility. I argue that the market economy along does not necessarily lead to the 
decline of community strength. This claim is supported by the case of Zhu Stronghold, as Zhu 
Stronghold is able to make the best use of the market economy and maintains community 
strength and prospers collectively in the reform era.  
  In explaining the limitation of community strength, I do not mean to deny the 
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egalitarianism. This new collective ideal of community is taken to heart among the younger 
generation, namely people who are born after 1960, who experience their early adulthood in the 
market economy. It also helps the younger generation to shift their identity from lineage to 
hometown, and prioritize friendship over blood ties. In addition, this new collective ideal of 
community was realized in West Mountain after 2005, when no more than one-third of registered 
residents lived in the local community. Thus, I claim a new egalitarian community was 
established in West Mountain. 
  This chapter is organized into five sections exploring the story of the transition of the 
local community through the revival of traditional practices. These five sections are arranged 
chronologically, while they also intersect with analytical categories. The first section discusses 
how villagers of the Lu lineage of West Mountain used traditional practices to deal with the 
legacy of the fragmented and stratified groupings of the Lu lineage in the 1980s. This section is 
also the first stage of the revival movements that focused on lineage. The second section turns to 
a discussion of the transition to the construction of the West Mountain identity through a revival 
of a temple procession in 1993. The revival of the Procession in 1993 marked the start of the 
second stage of revival movements that centered on a new collective identity based on deity 
worship. The third section and fourth section discuss two separate processes—social and 
cultural—in the second stage of the revival movement from 1993 to the present. The third 
section examines the effect of the modified temple procession and the newly constructed 
collective ideal of community on community unification. The fourth section evaluates the effect 
of the newly constructed ideal of community on the local culture. The fifth section turns to the 
present and shows what kind of community West Mountain is becoming now after thirty years of 
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[I] From Fragmented Groups to a Multi-Village Ritual Alliance  
	 ﾠ
  The revival movement in West Mountain started from ancestral worship and expanded to 
include deity worship. This section focuses on villages of the Lu surname and shows that the 
revival movement started as a bottom-up request of peasants and patriarchs to revive the local 
customs of the republican era based on ancestral worship. Not long after, there was an attempt by 
the local cadre to build a new ritual alliance that unified fragmented groupings of Lu surname. 
These new ritual alliances attempted to deal with the local past as a highly stratified and 
contesting region.  
  Although they had remarkable success in building new alliances, this section also shows 
that villages of the Lu surname were never unified as a community through ancestral worship. 
The closest one was the local deity temple—the Temple of Benevolence—which was 
successfully established as a temple of the Lu lineage. The story does not stop here. The Temple 
was further developed into a community-wide temple of West Mountain, which is discussed in 
the next section.  
  This section unfolds chronologically and demonstrates the process of building a unified 
community. Part A outlines the basic lineage structure and the composition of the community 
before the reform era. Part B focuses on the revival of ancestral worship of the villages of the Lu 
surname, and demonstrates the construction of a new ritual alliance that goes beyond the 
confines of genealogical order. Part C turns to the construction project of the Temple of 
Benevolence and shows how villages of the Lu surname mobilized together to complete the 
project. Although the construction project was a success, the Lu lineage did not become a unified 
community, for the committee of the reconstruction project failed to transform into a regular 
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A) The Lu Lineage before the Reform Era 
Lineage groups in West Mountain exemplify a cluster of single surname villages that 
developed according to lineage logics. The genealogy order is clear and straightforward among 
groups of local people. Every natural village is a lineage branch, and the relationship among 
villages is determined by genealogical order.1 This part outlines the basic lineage structure of the 
Lu lineage, and introduces the major modifications after the establishment of the PRC—namely, 
a new layer added to the administrative unit for inter-village alliance.   
According to genealogical records, the founding father of the Lu lineage migrated to 
West Mountain, in the late thirteenth century. Before the Lu family settled in the area, people of 
six other surnames lived there. By the turn of the nineteenth 19
th century, the Lu lineage became 
the dominant lineage in the local area. The Lu lineage controlled the best arable land along Gold 
River. Because of the limited flat land, each settlement could only sustain a limited population. 
With population growth, people moved to nearby undeveloped areas, which later developed into 
a new village. By the first half of the 20
th century, the Lu lineage developed into more than fifty 
natural villages—the smallest one had only one household with less than ten people, and the 
largest one had about three hundred people.  
  Village stratification corresponded to the lineage branch. The Lu lineage was divided into 
two major branches, the Peace branch and the Steel branch. Banyan village, located at the center 
of Gold River, and the wealthiest village, and other Lu villages located in the east and south side 
of Banyan village belong to the Steel branch. The Eastside administrative unit, adjacent to 
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1 For example, one of the sons of the first ancestor settled in A village. Later on, after three generations, because of 
population growth, a male of the fifth generation moved to B village and started a new branch. A few generations 
later, a male migrated from B village to C village and started a new branch. The genealogical order among these 
three villages, in local’s term, is that B village is a son village of A village, and C village is a son village of B 
village. Therefore, B village and C village are closer genealogically than A village and B village, or than A village 
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Banyan village in the east, and the other Lu villages residing in the west and north side of the 
Eastside administrative unit belong to the Peace branch. Most families of the Steel branch owned 
land, while families of the Peace branch were tenants of the Steel branch or paper makers who 
resided close to the mountain that grew bamboo.  
As a highly stratified community, the Peace branch and the Steel branch were in constant 
conflict, and there was no unified lineage council for the entire Lu lineage. The Peace branch and 
the Steel branch did not hold joint rituals. They both worshipped the founding father of the Lu 
lineage at the grave, but they worshipped him separately on different days. Within the Peace 
branch and the Steel branch, although each branch worshipped the founding-fathers of each 
branch together, no branch council was formed. What did exist were the village councils, and the 
multi-village council (the largest one involving four villages). For example, the successful 
overseas Chinese of Banyan village organized a village council that managed village affairs that 
was restricted to Banyan village. In other words, although blood ties were the logic of social 
interaction, the Lu lineage was not an integrated community.   
With the implementation of the agricultural collectivization in the 1950s, land was 
redistributed to close-by villages. The amount of land per-person owned was about the same 
after the redistribution, although the quality of the land differed. For example, Banyan village 
lost more than sixty percent of their land, although the village still occupied the best land of West 
Mountain.  
The new administrative unit created a new type of social interaction. The commune 
(equivalent to the township government) distributed resources and responsibilities in the unit 
brigade (equivalent to the administrative unit). Within a brigade, resources and responsibilities 
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brigade. The administrative unit expanded the scope of village interaction and coordination. In 
addition, villages belonging to different brigades had little chance of interaction with each other, 
regardless of the agnatic affinity.   
Kinship identity at the village level was maintained and strengthened in the new political 
system. The basic unit of the new political system was the production team. The production team 
was formed on the basis of the village, unless a village was too small to form a production team. 
To compete for economic and political resources, the village with more production teams formed 
a stronger alliance, which had a greater advantage. Worship of a common ancestor of a village 
was the ground for the alliance.  
Ancestral worship at the grave was the basic form of commemorative rites in the 
collectivization period. Each household worshipped their ancestor of three generations with other 
households who shared the same ancestor. Beyond three generations, worship was considered 
illegal so the grave was visited secretly. The production team leader had the obligation to 
organize worship at the graves of their common ancestors. He sent two to three male members to 
clean graves and provide sacrifices at graves in the first lunar month. It took two days for a 
production team to worship all their major common graves. No ancestral worship above the 
village level was practiced. 
 
B) Reviving Ancestral Worship 
  As the previous part pointed out, ancestral worship is the base for group alliance in West 
Mountain. Therefore, it is not surprising that the revival movement in West Mountain started 
from the practice of public rituals at graves. The scale started from ancestral worship within a 
village and then extended to inter-village ancestral worship. Ancestral worship within a village 117	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was practiced largely as what it was in the republican era, while some practices of inter-village 
ancestral worship are a new creation in the reform era to adjust to new social organization and 
political arrangement. The production team leader was the leader at the initial stage, and lisheng2 
(Confucian ritual specialists, or masters of rites) instructed the ritual process, for they kept the 
ritual book passed down for generations that recorded ritual procedure, ranging from private 
ritual (such as wedding and funerals) to public ritual (such as temple festivals and procession). 
Later on, party cadres (retired or not) got involved in the revival movement and emphasized new 
alliances based on new political landscapes. In sum, the revival of ancestral worship in the 1980s 
and 1990s not only revived the local custom and alliances in the pre-PRC period, but also formed 
new alliances that broke through the genealogical confinement.  
  This part discusses the process to revive ancestral worship. It takes Puddle village of the 
Eastside administrative unit as the primary example. The revival of ancestral worship in Puddle 
village began in 1984 when the household contract responsibility system was implemented. As 
pointed out in the previous section, in the collectivization period, the production team leader had 
the obligation to organize worship at the graves of common ancestors. In 1983, as one of the 
three production leaders of Puddle village at the time recalled, three of the production leaders 
discussed and agreed that there was little political risk to publicly reviving ancestral worship of 
the common ancestor of the village. By the end of 1983, they began to consult elders, and they 
called a meeting at the beginning of 1984 to announce the revival of ancestral worship as the 
local custom in the republican period. The production team leader recalled that villagers looked 
forward to reviving their local custom. There was no objection on this decision. In fact, some 
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descent groups had already revived grave sweeping since the turn of the 1980s.  
In 1984, grave-sweeping activity was revived under the instruction of lishen. According 
to local tradition as practiced in the Republican period, grave sweeping was held between the 
sixteenth day of the first lunar month and the fifteenth day of the second lunar month. After the 
Chinese New Year, the elders arranged dates for grave sweeping activity. The activity started 
from the closest ancestor to the founding father of Puddle village, and would visit one generation 
each day, meaning two or three graves if the male ancestor had two wives. For each grave, all 
households that had a share took turns in hosting the ritual. The host household needed to 
prepare sacrifices and hold a banquet for all attendants after the ritual. One male member of each 
household from the rest of the households had to attend the ritual and join the banquet. On 
average, each household visited ten to fifteenth ancestral graves. 
  Starting from 1984, grave sweeping activity ended with a ritual whereby all households 
of Puddle village gathered at the village ancestral hall to offer sacrifice to all ancestors of the 
village. A lisheng told me that this was a newly added ritual in the reform era to deal with the 
destruction of some graves in the late 1950s as a result of a political campaign to move graves on 
arable land to the mountains. Some graves were left without any caretaker and ended up being 
demolished. In local understanding, the spirit of deceased ancestors resides in the grave and the 
ancestral hall. Each village has an ancestral hall. Some graves were destroyed or forgotten about, 
and the final ritual of the grave sweeping activity was to ensure that every ancestor of the village 
was properly worshipped and given sacrifice. Although some elders recalled that the concluding 
ritual had existed in the republican era, they all agreed with the lisheng on the rationale for this 
concluding ritual. 
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ancestral hall, which was took place annually on the fifteenth day of the first lunar month. The 
revival was initiated by a lisheng who pointed out this custom in the ritual book, and seconded 
by the elder who remembered participating this ritual in the republican period. Male villagers 
offered sacrifice and incense in the village ancestral hall and did the dragon and tiger dance. 
They marched to the ancestral hall of Big House village, the village from which the founding 
father of Puddle village migrated, to offer incense. Afterwards, they marched to West Mountain 
market, performed dragon and tiger dances on the street, and marched back to the village 
ancestral hall.  
Informants of Puddle village are proud of being the first village in West Mountain that 
revived the annual parade of the village ancestral hall. Before 1949, only a few strong villages 
practiced the annual parade of the village ancestral hall. This was an act to demonstrate the 
strength of the village, and the parade of the dragon and tiger dance required male members to 
make it possible. Reviving the parade in the reform era had the same connotation as in the 
republican era. When no other village revived the parade, it established Puddle village as a 
strong village. 
In addition to ancestral worship within the village, villagers of Puddle village joined other 
villages with closer blood ties in reviving inter-village ancestral worship to what it had been in 
the republican era. Starting from the early 1980s, they joined with two other villages to worship 
the common ancestor of the twelfth generation at the grave, and to worship the ancestor of the 
eighth generation with three other villages. These inter-village ancestral worships were initiated 
by patriarchs and lisheng, and initially were practiced by patriarchs and lisheng. These were not 
activities of the whole village. A couple of years after reviving the public ancestral worship at 
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every household had to send a male member to attend the ritual.  
In my discussion so far, all the activities revived were local customs that can be traced 
back to the republican period. Yet in the late 1980s, a new ritual alliance was formed: seven 
villages of the Eastside administrative unit. There was no precedent for this collaboration, and 
the retired party cadres initiated this new collaboration. The new ritual alliance was a result of 
new social organization and political arrangement, and also served as a mechanism to reinforce 
the collaboration. Being in the same administrative unit, these seven villages shared the same 
opportunities. Public projects, such as building roads and setting streetlights, rely on 
governmental subsidy in the unit of the administrative unit. Zhongshao, one of the four retired 
party cadres who made the new alliance possible, explained,  
The upper-side village group and the downside village group make up the Eastside administrative unit. 
Historically speaking, these two groups were hostile to each other and fought over natural resources. This 
problem continued during the collectivization period… The hostility between these two groups made my 
job harder as the brigade leader [equivalent to the party secretary of an administrative unit]…  
In the reform era, the structure for resource distribution was different. In the collectivization period, 
everyone was poor and the locality had little chance to gain any subsidy from the upper level of the 
government. In contrast, in the reform era, the county and township government had extra money to 
subsidize local development. The subsidy was distributed based on the impression of the higher-level 
government having administrative units. In general, the higher-level government was in favor of units that 
showed more solidarity, as the government believed that stronger units would make better use of the 
subsidy…  
Venerating ancestors is our local custom and virtue. I thought that worshipping a common ancestor 
together was a good way to deal with past hostility, and established our administrative unit as a solidified 
one. I retired in 1984, and this gave me a good position to advocate forming a new ritual alliance of seven 
villages of the Eastside administrative unit. I knew patriarchs of each village very well from my past job, 
but I no longer needed to deal with the actual politics as the incumbent. There were three other retired party 
cadres who agreed with me, and two of us came from the upper-side village group. The other two were 
from the downside village group. We together talked to patriarchs of each village and persuaded them to 
support the plan. They then talked to their own decent group members and realized the plan. 
A new ritual alliance of the Eastside administrative unit was then formed, which broke 
the genealogical confinement. The upper-side village group shares the same ancestor of the 
eighth generation, and the downside village group shares the same ancestor of the eighth 
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other villages share the same ancestor of the eighth generation with the upper-side village group 
and the downside village group. However, the new ritual alliance of the Eastside administrative 
unit excludes these other villages of different administrative units.  
The new ritual alliance started with joint worship of the common ancestor of the seventh 
generation, the founding father of the Peace branch. The grave of the common ancestor of the 
seventh generation was referred to as the grave for offspring, meaning that the fengshui of the 
grave blessed its descendants with male offspring. In the collectivization period, households with 
newborn males went to the grave in the first month of the lunar calendar to offer incense to thank 
the ancestors for giving them male offspring. The joint ritual revival of the late 1980s was 
organized by households with males born in the previous year. One male from each household 
was obligated to participate in the ritual. After offering sacrifice, participants joined a banquet at 
the grave. 
In 1992, seven villages of the Eastside administrative unit started to collaborate on the 
annual ritual of worshipping the founding father of the Lu lineage in West Mountain. Each 
village has a vice-president of the event to collect funds (10 RMB per household) and to prepare 
sacrifice. Seven villages take turns in selecting the president (zongli) from each village (one 
village per year). The president has to coordinate seven villages. The president and vice-
presidents are chosen by patriarchs of each village. There is no open election for the position. 
Taking the opportunity to involve the younger generation in village and lineage affairs, elders 
consciously and unanimously decide to chose young people between the age of twenty and forty 
to serve as the presidents and vice-presidents. 
  The ritual alliance of the Eastside administrative unit succeeds in building the collective 
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upper-side and downside village groups. In addition, ancestral worship of the ritual alliance is a 
mechanism to socialize young men into the community, especially at the time when most of 
them are absent from the community on the regular base.  
  With the majority of adults earning a living outside the community and only coming back 
on important ritual occasions and Chinese New Year, the authority of the patriarch is declining. 
The decline of the authority of the patriarch has two main causes. The first one is that the 
patriarch no longer involves much in individuals’ daily life when they don’t live in the locality. 
Although the patriarch still has authority over descent group affairs, family issues and religious 
matters, individuals can easily ignore the patriarch once they have a long-term absence from the 
local community. For example, one of my informants who left the local community in 1996 at 
the age of 21 claimed that he basically had little interaction with the patriarch of his own descent 
group since then, and he knew no patriarch of other descent groups of the same village.  
  The second reason of the decline of the authority of the patriarch is that the patriarch 
controls few resources to contribute to public good provisions. In the new market economy, older 
generations find themselves have no skill to navigate with market logics and have no means to 
collect sufficient economic resources to for public goods. This undermines their leadership, and 
therefore, the authority of a patriarch is restricted to one’s immediate descent group. The party 
secretary of the administrative unit and the village head, through requesting special funds from 
the local government, are the person who control resources for public good provisions, such as 
building roads and local schools.  
With the decline of the authority of the patriarch, the party secretary of the administrative 
unit and the village head fill in the position in maintaining social and religious orders. The major 
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through their posts. In addition, since the 1980s, they are aware of the moral authority gained 
from leading ritual practices. They thus smoothly step in and take the major charge in monitoring 
community ritual practices. Choosing the president and vice-presidents of the annual ritual for 
worshipping the founding father of the Lu lineage and ensuring the ritual to be carried on 
smoothly become part of their regular tasks.  
When I spoke to the party secretary and the village head of the Eastside administrative 
unit individually, they both expressed that community-wide rituals help maintain the ground of 
social and moral order, and this is why they support and have to ensure continuity of traditional 
practice. In addition, an unspoken benefit of leading traditional practices, as I observe, is to 
enhance the political leader’s moral authority, which helps to increase their political authority in 
maintaining local order. For example, the village head of the Eastside administrative unit 
commented that villagers turn to him to deal with family and private disputes, such as the 
problem of abandoning aging parents. These private disputes in the past were usually presented 
to the patriarch instead of the party secretary or the village head. Although the village head has 
little formal power to deal with private disputes, this occasion shows the shift of the moral 
authority from patriarch to formal political leaders.  
  The ritual alliance of the Eastside village administration is a successful new ritual 
alliance involving the most villages in the reform era. Yet in 2007, a collective ritual of the 
whole Lu lineage was held at the graveyard of the founding father of the Lu lineage. This was 
the first time in the local history that Lu members gathered together to worship the founding 
father of the Lu lineage at the same time. Before 2007, villages of the Lu lineage worshipped the 
founding father of the Lu lineage separately. The new collaboration was initiated by a wealthy 
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worship of the founding father as an event of the whole Lu lineage. He gave an endowment to 
support the expenditure of the annual worship. Starting from that year, the time to the worship of 
the founding father of the Lu lineage was unified. However, the organization did not change. For 
example, villagers of the Eastside administrative unit organized themselves in the same way they 
did in 1992.  
  I argue that members of the Lu lineage do not form a unified ritual unit. The Lu lineage is 
still not a unified lineage. Other than worshipping the founding father on the same day, there is 
no further collaboration among all villages of the Lu surname. In addition, besides this ritual, 
there is no corresponding lineage association with sanctioning power. The fragmented feature of 
the Lu lineage continues in the reform era.  
 
C) Construction of the Temple of Benevolence 
Having discussed the revival of ancestral worship, I now turn to the restoration of the 
Temple of Benevolence (hereafter, the Temple). As seen in the last part, the Lu lineage did not 
form a unified ritual community that practices ancestral ritual together. Nor does the Lu lineage 
have a central lineage organization to deal with lineage affairs. This part shows that the local 
deity was once used to construct the lineage identity of the Lu lineage in the 1980s. Although the 
construction was not fully successful, as I will show in this part, it is at least more successful 
than ancestral worship. In what follows, I start from introducing deity worship in West 
Mountain.  
  In West Mountain, the territorial cult was revived later than ancestral worship. Each 
village has a village deity. The temple of the village deity is small (less than one square meter) 
and the deity has no statue. The name of the deity is written on a board, and people worship the 125	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board. Local people burn incense on the first and the fifteenth day of each lunar month. There is 
no collaborated organization around the village temple. Some villages performed opera on the 
fifteenth day of the eighth lunar month, starting from the end of the 1980s. Collecting funds for 
the opera performance is the only collective activity surrounding the village temple.  
  Among three community-wide temples in West Mountain in the Republican era, the 
Temple of Benevolence is the only one that has been restored as a community temple.3 The 
restoration of the Temple of Benevolence in the 1980s, however, involved only villagers of the 
Lu surname. At the time, members of the Lu lineage identified the temple as the temple of the Lu 
lineage.  
The Temple of Benevolence was a temple for multi-surname groups, and the Lu lineage 
dominated the temple in the republican period. Very few documents are left on the temple 
history in the late imperial China.4 What we do know is that the temple was built in the 
fourteenth century, approximately one century after the founding father of the Lu lineage 
migrated to West Mountain. When the Lu family settled in West Mountain, six other lineages 
lived in the area before Lu family. We do not know who built the temple and what deity was 
worship in the temple at that time. In the republican era, the Temple of Benevolence was the 
center for cross-lineage politics. The Lu lineage controlled the temple, as well as the annual 
procession, called the Eighth Day and Fourth Month Procession. The Lu lineage represented the 
two major deities of the temple. Two other surnames, Chen and Zhang, represented the other two 
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side deities. The other surname groups residing in West Mountain did not participate in the 
Procession.  
In the collectivization period, the Temple of Benevolence was destroyed. Throughout the 
collectivization period and the early period of the reform period, locals continued to go to the old 
temple place to burn incense on the eighth day of the fourth lunar month, the date of the 
Procession. The major deity of the Temple of Benevolence, Lord Grace, was said to be 
efficacious in blessing crops to grow properly each year, and in blessing believers to be safe 
when they traveled outside the community. Farmers and travelers were the main believers of the 
Temple.  
The construction project started in 1985 and was finished in 1987. The project was 
initiated by an old woman named Hu, who was born in 1916 and claimed to be possessed by 
Lord Grace between 1985 and 1987. Hu was ninety-three when I met her in the field; she was a 
healthy and clear-minded woman. She recalled,  
I was seventy-one when I was possessed by Lord Grace in 1985. I had no experience in being possessed 
before that. I was an underground member of the communist party in 1930s and 1940s. I did not believe in 
the local deity, and I rarely participated in superstitious activities…  
The first time I became possessed was in the middle of the night. I was asleep before I was possessed. I ran 
out of my third floor room to the courtyard of the tulou where I lived with my family and ten other families. 
I was yelling when I was running, and most people living in the same tulou were awakened by me. When I 
was standing in the courtyard, I heard Lord Grace talking to me. He said that for the past thirty years he has 
not had a house to live and is miserable. He wanted me to initiate the reconstruction project. I told him that 
I am old, poor and illiterate. I am afraid that I do not have the capability to lead the project. Lord Grace told 
me not to worry about the money. He said, ‘don’t you have relatives living in Indonesia? Write them a 
letter tomorrow and the funding will come.’   
Hu explained to me that with witness of her family members and neighbors living in the same 
tulou,5 they believed that she was possessed by Lord Grace. She said that every time she was 
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possessed, Lord Grace told her something about her family members or neighbors that she did 
not know. And these things were proved to be correct when confirmed with the relevant person. 
For example, the first time she was possessed, Lord Grace told her that her oldest son had been 
bothered by a chronic ailment for ten years. Her oldest son confirmed that he had hemorrhoids, 
which he was ashamed to tell anyone.   
  The story about the construction project is surrounded by the magic power of Lord Grace.  
Through the possession of Hu, Lord Grace arranged all aspects of the construction project, from 
choosing the committee members for the project to cleaning up the old temple site. Lord Grace 
named four people--patriarchs in their sixties and seventies--and asked Hu to organize the 
construction committee with them. The construction committee was formed based on these four 
persons. The site of the Temple was given back to the construction committee without much 
effort. The legend about the return of the site is told in the following way: the head of the family 
living on the old temple site dreamed of a boa lying on the pillar, which locals understood as an 
omen. After he woke up, he went to ask a spirit medium for the meaning of the dream. He was 
told that Lord Grace was coming to ask for his place back. He got scared and moved away.  
The construction project of the Temple of Benevolence was led by the Lu lineage. The 
Lu lineage emphasized their special relation with Lord Grace, and excluded the other surname 
groups. Although emphasizing the special relation with Lord Grace was consistent with the past 
history, the construction of the Temple of Benevolence as the temple of the Lu lineage reflected 
the stage of community integration. At the time, what was needed was to integrate the Lu 
lineage. The integration with the other surname groups did not come a bit later, which will be 
covered in the next section.  
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 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
seven people who were invited by the four named persons, together held their first meeting to 
discuss the restoration project. These twelve persons formed the construction committee council, 
and they all came from the Lu family (either Lu male members or spouses of Lu). The 
mobilization of the construction project was focused on and limited to Lu members. The funding 
of the project was mainly from overseas Lu members. After the first possession by the Lord 
Grace and the first meeting of the construction project, Hu wrote to her mother-in-law in 
Indonesia to ask for donation. Her mother-in-law was enthusiastic about the project and initiated 
a fundraiser within her friends, who were also from the local area. She collected 7,200 RMB. 
This fund started the restoration project. Later on, other Lu members with overseas connections 
also wrote to their relatives to ask for the support for the project. Eighty percent of the funding of 
the project came from overseas Chinese.   
  At the time, there was still political risk in getting involved in religious activities. The 
construction committee council came up with the idea of linking the Temple of Benevolence 
with the Five-One-Three Revolt, an event in the lore of the Chinese Communist Party. The Five-
One-Three Revolt was one of the earliest successful communist revolts. It happened at the 
capital of the county where West Mountain town was located in 1928. The leaders of that revolt 
had a meeting to plan for the revolt at the Temple of Benevolence. The construction committee 
council thought that if the temple became an officially recognized memorial site of the revolt, 
they could rebuild the temple in the name of commemorating the revolt. The council brought this 
idea to a Lu member who served as a general in the Communist army. The Lu general filed the 
application to the provincial government. In the name of memorizing the Five-One-Three Revolt, 
the council reclaimed the land of the Temple of the Benevolence from the township government. 
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intervention from the local government. The approval of the memorial site of the Five-One-
Three Revolt was received in 1992, much later than the completion of the construction project in 
1987. 
After the construction of the Temple of Benevolence in 1987, Lu villagers had an interest 
in reviving the Procession. Other than Hu, who withdrew from participating in the revival 
movement after the completion of the Temple of the Benevolence, the rest of the committee of 
the construction project planned on reviving the Procession. The negotiation process on the 
Procession was beyond the capacity of these committee members, however, which led to the 
opening up of space for retired local cadres to take part in the revival movement. I will turn to 
the revival of the Procession in the next section.  
  This part shows that the Temple was reconstructed as the temple of the Lu lineage. The 
construction project brought a sense of belonging among villages of the Lu surname, and it 
mobilized villages of the Lu surname in a way that the ancestral worship could not achieve. 
However, the committee of the construction project lacked a strong authority to transform itself 
into a regular committee. This problem can be illustrated through the list of the committee 
members. Other than Hu, the rest of the committee of the construction project were patriarchs of 
descent groups. They were well respected in their villages, but none of them had much influence 
outside their villages—they lacked community-wide authority and connections with other 
villages. Given this situation, how did the committee of the construction project succeeded in 
reconstructing the Temple in the first place? 
  The elements required for a successful construction project and a regular temple 
committee are different. For the former, the main factor is funding for the construction project, 
while the key elements for the later is community-wide authority and political and social 130	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
connections to link all sub-groups. Although the committee of the reconstruction project lacked 
the authority and connection, it did have enough ground for raising funds for the construction 
project. As I pointed out earlier, the reconstruction project relied mainly from the donation of 
overseas Chinese. It was not an internally funded project. The committee members of the 
reconstruction project, including Hu, were from strong villages that have a great amount of its 
members migrating to south-Asia in the republican period. These overseas Chinese were 
economically better off than their relatives back in the hometown, and most of them were 
enthusiastic in deity worship. In addition, the magic power of Lord Grace demonstrated through 
Hu further persuaded overseas Chinese to make the contribution. In sum, the demonstration of 
the magic power through Hu and overseas Chinese are the key elements to the success of the 
construction project. Yet, these two elements were insufficient to the continuing development of 
the Temple into a community-wide temple. The next section discusses what makes a community-
wide temple possible. Toward the end of this part, I have a few more words on the role played by 
magic force and overseas Chinese in the revival movement.   
These two elements—the magic force and overseas Chinese—are the common elements 
that can be found in the early stage of the revival movement in Fujian.6 Most communities have 
stories about the magic force of the local deity or the common ancestor (although the 
presentation varies, ranging from spirit possession to dreams or natural omen). When there was 
higher risk for political prosecution to traditional and religious practices, stories of the magic 
force were particularly important in giving villagers confidence in their practices. In contrast, 
financial contribution from overseas Chinese gave local communities resources to revive 
traditional practices when local people were too poor to afford any expenditure. In particular, 
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Fujian is a famous province of overseas Chinese since the 19
th century, and the revival 
movement in Fujian province at the early stage in the reform era largely relied on overseas 
contributions. In addition, in the beginning of the reform era, the state had tried to attract 
overseas investment, and traditional activities were tolerated in the name of overseas Chinese. 
Overseas contributions also offered political protection to the local community for their 
traditional practices.   
  These two elements became less important and less useful as the revival movement 
involved less political risk and shifts from reconstruction project (which requires more money) to 
community building (which requires authority and connection). In what follows, I turn to discuss 
the transition to community building in West Mountain era.     
 
[II] Community Building: Reviving the Eighth Day and Fourth Month Procession 
 
This section discusses the revival of the eighth day and fourth month procession of the 
Temple of the Benevolence in 1993. This section shows that with the involvement of the party 
cadre, the Procession allying six administrative units (with a population of nine thousand people 
in the year of 2009) was successfully revived. In addition, the collective ideal of community was 
defined by the party cadre in order to override the old model of stratification in the republican 
era. This new collective ideal of community with corresponding new arrangements of the 
Procession set the general direction of community building to the present.  
This section has two parts. Part A outlines the old model of stratification that becomes the 
contrasting model for the new collective model, and part B focuses on the revival of the 
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A) The Old Model: A Highly Stratified Region 
  As pointed out earlier, unequal land ownership led to the fragmentation of the Lu lineage 
and stratification among the ten surnames of West Mountain. Stratification was reflected not 
only in economic well-being and land ownership, but also in ritual. This part summarizes the 
collective ideal of stratification and ritual arrangement realizing the collective ideal in the 
republican era. Note that this was not the collective ideal of stratification of local people in the 
republican era. Instead, it is what current villagers of West Mountain think the collective ideal of 
stratification was in the republican era. The importance of this part is not to represent the reality 
in the republican era. Instead, this old model of stratification serves as the oppositional ideal for 
the local people when they try to build a new, equalitarian community. We need this old model 
to understand why the new model was constructed as it is.  
Although the origin of the Procession is untraceable, the Procession was a means of 
social control in the republican era. The Lu lineage controlled the Temple and forced weaker 
groups to join the Procession symbolizing subordination. Different deities represented different 
social status. Lord Grace as the main deity of the Temple was carried by the wealthier branch of 
the Lu lineage, the Steel branch. The Peace branch, as tenants of the Steel branch, carried the 
first lady, symbolizing the second in the order. The Chen surname carried Junior prince, and the 
Lin surname carried patriarch Buddha (only one of the two patriarch Buddhas took part in the 
Procession). A Lin villager commented, “Our ancestors were forced to join the Procession by the 
Lu lineage. Our ancestors were tenants of the Lu lineage, and could not refuse to attend the 
Procession. Before 1949, Lin villagers seldom worshipped in the Temple of the Benevolence. 
The temple was a temple of the Lu lineage.” There are different versions on the groups who 
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key message is the same: other surnames joining the procession were forced by the Lu lineage 
and the story told by the elders of other surnames shows resentment toward the control of the Lu 
lineage.  
Stories told by groups that did not participate in the procession in the republican period 
show resentment toward the control of the Procession and the Temple of Benevolence by the Lu 
lineage. A Su villager said, “Our ancestors settled in West Mountain much later than most other 
surname groups. When we settled here, the Lu lineage asked us to carry the earthly god in the 
Procession. Our ancestors thought that by asking us to carry a trivial deity the Lu lineage insulted 
us. Our ancestors therefore refused to join the Procession.” The rest of the surnames of the 
central West Mountain area that did not join the procession shared this story to explain why their 
ancestors did not join the Procession.  
In contrast, stories told by Lu members ignored the suppression part, although they did 
point out the Lu lineage was better off economically than the rest of the surnames. Informants 
also commented that Lord Grace was a deity of the Lu surname and he was in favor of the Lu 
surname in blessing their fortune, safety, and health. Among the Lu lineage, there was 
stratification as well. I repeatedly heard stories about how the first lady protected villages of the 
Peach branch in a collective flight between the Peach branch and the Steel branch.  
In sum, the old model of stratification, told by different surname groups and villages, is 
similar in emphasis of power and wealth differentiation among surname groups. The model has 
no such sense of community among different surname groups. Conflicts and hostility among 
surname groups are taken for granted and are further naturalized as the composition of social 
order. Symbols (the five deities, namely) in the Procession reiterates this model of stratification, 
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of surname groups. This understanding of the old model became the base for the emergence of 
the new collective model.   
 
B) The New Collective Ideal of Community 
This part examines the revival of the Procession in 1993, which started the formation of a 
new community. As I discussed in the last section, the committee of the reconstruction project of 
the Temple of Benevolence (1985-1987) lacked the community authority and political 
connection to revive the Procession which involves not only all villages of the Lu surname, but 
also villages of the non-Lu surnames. Retired local cadres, with abundant political connections 
with party cadres of other administrative units and having been known at least by villagers of an 
administrative unit, were the best candidates to step in to make the Procession possible. While 
retired party cadres had political and social capital to revive the Procession, they had different 
agenda and concerns on community building, compared to the other local leaders. They set the 
Procession in a new direction. This section shows the collective ideal of community building and 
the arrangement of the Procession set up by party cadres. In what follows, I first ask why local 
party cadres were involved in the Procession at the first place.  
I argue that the local cadre helped revive the Procession because they saw it as a political 
move to express the solidarity of people of West Mountain and to represent West Mountain as an 
independent, unified region. This argument is based on that fact that the timing for reviving the 
Procession coincided with the request to separate West Mountain from the Steep-mountain town. 
The central West Mountain area belonged to the Steep-mountain town since the collectivization 
period. The township government was a two-hour walk from the central West Mountain. It was 
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addition, local cadres also complained that the township government favored closer villages and 
they thought the local area would gain more resources if they established a separate town. The 
movement to establish an independent township government started in the late 1980s and mainly 
involved party cadres. West Mountain town was formed in 1992.  
Although none of my informants directly connected the movement for an independent 
township government with the revival of the Procession, party cadres involved in both 
movements talked about the goal of the two movements in the same way—to establish solidarity 
among villagers of West Mountain. The township governor of the Steep-mountain town from the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s, a Lu member, said, “In the course of seeking independence, 
villagers of West Mountain showed solidarity and determination.” Yet, when I talked to ordinary 
villagers about the movement for an independent township government, none of them recalled 
the movement at all. “We have benefited from a separate township government. But, to talk 
about the movement back then, it mostly only involved party cadres. We had nothing to do with 
it, and neither did we have anything to contribute to it,” one of my informants commented. It is 
very likely that party cadres used local people’s zeal for the revival of the Procession as their 
evidence of the solidarity of people of the central West Mountain in their fight for the 
independent town.    
Every party cadre who was involved in the revival of the Procession in 1993 commented 
that their motivation was to construction West Mountain as a unified community. With the goal 
of constructing community solidarity in mind, the local cadre was less interested in reviving the 
Procession to what it was in the pre-1949 period. They were aware that the stratification of the 
Procession contradicted the official idea. Egalitarianism, instead, became the main spirit they 
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Following this guideline, three consensuses were achieved among leaders of the Temple 
of the Benevolence, influential patriarchs, and retired party cadres. Foremost, the original 
stratification of the Procession had to be demolished by removing the surname as a marker of 
group distinction, and instead using the administrative unit. Second, every group took turns 
carrying four deities. Third, in holding the Procession, a procession council was formed with 
equal representation from each group and surname. These three consensuses speak to the old 
model that I lay out in the previous part.  
In addition to egalitarianism, the local cadre also emphasized democracy as the key 
element in holding the Procession. After achieving three consensuses in 1992, local people were 
invited to meetings to negotiate with the participation and organization. Historically, five 
administrative units were involved in the Procession. Three units out of these five had only some 
surnames participating. In the consensuses, the basic unit to attend the procession was the 
administrative unit. In other words, an administrative unit had to unanimously agree to join the 
Procession or it did not join at all. Meetings were held within each administrative unit to 
determine if the unit joined the procession or not. At the beginning, there were disputes within 
surname groups that did not participate in the Procession in the pre-1949 period. The local cadre 
later on convinced them that it would not do any harm for them to participate in the Procession. 
In addition, the locality would be peaceful with their participation in the Procession. In the end, 
every household in the five administrative units agreed to participate in the procession. The other 
five administrative units which did not participate in the Procession before 1949 were all far 
away from the central West Mountain. One of these five administrative units had only Lu 
members. Being a Lu surname, villagers of this administrative unit expressed strong enthusiasm 
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area, this administrative unit was included in the Procession while the other four villages were 
excluded from the Procession.  
 
The Arrangement of the Procession 
  After having unanimously agreement to join the Procession from the six administrative 
units, local leaders gathered together to arrange the practice of the Procession. Most part of the 
arrangement of the Procession corresponds to party cadres’ ideal of community building: 
egalitarianism, with the exception of the premier (zongli) and the vice-premier (fu zongli). In 
general, the arrangement of the Procession de-emphasizes surname groups and provides equal 
access for every group.  
The organization of the Procession was rearranged as follows: the premier was chosen 
from the group carrying the statue of Lord Grace; he took charge of organizing the Procession 
and collaborating all four groups. In addition, two vice-premiers were chosen in each group for 
the execution of the Procession at the administrative level. These nine persons, an accountant, a 
treasurer, and ten clerical staff appointed by the premier formed the Procession Council. The 
term of the council is a year, beginning on the eleventh day of the fourth lunar month to the same 
day of the next year. The six administration units are divided into four groups, according to 
population and geographical location (two groups have two administrative units each, and two 
groups have one administrative unit each). Each group takes turns in carrying different deities.  
  In addition, the route of the procession was rearranged. In total, there are ten altars to 
worship the deity. Two of these were newly added to accommodate groups that did not take part 
in the pre 1949-practice. The rest of the eight altars were set up in accordance with the pre-1949 
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Since that community temple was destroyed, the deity stays overnight at two altars. The route is 
arranged as a circle surrounding the Temple of the Benevolence, which differs from the pre-1949 
practice. The route of the pre-1949 practice was not arranged in a circular order. Rather, 
previously some places were passed by two times or more, and the total length of the route was 
much longer than the circle arrangement. No one has an explanation for the logic behind the 
route of the pre-1949 practice. I did observe, however, that the route of the procession in Zhu 
Stronghold is very similar to the route of the pre-1949 practice of West Mountain. Informants of 
Zhu Stronghold explained that the route is arranged according to bagua (literally eight symbols, 
or eight trigrams used in Taoist cosmology to represent the fundamental principles of reality). I 
suspect that the route of the pre-1949 practice was arranged according to a similar logic or some 
other Taoist logics, even though the religious and sacred aspect of the Procession was mostly 
abolished in the reform era.  
The major thing preserved from the Republican era is the selection of the premier and the 
vice-premier. The selection is based on the will of Lord Grace. On the eleventh day of the fourth 
lunar month—the day after the end of the procession—people who are interested in competing 
for the premier and the vice-premier of the coming year’s procession gather in the Temple of 
Benevolence to throw divination blocks in front of the statue of Lord Grace. The person who 
throws positive divination blocks three successive times is said to be chosen by Lord Grace. If 
two or more persons throw three successive positive divination blocks, they go on to the second 
run to see who can throw three successive positive divination blocks first. This was the old 
method used in the republican era, and is important to show the presence of Lord Grace. As my 
informants said, there was no dispute on maintaining this procedure at the planning meeting. For 
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rule of egalitarianism, as it entitled every villager to compete for the premier and the vice-
premier. In addition, they could not find any better way.  
 
The Collective Ideal of Community Building 
  When I did my fieldwork in 2008 and 2009, I found a consistent and coherent ideal of 
community building among villagers of West Mountain. The narrative of informants is almost 
the same as what party cadres told me as their guiding ideas for the Procession—egalitarianism 
and democracy. In addition, most informants who attended meetings to negotiate if their 
administrative units would take part in the Procession in 1992 can recite the three consensuses of 
the local leader on the Procession. Furthermore, every year the slogan for the Procession 
reiterates the central ideas of community—egalitarianism, solidary and harmony. My informants 
often speak of belonging and sense of solidarity as the ideal shared emotion of community.  
  I argue that a new set of collective ideals about community building has been established, 
whereby the community is based on equal social status among ten surname groups. This is seen 
in the consistency among the narratives of the village from both local villagers and the party 
cadres. They speak about how group distinction based on surname hurts community solidarity 
and should be avoided. They communicate that the ideal of the community is that everyone is 
equal and harmoniously lives together. Note that this version of ideal community building does 
not mention subgroups’, individual responsibility, or obligation toward the community.   
  The Procession of West Mountain is one of the most magnificent processions in the 
county, for it successfully mobilizes villagers of the six administrative units of the central West 
Mountain area. When the Procession began in 1993 it formed a new local community, although 
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market economy over the subsequent fifteen years, however, helped form a collective identity so 
that by 2008 these six administrative units have formed a collective identity. The next section 
looks in detail at to social processes of community building from 1993 to the present.  
  
[Ill] Social Processes of Community Building and Contestation 
 
  The previous section demonstrated that with the help from party cadres the Procession 
was successfully revived. It showed that party cadres gained the power to define the collective 
ideal of community building and rearranged most part of the ritual arrangement according to 
their ideal of community. The egalitarianism among surname groups implemented by the party 
cadres was not what patriarchs and other local leaders of the Lu surname had in mind, however. 
Although they were welcome to expand the Procession to the whole central West Mountain area, 
they wanted to preserve the superior status of the Lu surname. In the negotiation process to 
revive the Procession, these Lu people did not oppose to the new arrangement, for they knew the 
Procession would not be revived without the help of party cadres. In addition, they agreed that 
the collective ideal of the community proposed by the party cadres was ideologically correct. 
This did not mean that they became true believers and practitioners of the new collective ideal of 
the community. Rather, they continued bringing surname politics and emphasizing the 
superiority of the Lu surname over the other surnames. Community building in West Mountain 
was a struggle between the collective and lineage identity.  
The list of the premiers of the Procession (table 4.1) and the president of the temple 
committee council, as well as the changing qualifications and responsibilities of these positions 
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identity in West Mountain. This data reveals an interesting trend toward community building. In 
the beginning, surname politics overrode the ideal of egalitarianism, and the Lu lineage still 
claimed their superiority over the rest surnames. The premier of early years was an influential 
community-wide leader that took on responsibility in building community strength through 
construction projects of the Temple and other construction projects, such as roads over which the 
Procession passed. In contrast, in recent years, there is little trace of surname politics in the 
Procession and the selection of the premier. The premier position passed to wealthy businessmen 
with little community influence, but who could afford to spend money for the Procession. Other 
than leading the Procession and managing the temple, the Procession council and the temple 
committee were no longer involved in communal affairs. In short, one sees a community moving 
forward to realize egalitarianism in the Procession, while the Procession lost its inner vitality to 
provide substantial utility to the community.  
[Table 4.1] The List of the Premiers of the Procession 
Year  Last 
Name 
Age at the 
time 
Absentee   Occupation 
1993  Mr. Lu  Mid 50s  N  The party secretary of one of the administrative unit 
1994  Mr. Lu  Late 50s  N  Local doctor and a patriarch  
1995  Mr. Lu  Early 50s  N  A small shop owner and a retired local cadre 
1996  Mr. Lu  Early 60s  N  A retailer of fertilizer and retired cadre on the state payroll  
1997  Mr. Lu  Early 60s  N  A car repair worker, a patriarch and a representative of the 
construction committee council of the Temple in the 80s 
1998  Mr. Lu  Mid 40s  N  The head of gamblers  
1999  Mr. Lu  Mid 50s  N  Car repair businessmen, and a patriarch 
2000  Mr. Lu  Early 40s  Y  A factory owner in Xiamen and his father is the village head. He 
father was in charge of the Procession 
2001  Mr. Lu  Mid 40s  Y  A factory owner in Xiamen and his father is a retired cadre on the 
state payroll. His father was in charge of the Procession. 
2002  Mr. Lu  Late 40s  Y  A steel factory owner in Guangdong. His father was in charge of the 
Procession. 
2004  Mr. Lu  Mid 40s  Y  A factory owner in Xiamen and his father was the village head. His 
father was in charge of the Procession. 
2005  Mr 
Zhang 
Mid 40s  Y  A factory owner in Shenzhen (who father was a ordinary farmer) 
2006  Mr. Lu  Early 50s  N  The head of a construction team, and a patriarch 
2007  Mr. Lu  Late 40s  Y  A businessman doing business outside the local community 
2008  Mr. 
Chen 
Mid 40s  N  A factory owner in the local 142	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
2009  Mr. Lin  Early 40s  Y  A factory owner in Xiamen 
 
The most immediate explanation of the transition is the new market economy that 
displaced most working adults to nearby industrial cities for low skilled jobs. This is the 
explanation given by my informants, and it is also a commonly employed perspective for China 
specialists in explaining the consequence of the market economy on remote rural regions. 
But the causal relation is too simple and denies local communities agency in making 
efforts to engage with the market force. All three cases of my study show that the revival 
movement is a collective effort to deal with new challenges in the reform era. Each community 
has specific issues it faces, and has its particular cultural legacy and historical past that confines 
or enables the community to respond to challenges in culturally logical ways. For West 
Mountain, fragmented and contesting grouping was the key issue that community members were 
dealing with in the 80s and 90s. But toward the end of the 1990s, the community was still unable 
to complete the transition toward a coherent and cohesive community.  
When an economic transition began in the decollectivization period, traditional practices 
were not employed to respond to the economic transition. At the turn of 2000, the community 
experienced a sudden out-migration trend and it was too late for the collective to respond to 
market forces. Furthermore, as I pointed out above, the collective had not yet accomplished the 
transition to a coherent and cohesive community. The key question is why West Mountain could 
not form a cohesive community at this time.  
To answer this question, this section is organized into two parts. Part A discusses the 
transition of the community by examining the list of the premiers of the Procession and the 
president of the temple committee. This part follows the narrative of the community 
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local politics, especially surname politics, suddenly declined, as people left the community. Part 
B addresses the question why West Mountain failed to develop a coherent and cohesive 
community by the turn to 2000. By reexamining the struggle between the collective and lineage 
identity, this part argues that framing the collective identity and the lineage identity as an either-
or choice limits community development that can provide community members with more 
support in the face of a market economy. As for what kind of community West Mountain 
become after the turn of 2000, I will continue the discussion in the fifth section on out-migrant 
workers.  
 
A) Surname Politics and the Transition  
This part examines the transition of local surname politics. First, I examine the list of the 
premiers of the Procession and the president of the temple committee council to show a general 
trend toward the decline of surname politics. Second, I examine changes of the qualifications and 
responsibilities of the Premier, and find the decline of the traditional authority and the decline of 
the involvement of the Procession council in community affairs. 
The list of the premiers records that the premier, before 2004 are all of Lu surname and 
the premiers of 2005, 2008 and 2009 were of Zhang, Chen and Lin respectively. In addition, the 
first to the third president of the Temple Committee Council are all of the Lu surname. The 
fourth president, serving from 2005 to 2008, and continuing to the fifth president from 2008-
2011 is of the Su surname. He commented on the change of the surname politics:  
At the beginning of the revival movement, the Lu surname still thought that they must control the Temple 
and the Procession. In 1999, when it was my village’s term to serve the premier of the Procession, I was 
interested in competing for the premier. However, other Lu members in the same group prevented me from 
doing so. They said that only Lu members could serve as the premier. Although there was an attempt to 
advocate egalitarianism among surname groups for joining the Procession, in the early years, Lu members 
were still in control of the Procession and the Temple. In the end, I did not have the chance to compete for 
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After the 2000s, however, more and more villagers resided outside the community, and fewer and fewer 
people are interested in managing the temple affairs and community affairs… One cannot get any wealthier 
by competing within the community. The competition moves outside the community… Since then, local 
politics changed. The tension among surname groups decreased. By the mid-2000s, competent persons 
moved out the community and no one wanted to serve as the president of the Temple. The locality was left 
with few persons competent and healthy to manage temple affairs. This was why I was nominated in 2005.  
I am busy in helping my son’s business in Xiamen. I do not want to continue serving as the president of the 
Temple Committee Council. However, no one else is willing to take over the position. I have to serve one 
more turn. But this will be the last term that I serve. I am definitely going to step down from the position 
after this term.   
The significance of the Procession for local people is changing. The Procession was a 
reflection of lineage politics and the power structure before 2005. With more than two-thirds of 
local people residing outside the community since the turn of 2000, the Procession carries less 
substantial weight on the power struggle of local people. It has become a symbol of local 
identity, especially for out-migrant workers in reclaiming their connection with the local 
community. For this group of the people, surname politics is unimportant, compared to the 
shared experience of participants in the Procession. The past hostility among surname groups is 
fading away from younger generations’ memory.  
  Furthermore, a closer reexamination of the list of the premiers of the Procession from 
1993 to 2009 reveals changes in the qualification and responsibility of the premier. The premiers 
from 1993 to 1999 were local elites and influential figures of the central West Mountain. Their 
leadership skills and broad social networks were crucial factors that contributed to the success of 
the Procession. The premier of this period was expected not only to hold the Procession but also 
to manage temple affairs. In the one-year tenure, they served the temple as a full-time job 
requiring full attention. None of them donated a significant amount of the money in their turn. 
Speaking to the qualifications of the premier in the early years, the premier of 1995 said,  
In the early years when the Procession was revived, the premier had to fill to three qualifications. The first 
was that the person had some economic strength, so that local people need not worry about the corruption 
of the person. The premier was not expected to make a big donation, however. The second was that the 
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was that he must have experience in dealing with community affairs. Therefore, the ideal age was between 
fifty and seventy. Younger persons might not have enough experiences in dealing with community affairs, 
while older persons lacked the energy to handle all trivial and complicated affairs.  
The position of the premier from 1993 to 1999 was understood as a community service, whereby 
one was obligated to give back to the community. Although the magic power of Lord Grace 
appeared in the conversation, the premier of that time did not see it as the primary reason of 
motivation. 
From 2000 to 2004, a new trend emerged. The premier suddenly switched from the 
generation in their fifties and sixties to the generation in their forties. They were successful 
businessmen who owned factories in the city. Their nomination was combined with their own 
success in business and the influence of their fathers in the local community. These premiers, as 
absentees of the community, did not take part in the preparation of the Procession. Instead, their 
fathers managed the preparation of the procession and the temple affairs. These premiers spent a 
great amount of money in the procession, and they believed that serving the premier would bring 
them fortune in their business. Xuyi, the father of the premier of 2004 and the head of his 
administrative unit, explained, 
I was the one who managed every detail of the Procession. The only two things that my son did were to 
donate 20,000 RMB and to show up in the three-day procession… It was my leadership skill that made the 
procession… The reason it was under his name instead of mine was that he was the one who paid the bill, 
and he should be the nominal premier…  
This example shows increasing importance of wealth for serving as the premier, although 
leadership skill was still required at the time.  
Beginning in 2005, wealth became the most important criterion in deciding who could 
serve as the premier. Gaining more luck in their business became the motivation for people to 
compete for the premier, which led to the average age of people serving as premier dropped to 
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the father of the premier after 2005 was just a common villager. It was simply the wealth of the 
premier that put them in the position. These premiers knew nothing about community affairs or 
traditional practices. Take Mr. Chen, the premier of 2008 at the age of forty-one, for example. 
He owned a plastic factory in the local area. Speaking of his motivation to serve the premier he 
said, 
Every former premier earned more money after they served the position. Lord Grace is efficacious in 
blessing his believers with fortune… I serve this position with hopes that my family members will be safe, 
and my business can further prosper… As for the reputation of the community, I have no wish in this 
regard.   
When asked about what he had done in the past year for the preparation of the procession, he 
replied,  
I know nothing about the Temple of the Benevolence and the Eighth day and the Fourth Month Procession. 
Neither am I interested in temple affairs… Fortunately, the premier does not need to take charge in 
managing the temple affairs… There is a group of elders who oversee the Procession. They have been 
involved in the Procession and temple affairs since the beginning of the revival movement in the reform 
era. They know everything. I do not need to have any prior knowledge about the Procession. I only need to 
do what they tell me to do. The most important obligation for me is to make a big donation to make sure 
that the procession is practiced in a magnificent way.  
In the three-day procession, Mr. Chen looked nervous and disoriented. There were always elders 
standing behind him to instruct him what to do, ranging from when to light incense and when to 
give red envelopes to ritual specialists, or when to lead the troupes to move to the next alter. The 
detailed schedule of the procession was arranged by the elders, and the prior-communication 
among villages involving in the Procession was done among the elders of these villages.  
  With the decline of surname politics, another form of conflict emerged in the practice of 
the Procession. That is, an increasing tension between the elders, prioritizing the maintenance of 
local traditions and the local order, and younger generations who seek blessing for their own 
well-being in the market economy. This conflict became especially salient between the premier 
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In what follows, I use an incident of 2008 to illustrate this point. Before meeting to elect 
the new premier, the procession of 2008 ended with a ritual to send the deity back to the temple. 
After the ritual, the Daoist who preformed the ritual complained that the price had never changed 
in the past fifteen years, and asked for 400 RMB, which was a big increase from 150 RMB in the 
past years. The premier of 2008 took out his wallet and gave him the exact amount he asked for 
without making any attempt to bargain with him. However, this transaction irritated the elders 
who oversaw the ritual. They said to the Daoist’s face that he was too greedy. This occasion 
turned into a twenty-minute flight. Mr. Chen stood aside silently and looked embarrassed. At the 
end, the Daoist still left with four hundred RMB. The incident did not end there, however. The 
next day a temporary meeting was held among the elders who served in the temple committee 
council. The elder who initiated this meeting explained to me,  
In this past three-day procession there were many violations of the local custom… The people who serve as 
the premier nowadays are too young. They do not understand the local custom and neither do they care… 
Something needs to be done to correct this problem. The incident happened yesterday is not just about 400 
RMB. It was about the community rule, and we have to stick to it. 400 RMB and 150 RMB make no big 
difference for Mr. Chen. However, by paying more, he broke the community rule and undermined the 
authority of the elders… It was not a place for Mr. Chen to be generous… This kind of incident has 
happened often in recent years… I called this meeting to deal with this kind of situation. Although we are 
on the list of consultants for the Procession Council, the premier still has the final say over most of the 
decisions. I want to make a formal rule to require the premier to appoint two advisors from the elders, and 
he has to make every decision with these two people, no matter how trivial.  
From the changes in the qualifications and responsibilities of the premier, I conclude that 
when surname groups no longer take the Procession and the Temple as a space for power 
struggle, the local tradition loses its authority over people’s social and religious life. This further 
leads to the decline of the community order. Therefore, the issue of the decline of the community 
order is rooted much deeper than forcing the premier to follow local custom. Without major 
changes in the mechanism producing traditional authority, it matters little for the community 
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examines what went wrong for West Mountain to loss its traditional authority, asking if the 
market force can take full responsibility?  
 
B) Conflict between the Collective and Lineage Identity  
  Even my informants told me that the force of the market economy is responsible for the 
decline of community strength and traditional authority. This part reevaluates this claim, and 
urges that blaming the market force for the dissolution of traditional communities only deprives 
us of opportunity to have a deeper understanding on the base of community building. We need to 
carefully look into micro-processes of the transition.  
  West Mountain cannot be treated as a complete failure in the face of the market economy. 
After the turn of 2000, two-thirds of villagers regularly live and work in major cities in south 
China. In addition, people who are better off economically choose to leave the country and 
become citizens in major cities in south China. The local community cannot restrict its residents 
from leaving, nor does it have the means to encourage them to stay—not even the ancestor as a 
symbol has any effect in keeping descendants from permanently leaving the hometown. Despite 
this situation, the local community still functions effectively; the local cadres enforce state 
policy, and seeking state subsidies for construction projects, such as building roads and leading 
traditional practices, such as ancestral worship and deity worship. Furthermore, the local 
community provides hometown identity for out-migrant workers in their daily struggle in the 
city. The main issue is not that the local community has dissolved in the market transition; rather, 
the issue is why cannot the local community provide more help for its villagers and maintain the 
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I argue that what restricts West Mountain from dealing with the inherent issue of the 
community is their framework making collective identity and lineage identity as an either-or 
choice. This issue speaks to the community base. A strong community does not need to be 
conflict-free, and the community can certainly have sub-groupings. The secret of a strong 
community, however, is to maintain coherence and sub-group differentiation at the same time. 
As in the case of Zhu Stronghold, I demonstrate that this is what makes Zhu Stronghold succeed. 
Yet people in West Mountain do not see the possibility for the coexistence of group coherence 
and sub-group differentiation. The rest of this part discusses why this is the case.  
  To address the issue of group dynamics, I firstly discuss the persisting and changing 
social structure in West Mountain. The wealthier groups of the Republican era were still 
wealthier than the rest in the 80s and 90s for two reasons. First, they had better land, so that even 
though land was redistributed in the 1950s, and the wealthier groups no longer held more land 
than the rest, better land gave them the advantage to develop economic agriculture (such as 
planting tobacco), and brought in more money in the 1980s after de-collectivization. Second, 
many people of these wealthier groups migrated to Southeast Asia in the republican era, and 
these overseas Chinese were much better off than villagers in West Mountain. Overseas Chinese 
were able to send back more remittance than they could have done in the Maoist period. 
Villagers with wealthy overseas Chinese were financially better off than the rest.  
The difference in wealth in the 1980s did not lead to inequality, as in the republican 
period. First of all, the wealth difference of the 80s and 90s was much smaller compared to that 
of the republican era. In addition, the wealthier groups did not control the means to subordinate 
the poor. Even though they occupied better land, they did not own more land to the extent to be 
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off overseas relatives mostly chose to leave the countryside and move to the city through the 
financial support of overseas relatives in the 1990s.  
  In the 80s and 90s, the villages of West Mountain were stratified by the material base of 
subordination no longer existed. What constituted the different power of subgroups was the size 
of each group. Groups with more members considered themselves stronger groups and requested 
more control over community affairs and local politics. Although the number of members in 
each surname group increased dramatically in the 70s and 80s, the order of the amount of 
members in the ten-surname group did not change. The Lu lineage was still the lineage with the 
majority population. In addition, the strong villages of the Lu surname of the Republican era 
maintained their status up to the reform era.  
  Group differentiation in West Mountain remains at the forefront of community relations. 
Group and surname politics motivated and drove the reconstruction of the Temple of 
Benevolence and the revival of the Procession, as I have discussed in the previous sections. 
Group differentiation is a social process, where traditional practices serve as the site for group 
and surname politics. But, in West Mountain, group differentiation has a tarnished past.  
In West Mountain, traditional practices based on group and surname politics continue to 
be associated with the domination of the landlord class. In the reform era, group differentiation is 
conflated with the past memory of class suppression, and group differentiation is a sin that has to 
be eradicated. The local leader and local people could not imagine another way to deal with the 
past memory of surname politics, but it set the collective identity and surname identity as either-
or category. This treatment with group differentiation was particularly formalized in local 
people’s conceptual framework at the beginning of the revival of the Procession through the 
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  It is impossible to eliminate group differentiation, especially in the case of West 
Mountain, where the population of the Lu lineage significantly out-numbers that of other groups 
of the non-Lu surnames. As I have showed earlier, the Procession and the Temple committee 
continued being controlled by the Lu lineage up to 2004. Most informants of the non-Lu 
surnames above sixty still commented that the Temple of Benevolence is the temple of the Lu 
lineage. They saw a continuation of surname politics and group suppression from the republican 
period to the reform era. They neglected the fact that in daily life, the Lu lineage no longer 
controlled their access to economic means. The nature of group differentiation in the reform is 
very different from that of the republican era; however, the elders of the non-Lu surnames did 
not seem to recognize this fact. This blindness is led by the collective ideal of community 
proposed by the party cadre that suggests any kind of group differentiation is wrong.  
  The whole energy at the early stage of the revival movement was channeled to deal with 
surname politics. As a result, West Mountain lost its chance to develop traditional practices to 
support its members in the market transition. In interviews, none of the local leaders who 
participated in the Procession and the Temple in the 90s mentioned any concerns of the market 
transition. Thus, it is not surprising to observe a sudden change of dynamics of local politics after 
2000, when the market of low-skilled jobs was more open than ever. In the next section, I discuss 
the cultural processes of community building and then turn to what kind of community West 
Mountain has become since the turn of 2000.  
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[IV] Cultural Processes of Community Building 
 
  The last section focused on the social process and discussed how the issue of surname 
politics limited community building in West Mountain. This section turns to the cultural process. 
As showed in the second section, when reviving the Procession in 1993, the party cadre defined 
the collective ideal of community building and arranged the Procession to corresponding to the 
collective ideal of community. There is one important cultural aspect they left open, however: 
the symbol, Lord Grace. No matter how secular the new arrangement of the Procession, holding 
the statue of Lord Grace in the Procession makes Lord Grace symbolize the collective. What 
does Lord Grace represent? Does Lord Grace have supernatural power? Is Lord Grace in favor of 
the Lu lineage as members believe? Or can Lord Grace impartially bless every surname group of 
West Mountain? And, foremost, what is commemorated in the Procession, Lord Grace or 
something else?   
  These questions are left open to personal interpretation. The party cadre and the temple 
committee made no attempt to define the symbol. The party cadre did not want to call local 
people superstitious, and the temple committee (of whom the majority is of Lu surname) wanted 
distance from the old model of stratification. The symbol of the old model of stratification was 
thus left ambiguous. What I end up observing is a wide open, free interpretation of Lord Grace 
with little correspondence to community order.  
I argue the basic message of the community deity has a strong connotation with the ideal 
of community, and this has consequence in shaping community building. In West Mountain, the 
only coherent message about Lord Grace is that Lord Grace is responsive toward his believers 
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to Lord Grace, the more blessing he can earn from Lord Grace. In this message, individual 
utilitarian is the key message, and Lord Grace has an ambivalent connotation with the 
community as a whole. This problem with the symbol origins from the past sin of the symbol, 
further restricts the symbol to support the collective aspect of community. To demonstrate the 
problem of the symbol, in what follows I closely examine narratives of the history of the 
Procession and the symbol of Lord Grace.  
 
A) Two Competing Narratives of the History of the Procession 
  From very early on in my fieldwork, I noticed that there were different versions of the 
history of the Procession, which led individuals to believe in a different object that was assumed 
to be commemorated in the Procession. This part first discusses different versions of the history 
of the Procession, and the next part turns to the commemorated object. I summarize two 
competing, contradictory narratives in the history of the Procession: the narrative of stratification 
and the narrative of the communist revolt. The first version comes from memories of the elders, 
while the second version is a new creation of the past twenty-years that circulates among 
younger generations. In what follows, I provide examples of these two narratives.   
  In the narrative of stratification, the Procession is understood as a means for wealthy Lu 
members to control the locality. Lord Grace is a family deity of the Lu lineage. People were 
divided according to their surname groups and each surname group carried different deities that 
reflected the power structure of the community. Lu members remembering this narrative stress 
the superior statues of the Lu lineage in West Mountain. For people of other surname groups, this 
narrative comes with a resentment toward the Lu lineage. People whose memory of the 
Procession fell in this version are elders above sixty-year-old.   154	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  The narrative of the communist revolt is a new creation starting from 1985, when the 
elders linked the Five-One-Three Communist Revolt with the Temple of the Benevolence to 
avoid the risk of political persecution. In this version, leaders of the Revolt gathered at the 
Temple to plot the revolt. There was no connection between the Revolt and the Procession in the 
initial version. The narrative of the history of the Procession and the Revolt kept developing. By 
2008, one of my informants in his late thirties, articulated the history of the Procession as 
follows: 
A day before the Five-one-three Communist Revolt, which happened in 1928, the leaders gathered in the 
Temple of Benevolence to plot the revolt. In the meeting, they offered incense to Lord Grace and asked for 
blessing… The Revolt succeed and local people believed that it must have been due to the blessing from 
Lord Grace… It was one of the earliest successful revolts and it was important for the communist party at 
the time. After the revolt, the local people held a procession to thank Lord Grace… The revolt happened on 
May thirteenth, which was the eighth day of the fourth lunar month…  
The narrative of the communist revolt of the Procession is a new creation based on the 
official history of the Five-One-Three Communist Revolt. As the first successful communist 
revolt in Fujian province, the Five-One-Three Revolt is taught in school and even elementary 
school age kids know about this revolt. This version of the history of the Procession, therefore, 
makes sense for people who are educated under the communist regime. Furthermore, local 
people use their knowledge about the Revolt and add it to the history of the Procession.     
The elders are aware of the narrative of the communist revolt, and since the beginning of 
my fieldwork, they told me to ignore this version because it was false. For example, May 
13,1928 was not the eighth day of the fourth lunar month of the year. In addition, the Procession 
began long before the Revolt in 1928. The elders, however, have no intention of dealing with the 
false narrative. On a number of occasions, elders were present when I spoke to young people, 
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anything in the face to these young people. When these young people left, however, they did 
emphasize to me that the narrative of the communist revolt were false  
It is important to note that the above two narratives are a summary from a number of 
stories that collected from informants. There is no standard version of either narrative, although 
the narratives of stratification are more similar than the communist revolt version. The major 
variation of the narrative of stratification is about the surname groups that carry the patriarch 
Buddha and Junior Prince. The narrative of the communist revolt is less standardized. Within the 
variation of this narrative, two points are often mentioned, the first being that the Revolt was 
successful because of the magic power of Lord Grace. The second one that the Procession was to 
commemorate the Revolt.  
More often, informants cannot provide a full account of the history of the Procession, and 
even when they try, the narrative of the communist revolt is mixed with the stratification one. 
For example, one informant replied to my inquiry of the history of the Procession in the 
following way:  
Well, I am not sure about the history of the Procession. I know very little about the history… I think the 
Procession has something to do with the Five-One-Three Revolt. Well… as to the link between the 
Procession and the Revolt, I am not sure… You have to talk to the elder managing the Temple. I really 
don’t know… I am sorry that I am of very little help to you. 
I received many such responses from people, especially those under fifty. The other example, 
given by a Lu farmer in his early fifties, is a mixture of the two versions. 
The Procession started after the success of the Five-One-Three revolt. Villagers held the Procession in the 
name of commemorating the Revolt. This was only a disguise from political persecution. The true attempt 
was to pay respect to Lord Grace, and to ask a blessing from Lord Grace… Lu members dominated the 
Procession, and the group was divided into four according to the power and wealth of each group… 
Although the elders are aware of the narrative of the communist revolt and say that is a 
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toward the stratification narrative. As discussed earlier, at the beginning of the revival of the 
Procession, the local cadre aimed to correct the stratification legacy. The message that the elders 
emphasized at the initial stage of the revival of the Procession led the younger generations to 
believe the link between the communist revolt and the Procession.  
 
B) What is commemorated in the Procession, Lord Grace or the Five-One-Three Communist 
Revolt? 
  One might argue that the correct history of the Procession is not important. After all, it is 
common that local people remember little of the history of the group to which they belong, that 
they remember the past incorrectly, or they believe in a false history. The emphasis here is not 
the correct version of the past history, rather I argue that what is commemorated symbolizes the 
collective and impacts community building. This is why we need to take a closer look at what 
each version of the history of the Procession stands for.  
There are two types of answers on what is commemorated in the Procession: Lord Grace, 
and the communist revolt. When the commemorated object is Lord Grace, the collective links 
with the magic power as a sacred entity. The fate of individual members is determined by the 
collective, represented by Lord Grace, and individuals pray for fortune for themselves and the 
collective. In contrast, when the commemorated object is the communist revolt, the collective 
links with the communist state, and the collective exists only because of the state.7 In addition, 
the commemoration (referring to the Procession) has no magic power and cannot determine the 
fate of the collective and individual. The collective is a secure entity that individuals can choose 
to take part in it or not.  
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These two objects of commemoration are not an either-or choice. A few informants 
thought that the Procession commemorates both Lord Grace and the communist revolt. In this 
understanding, the collective has both faces: a sacred entity with magic forces and a secular 
entity emphasizing individual choices. The magic force in this perspective is more likely to be 
conceived in individualist perspective with little concern over the community order.     
In sum, Lord Grace in local people’s narrative has little association with the community 
order. Lord Grace as a representation of the collective is mostly understood from an individual 
utilitarian perspective, which in the past was to bless the growth of crops, and now is the wealth 
of individual business. Solidarity, an important guideline for the local cadre to arrange the 
Procession, has very little room in the symbol of Lord Grace. The symbol does not carry the 
equivalent meaning as the collective ideal of community. This discrepancy undermines the effect 
of the Procession on community building. 
In saying that Lord Grace fails to carry the meaning of solidarity does not mean that the 
Procession is a complete failure. Solidarity can be generated through mobilizing people together 
to accomplish a collective task. In this regard, the Procession has successfully generated a sense 
of solidarity and community on younger generations. It is only that the secular version of the 
collective generates less a sense of morality, which is an important element contributing to the 
maintenance of community order and solidarity.   
 
[V] A Hometown of Out-migrant Workers 
 
  West Mountain is a community with a collective identity. The lineage identity has 
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their families. Friendship based on affection and shared hometown identity has replaced the 
importance of the lineage identity. Friendship from youth, such as playmates and classmates in 
elementary and high school, are particular important in providing material and emotional support 
to deal with difficulties and hardship in the city. 
  Community members, especially young out-migrant workers, enthusiastically take part in 
the Procession, and they consider it the most important occasion to celebrate and strengthen their 
hometown identity. The young generations do not associate the Procession with surname and 
group politics, and neither do they remember much about the past history of class suppression. 
They compete for the position of the premier and vice-premier of the Procession to receive good 
fortune to survive in the market economy.  
  This seemingly sudden transition to an egalitarian community has undergone a longer 
transition than what is told by the surface story: that is, the rapid transition of the qualifications 
and responsibilities of the premier. The transition to an egalitarian community was accomplished 
by market forces turning the local community into a hometown of out-migrant workers at the 
turn of 2000.   
  In contrast to the intensive surname politics at the community level, in the economic 
sphere, blood ties had not the determining factor for work relations and collaboration since the 
beginning of the collectivization period. In the 1980s, peasants and construction workers were 
the most prevalent outside community. All informants related that at the time the five to ten 
people who formed a work team usually came from the same village and were friends or 
relatives who could work together harmoniously. The blood ties did not determine the working 
relationship. In other words, within a social network (which usually is a village), people chose to 
work with people who they could more easily get along with, rather than their relation by blood.  159	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  Personal networks are the only resource that villagers have from the local community, 
and it has limited utility. The exchange among villagers of West Mountain is limited to 
information for job allocation in low skill industry, but not new business opportunities or 
economy capital. Villagers of West Mountain never develops intensive networks for private 
loans, as do villagers in Zhu Stronghold. The comparison of business models of West Mountain 
and Zhu Stronghold will be further elaborated in the concluding chapter.  
  Decollectivzation created generational differences between people who grew up before or 
in the collectivization period, and people who grew up in the reform era, i.e. those born after 
1960. These two groups have very different experience with the market and the community. For 
younger generations, their ideas have been shaped by the market, and they do not carry 
memories about the community (namely surname politics). In contrast, people, who arrived in 
their early adulthood before or in the collectivization period, still experience the community 
through the past memory.  
  The sudden decline of surname politics after 2005 has to do with the transition of the 
leadership from the older generations to the younger generations. When West Mountain became 
a hometown of out-migrant workers at the turn of 2000, older generations discovered that they 
did not know what to do with a community with such an out-migration flow, and they did not 
master the skill to navigate with market logics. Therefore, there was a gradual transition of the 
local leadership, which can be observed from the list of the premier of the Procession as shown 
above and also the change of the party secretary and the head of the administrative unit. This 
transition also happened in the family. Informants of older generations commented that the 
family economy had to rely on the younger generation, and old folks were outdated, and cannot 
compete in the market economy. The authority in the family, thus, shifted to younger 160	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generations.8 With the younger generation stepping into the position of leadership, the surname 
politics lost its prevalence, because the younger generation did not care.  
Today, because most young people live regularly outside the community, they do not 
need to fight over resources or power within the community. Instead, what they care about is 
their hometown identity. No matter how symbolic the local identity, or how little it is related to 
daily economic struggle, it is the base for young people to know who they are, and it is what they 
flight over.  
  West Mountain is a community that functions effectively with the local cadre and the 
head of the administrative unit governing political, social and religious order. The basic 
infrastructure, such as roads, street lights, and running water, was implemented in the past ten 
years with a governmental subsidy that the head of the administrative unit won from the 
township and county governments. In addition, the local cadre and the head of the administrative 
unit step in to replace the authority of patriarchs to deal with social and religious affairs and they 
have the responsibility to make sure that the Procession will be held every year according to 
local custom. The current local political leaders are middle-age businessmen who move back to 
the local community after spending ten or twenty years outside.  
  The local community provides important safety net for out-migrant workers. The local 
community relieves the burden to take care of the aging parents, and out-migrant workers leave 
young kids with their parents in their hometown. Furthermore, in an economic downturn, they 
can always turn to the local community to sustain themselves. With land that no one works on, 
returned migrant workers can easily borrow land without rent, where they can plant persimmon 
or tobacco plant, which requires little capital. The land a middle-age couple can work is about 
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fifteen acres, which, on average, can earn 20,000 RMB a year. (The expense for a person living 
in the local community is about 3000 RMB per year.) With a little capital, villagers can raise 
pigs or chickens that can bring in as much as 200,000 RMB a year depending on the size of the 
farm. In addition to agriculture, most young men living in the community drive coal trucks. 
  As for why the local community of West Mountain does not provide substantial cultural 
advantages for its members working outside the community, as the case of Zhu Stronghold, I 
would like to reiterate what I have said in the chapter on Zhu Stronghold about the use of 
traditional practices for economic venture here. To develop cultural repertoires for a business 
venture requires a sophisticated arrangement to link traditional practices with economic 
behaviors and also corresponding collective ideal of community to form a strong, solidifying 
community with floating boundaries. This kind of cultural arrangement cannot be developed 
overnight, and neither can it be developed simply out of rational calculation, as I show in the 
case of Zhu Stronghold. West Mountain revived traditional practices to deal with community 
issues irrelevant to economics.    
  Currently, the major task of the local community of West Mountain is to deal with people 
migrating out and back to the community. A villager not doing well in the market economy 
might move his family back when he fails in investment or to reduce living costs. Most people 
migrate to the city in their early adulthood or even younger, and most of them come back to the 
community for a few years before they take another adventure to the city again. The experience 
of Xinglong, the head of the Eastside administrative unit, illustrates the in-and-out process of the 
local people; it also illustrates the effectiveness of the local community in accommodating and 
benefiting from the returned villagers.  
I was born in 1964. In 1990, at the age of 26, I went to the capital of the district government for West 
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province to do business in 1999… I have earned some money in the past years doing business elsewhere. In 
1999, I lost 387,000 RMB because of a failed investment with a friend of mine… 
It was not that easy to save money in big cities. I started to consider moving back to Puddle village… After 
2000, the local government encouraged the development of professional farms. I moved my family back to 
the village in 2004. The investment to start up a big farm is not small. I put in 200,000 RMB and raised 200 
pigs. The revenue I earn per year is about 200,000 RMB… I have a son 22 years old and a daughter who is 
20. My son and daughter both worked in factories in Guangdong before we moved back. They live with us 
now. They also work in the pig farm… It took four of us to take care of pigs in the farm.  
Xinglong was elected to serve as the head of the Eastside administrative unit in 2006. When I 
asked how he got elected he explained, 
When I first came back to the village in 2004, I did not know anyone under 35. Being outside for fourteen 
years, other than coming back for Chinese New Year, I did not participate in village affairs. I seldom came 
back to participate in the Procession… I did pay the head fee for my family every year.  
The only community activity that I participated in before I moved back in 2004 was to serve as the 
president of the annual grave visiting for the founding father of Lu lineage in 1992. It was the first year that 
seven villages of the Eastside administrative unit held the activity… I made some money at the time doing 
business in the city. The elders of Puddle village recommended me to serve as the president. They thought 
that I was an honest person and I had some money… 
Although I had been away from the community for such a long time, when I moved back in 2004 the elders 
still remembered me. Serving as the president of the grave visiting activity of the founding father of Lu 
lineage helped. Some elders of other villages did not remember me at first. When I mentioned to them that I 
was the president in 1992, they remembered. They remembered me as an honest person and they knew my 
parents were kind… In 2006, I served as the president of the same activity again…  
Later in 2006, when I decided to run for the head of the administrative unit, I visited the elders of a number 
of villages… Although at the time, many villagers, especially young people, did not know me. The elders 
persuaded their relatives and villagers to vote for me… I competed with the original head of the Eastside 
administrative unit. He had been in the position for nine years. He did little for villagers… In the end, I got 
nine hundred votes and he got four hundred and eighty votes…   
The above case of Xinglong demonstrates that West Mountain does not provide any 
cultural resources other than symbolic identity of a hometown for its villagers to navigate 
through the market economy outside the community. The cultural mechanism works in 
maintaining the basic social order of members living in the community and assimilating returned 
members back to the community. The decision to move in and out of the local community is 
based on a rational calculation in the new market economy. The cultural mechanism to maintain 
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brief, symbols of the ancestor and the local deity do not prevent locals from breaking with the 
community, and have little effect in bring local people back to the community. However, social 
and cultural processes producing these symbols are still effective in maintaining basic 
community order and producing local identity.  
 
Conclusion 
  This chapter speaks to four general issues of this dissertation: the path of cultural 
adaptation, the intersection between the market force and community strength, and the group 
dynamic of conflict and unity. I here briefly summarize the case of West Mountain in light of 
these three general issues.  
For the path of cultural adaptation, my general position is that revival movements are 
used to respond to new challenges in the reform era. Based on the community past, and the 
relation with the new market economy, each community chooses different community issues on 
which to focus, resulting in diverse paths of cultural adaptation. West Mountain exemplifies a 
local community using revival movements to consolidate fragmented groupings. In this process, 
the economic transition is left out of the concern of revival movements.   
  For the second issue of the intersection between market forces and the community 
strength, my general position is that a local community does not deem to lose community 
strength and traditional authority in the face of the market economy. Instead, there are more 
complex micro-processes happening in each community, and both structure and cultural 
elements need to be taken into account. In the case of West Mountain, the decline of the 
community strength around 2000 needs to be explained by both structural and cultural forces. 
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decline of the community strength. In this chapter, I also showed the problem in the collective 
ideal of community that weakens community strength.  
  For the issue of group dynamics on unity and conflict, I take a position to stress the 
importance to accept and incorporate both kinds of group dynamics in ritual practices. I argue 
that a community can only be strong when it is able to maintain group coherence and sub-group 
differentiation at the same time. West Mountain represents an opposite case of this argument, as 
people in West Mountain do not accept the possibility for the coexistence of these two kinds of 
group dynamics.  
  The concluding chapter will further discuss and elaborate my position on these three 
issues, which are based on the three cases. I will also compare the three cases and engage 
existing theories on these issues. 
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Chapter Five: Du Village—A New Traditional Village 
 
  This chapter exemplifies a community building collective identity through the image of a 
traditional village of the republican era. The image of a traditional village is constructed through 
revival movements creating distinctive traditional space and ritual cycles. The image of a 
traditional village provides a distinction from modern life, but it does not alienate villagers from 
modern life. Local tradition becomes local pride. Only community members can take part, while 
migrant workers living in the village are excluded.   
   This chapter illustrates that what is practiced and claimed to be local tradition is a new 
synthesis accumulating from different stages of revival movements over the past thirty years. 
The new synthesis includes bi-annual ancestral worship revived in the 80s, practices of deity 
worship standardized between the 1994 and 2003, and beginning in the mid-2000, new 
responsibilities of community management of the Oversea Chinese Council (OCC) of Du village 
(equivalent to the lineage organization), such as organizing patrols to safeguard the community 
and coordinating with the Cape Crab government to deal with disputes over land ownership. The 
new synthesis is not instructed by coherent cultural logics, but is a result of external factors, 
namely, the state and community issues. The state defines what is allowed in the cultural sphere 
and provides resources for traditional practices. Du villagers work under available cultural 
resources and reformulate traditional practices to deal with community issues emerging in the 
reform era. Old cultural elements are inscribed with new meanings, and new cultural elements 
are invented to deal with new situations.  
  The new set of local traditions has three major symbols, which make up the temporal 
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order instructed by the local deity Baosheng, and the future guarded by the magic power of the 
Youyinggong (YYG, another local deity). These three symbols also work together to guide 
different dimensions of community life: a social hierarchy based on seniority, a village identity 
defined by the jurisdiction of Baosheng, and the individualistic economic model promoting by 
the YYG.    
Unlike the cases of Zhu Stronghold and West Mountain, which reflect mass participation 
and collective mobilization, the traditional practices of Du village involve no mass participation 
or collective mobilization. According to the local convention, only old people are responsible for 
traditional practices. Young people at most make voluntarily donation to community temples, 
without any community norm on the amount of the donation. Traditional practices reach 
individuals through everyday interaction and work at the level of cognition.    
  By not involving mass participation and collective mobilization, the cultural process of 
constructing collective identity is disassociated from the social process of creating patterns of 
social interaction. The consequences are unclear rule on group alliance and flexible individual 
group affiliation. These consequences further lead to power struggles, factions and corruption of 
the OCC. In this sense, the cultural and social processes of revival movements of Du village are 
very different from those of Zhu Stronghold and West Mountain, where the cultural process and 
social process of revival movements developed together.  
The case of Du village demonstrates a distinct cultural synthesis in an urbanized village, 
where villagers reside in the village with migrant workers. Du villagers benefit from the 
transition to a market economy through various state policies (such as the creation of a special 
industrial zone) and the closeness to the Xiamen city (later becoming part of the city). The 
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West Mountain and Zhu Stronghold, where the majority of adult villagers work and reside 
outside the village. As a consequence, Du villagers do not fight against neither their economic 
conditions, nor the cultural sphere laid out and defined by the state. They work with it. Revival 
movements and current practices are all culturally logical, but it is practicality that guides the 
development of the new local tradition rather than adherence to cultural ideology. Du villagers 
are freer to strategically employ and synthesize different cultural elements that might not be 
logically compatible, namely, the mixed use of practices of ancestral worship and deity worship.   
This chapter is organized into five sections. The first section outlines three key social and 
economic changes in the collectivization period that laid the foundation of revival movements in 
the reform era. The second section focuses on the development of the synthesis of traditional 
practices in Du village. According to the content of revival movements and state intervention, 
revival movements can be divided into three stages. This section examines the goals and content 
of revival movements in these three stages. The third section examines the synthesis in present 
day practices. In specific, this section asks how this set of new local traditions work together. 
The fourth section investigates the development and transformation of the leadership in the OCC 
to demonstrate the consequence of an unstable structure of social relations. In addressing the 
question of how new local traditions shape communal and individual life, the fifth section 
summarizes three impacts: flexible group affiliation, low social mobilization, and a cultural 
framework distinguishing traditional practices from modern life. 
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[I] Background 
  This section describes three key social and economic changes in the collectivization 
period that laid the foundation of community life and revival movements in the reform era. The 
first change was in the hierarchical lineage structure, which was broken down under new 
political arrangements, and the social structure was gradually transformed into horizontal 
alliances among descent groups. The second change was the implementation of political units to 
promote village identity. Third, the state more closely controlled Du village by providing 
economic benefits and opportunities that most other rural communities could not have—Du 
villagers were offered opportunities to become state workers, which brought more income and 
subsidy than peasants. As a result, Du villagers were more docile to the state than peasants, as 
workers could loss their job if they violated the state policy.   
  These three social and economic situations continued into the reform era. First, the 
horizontal alliance among descent groups became the pattern of social relations. Second, the 
identity of the agnatic group between the whole lineage and the descent group (i.e. the branch 
identity and the sub-branch identity) lost its significance, and village identity was further 
consolidated. Third, the state continued to provide new economic opportunities to encourage the 
household as the economic unit and to discourage collaboration among relatives.  
  Revival movements discussed in the rest of this chapter have been developed under these 
three social economic situations. Through revival movements, Du villagers do not attempt to 
change or fight against these basic situations set by the state since the collectivization period. 
Instead, villagers adapt and employ cultural resources to work under these given conditions to 
deal with community issues and pursue individual interests. In what follows, I discuss the three 
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A) The Breakdown of the Lineage Structure and the Horizontal Alliance 
In the collectivization period, the social structure of Du village was transformed from a 
hierarchical genealogical order to a horizontal descent group alliance. The the genealogical order 
was more stable and rigid. The lineage was structured through multi-layered grouping: the 
descent group, sub-branch, main branch, and the whole lineage. In the collectivization period, 
because of the suppression of higher-order lineage organizations and the implementation of the 
production team, the hierarchical lineage structure was broken and only the descent group 
functioned. With the breakdown of the hierarchical genealogical order, a new form of alliance 
based on functional necessity and personal interests emerged. I name the new form of alliance as 
a horizontal alliance because the higher-order lineage attribution ceased to matter.  
  Under the horizontal alliance, the descent group was the basic unit for ritual collaboration, 
and became the base to solidify a production team. The production team was an economic and 
political unit, but communist ideology did not replace belief in local deities and ancestral 
worship. Solidarity and morality still depended on community norms of the past. The most 
effective way to solidify a production team was to use the traditional ritual to bridge descent 
groups. For example, the fourth production team of Du village was known as the most solid team 
of the brigade. Its former team leader contributed to their alliance with descent groups. Back in 
the 60s the team leader formalized the rule that all households of the production team would help 
each other in life rituals. Leaders of the production team were responsible for monitoring and 
organizing all life rituals in the team. For example, every household had to send one family 
member to help in each funeral. However, the production team did not replace the descent group. 
Each descent group had the autonomy to handle inner group affairs. 
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meaning a descent group could only ally with other descent groups from the same sub-branch, 
and a sub-branch could ally with other sub-branches of the same branch. Under current group 
alliances, an alliance between any descent groups is possible regardless of its sub-branch or 
branch attribution. The new alliance is mainly out of functional consideration and fosters the 
exchange of human labor or political collaboration. Each descent group of the allied groups is an 
independent ritual unit. Compared with alliances based on genealogical orders these kinds of 
alliances can be changed more easily and the corresponding social structure is less stable in that 
the alliance could easily break down. This unstable social structure is the condition faced by 
revival movements.  
 
B) The Formation of the Village Identity 
The transition from the lineage identity to the village identity started in the 
collectivization period with the state attempt to consolidate the village boundary for political 
control. To understand this transition, I go back to the situation in the republican era. In the 
republican era, village identity was vague and the lineage identity made up group identity. The 
relationship among Black Mountain and Du village best illustrates the difference between 
lineage identity and village identity. Villagers of Black Mountain village were migrated from Du 
village and they belonged to either the first branch or the third branch of the Du lineage. In the 
republican era, they belonged to the same administrative unit. In addition, the border between 
these two villages was ambiguous. Villagers living at the border between Du village and Black 
Mountain village had a strong affiliation of the lineage branch and the sub branch without a clear 
village identity. An informant in his early nineties whose family resided at the border and 
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of the third branch of Black Mountain. They continued the practices in the 40s after they moved 
to the center part of Du village. His father was active in community affairs in Black Mountain 
but never in Du village. He commented that at the time individuals were defined by lineage 
branch affiliation, for there was no clear village identity based on the territory in which one 
resided.  
In the Maoist period, the state drew a new village boundary, creating village identity. Du 
village became a collective unit for the distribution of resources and political power. Du village 
and Black Mountain village were assigned to different brigades. Du village was in competition 
with its other adjunct village, Wang village, to control the Cape Crab brigade. Du village was 
established as a solid collective unit under this new political configuration.  
  In the reform era, lineage identity was exchangeable with village identity. There are at 
least three factors why lineage identity lost it significance and cannot be restored. First, the 
hierarchical lineage structure broke down in the collectivization period, as pointed out above. 
The second factor is that in the early stage of revival movements the local state still forbade 
lineage activities at a level below the whole lineage, which meant that Du villagers did not have 
a chance to fix the problem of the broken lineage structure. The third factor is the decline of 
group solidarity of the descent group in the 80s and 90s. In the decollectivization period, the state 
eased regulated of use of land, leading to families of a descent group competing with each other 
over land and fixed assets, such as old houses and ancestral halls. It was not uncommon for some 
people to pressure their own siblings and relatives to give up larger pieces of land or a bigger 
share of joint assets. The descent group, although still functioned as the basic unit of life rituals, 
began to fall apart. Less than one-third of old houses survive up to the present, while one-third of 172	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twenty-four ancestral halls of the descent group survive. These three factors restricted the 
restoration of lineage identity and structure.   
The transition from lineage identity to village identity was not accomplished until in the 
reform era, when traditional practices confirmed village identity. The process of the 
consolidation of the village identity through traditional practices, namely deity worship, is 
discussed in the next section.  
 
C) Individualism in the Economic Sphere 
  Since the beginning of the reform era, economic collaboration among relatives was 
uncommon. The economic model of Du village is based on the individual household (a couple 
with unmarried children) as the economic unit. This model has its roots in the collectivization 
period, and is further encouraged by the state. Below, I briefly recount state involvement in local 
economic development from the collectivization period to the present. 
  In the 1950s, the nearby area of Du village was designated a special industrial zone with 
a number of state-owned factories. A number of Du villagers were recruited into these factories, 
and workers of state-owned factories were economically better off than peasants. Meanwhile, the 
state closely monitored workers and could threaten to fire them. Workers were typically more 
docile than peasants for this reason.  
  In the 80s, after decollectivization, peasants of Du village not only enjoyed better 
economic opportunity for its location close to Xiamen city, but also enjoyed private loans 
provided by the state. Economic incentive was a tool for the local state to implement a birth 
control policy. At this time, villagers of Du village were much better off than most rural 
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while a great number of villagers earned money by transporting goods to Xiamen city. These 
businesses were mostly operated through individual household, which was the model encouraged 
by the local government.  
  When the Du village was included in a special industrial zone for Taiwanese factories, 
villagers were benefited through compensation for land expropriation and opportunities to work 
in the local factories. At the time, the GDP per capital for rural residents was less than 500 RMB, 
while Du villagers received three thousand RMB per person in the first land compensation. In 
addition, in the 90s, a number of villagers worked in the local factories. Working in the local 
factories provided new opportunities, even if it did not lead to great wealth. After working in 
local factories for a while and becoming familiar with Taiwanese factory owners, some villagers 
started their own little workshops specializing in a labor-intensive work (such as sewing logos 
onto clothes). These workshop owners made better money than factory workers, and they did not 
need to compete with big factories. This has been the path of Du villagers from the 90s to the 
present.  
With opportunities provided by the state, Du villagers have no incentive to take greater 
risks, especially since they already enjoy higher living standard than most of rural communities. 
Du villagers take advantage of economic opportunities provided by the state and its location, and 
they do not leave the village for better economic opportunities. Although none of the Du 
villagers are particularly wealthy, they are satisfied with living standards in Du village, which is 
almost the same as that of Xiamen city.  
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[II] Three Stages of Revival Movements 
 
  This section examines the development of revival movements in Du village. What has 
been revived in Du village is determined by two factors: the state and community. First, revival 
movements are shaped by the cultural sphere defined and permitted by the state and resources 
offered by the state for traditional practices. Second, revival movements are employed to deal 
with community issues Du villagers face. Combining these two factors, revival movements can 
be divided into three stages: stage one, 1982-1994, reviving ancestral worship, stage two, 1994-
2003, reviving the territorial cult, and stage three, 2003 to the present, developing self governing 
capacity. This section discusses these three stages. For each stage, I focus on examining what is 
allowed in the cultural sphere, what is the pressing community issue, and what is revived.  
 
A) Stage One, 1982-1994, Reviving Ancestral Worship 
Stage one is characterized by the open revival of ancestral worship and underground 
activities of deity worship. The open revival of ancestral worship was a result of governmental 
policy, although ancestral worship did not arouse much enthusiasm among villagers. Instead, 
villagers were more interested in reviving deity worship to deal with individual concerns of 
economic uncertainty and the reconstruction of the collective identity. Deity worship developed 
into underground activities as the local state tried to suppress it. This part discusses the 
development of these two lines of the revival movement.  
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The Local State and the Establishment of the OCC 
When the central state relaxed control over local traditional practices in the reform era, the 
local state saw local tradition as cultural capital that could be exchanged for economic capital 
through local development. The local state—in the case of Du village meaning Fujian province, 
Xiamen city and Xinlin district (from top to lower level)—was less alert to local tradition than 
the central state, and was more eager to promote economic development. Throughout the 
collectivization period, villagers in Fujian province received a great amount of remittance and 
substantial goods from overseas. This led the Fujian provincial government to see overseas 
Chinese as potential investors, and started to create policies to attract them.1 For example, the 
Fujian provincial government organized business investigation trips for overseas Chinese to 
investigate business opportunities in Fujian.  
Encouraged by the provincial government, the district government of Xinlin, where Du 
village is located, was one of the earliest district governments that made explicit moves to built 
connections with overseas Chinese. At the time, overseas Chinese communities doubted the 
stability of the political climate in the communist regime. To mitigate their suspicion of the 
communist regime, kinship connections were used by the local government as an effective 
strategy. In their business investigation trip, the local state also arranged a trip for overseas 
Chinese to visit their hometown. As early as 1980, with a great number of overseas Chinese 
businessmen in South-east Asia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan the Xinlin district government 
sponsored the formation of the OCC for every village with former villagers being overseas 
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1 The people of Fujian province have a long history of migration to South-east Asia, which can be traced back to 
before the sixteen century. From the second half of the 19
th century up to the establishment of the People’s Republic 
China in 1949 was the high point of the migration period. The migration in this period was back and forth. That is, 
people traveled between their hometown and the new settlement. A lot of people had at least two wives—one in the 
hometown and the other in the new settlement. Their offspring also traveled between these two places. Offspring 
born in the new settlement would be sent back to the hometown to learn Chinese and get familiar with the 
community back home. Offspring born in the hometown would be sent abroad to learn to do business.  176	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Chinese. The OCC became a semi-official organization that aimed to recruit overseas Chinese on 
the behalf of the district government, and to arouse identity from overseas Chinese by drawing 
from common ancestry and affection deriving from kinship ties.  
Although the state was hostile to traditional and religious practices, attitudes varied from the 
central government to the local government. The central government was concerned with 
ideological control and the transformation from tradition to modernity. The local government, 
however, was not so concerned with ideology, but rather interested in maintaining social order. 
In the reform era, as economic development became the primary goal of the local government, 
they were willing to employ whatever strategies they could to achieve this primary goal as long 
as these strategies did not violate the regulations of the central state.  
  Following this logic, from very early on, the Fujian provincial government distinguished 
traditional practices into two different realms, ancestral worship and deity worship, to avoid 
violate the central state policy. Although both of them were categorized as feudal superstition by 
the central state, ancestral worship was tolerated because it could be reframed as a secular 
memorial of a common origin of a group. In contrast, the central government took a stronger 
stand against deity worship, which involved supernatural powers. Thus, the Fujian provincial 
government tolerated ancestral worship but was cautious on deity worship.  
The Xinlin district government largely followed this dichotomy. It encouraged ancestral 
worship but restricted OCC from deity worship. This attitude set the general tone for the OCC of 
Du village in the early stage of the revival movement. The local government was only concerned 
with the form of local tradition—ancestral worship versus deity worship—but had no intention to 
change the belief of local tradition.  177	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Since the end of the nineteenth century, a great number of Du villagers migrated to 
Southeast Asia and Taiwan. At least eighty percent of all households in Du village had one 
relative residing overseas. In addition, Du village enjoyed a privileged position over other 
villages, as villagers of eight other villages in the area had migrated from Du village, and all of 
them had a great number of former members from overseas. Overseas Du members from these 
eight villages would also visit the ancestral temple of Du village.  
The establishment of the OCC of Du village by the district government in 1982 started a 
systematic, organized revival movement in Du village. The two sets of major activities of the 
OCC in the first ten years were the renovation of the ancestral temple (1982-1987), and the 
compilation of genealogy (1987-1991). The renovation of the ancestral temple and the revival of 
ancestral worship in the ancestral temple were the first two accomplishment of the OCC. From 
1987 to 1991, compilation of a genealogy was the major task of the OCC. Overseas Chinese of 
the Du surname were the main donator of these projects, and a few leaders of Overseas Chinese 
of the Du surname guided the direction of these projects, such as the style of the ancestral 
temple, and the format of the genealogy.  
From 1982 to 1991, when lineage activities in Du village flourished, what did these 
activities bring to the community? Commemorative rites at the ancestral temple left almost no 
impact on people’s daily life. The main reason for the low impact of the revival of ancestral 
worship was the breakdown of the lineage structure of the republican era that corresponded to 
ancestral worship. When the bi-annual ancestral worship was revived in the 80s, the ritual was 
largely revived according to what the elders remembered about the ritual practices in the 
republican era. Without the support of the corresponding lineage structure, the hierarchical 
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performance that involved only a small portion of Du villagers (less than ten percent of Du 
villagers were eligible to participate) and had nothing to do with the rest of villagers.  
The neglect of the gap between the ritual practices and the reality was not out of 
ignorance of the representative of the OCC. It was a result of state intervention. The local state 
only supported revival of ancestral worship at the whole lineage layer, and did not support the 
revival of any layer of the branch under the whole lineage. The local state forbade the local 
community to organize the lineage activity according to the branch. Instead, it requested to 
organize the lineage activity according to the production team, which resulted in further 
alienating the ritual practice from the lineage structure.  
The OCC worked under the state instruction and defined only the ancestral worship of the 
whole lineage as its task. The OCC in Du village had no intention to challenge the state 
regulation and policy, as the leader was chosen and screened by the local state. The OCC 
inquired into the district government every time they did anything new to ensure they were legal. 
In other words, the OCC was responsible to the local state; it had no responsibility to villagers 
and their requests.  
 
Underground Activities of Deity Worship 
  If villagers of Du village were indifferent to lineage activities, what were they concerned 
with at the time? Informants all pointed to the territorial cult. Since the 1970s, there was a strong 
bottom-up request to revive deity worship. The enthusiasm led to the first tradition-related 
project, the construction of the Youying Gong temple (hereafter the YYG temple), in 1976, and 
later on a number of activities in the 80s.  179	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Through the two cases of Zhu Stronghold and West Mountain, I argued that reviving 
traditional practices is a way that community members deal with community issues and new 
challenges brought by the political and economic transition in the reform era. The rest of this part 
focuses on the same question, what motivated villagers to revive deity worship when there was 
still political risk involved.  
There are two factors in motivating villagers to revive deity worship in the late 70s and 
80s. The first one is the individual concern with the uncertainty of the current situation and the 
future. The second is the concern of community identity. Although these two motivations appear 
simultaneously in interviews, the first one is stronger than the second at this stage. In what 
follows, I will explain these two concerns of community members.  
  Individual concern with the uncertainty of the present and future was brought to my 
attention when I first learned about the 1976 reconstruction of the YYG temple, which was the 
first deity-worship activity. This uncertainty persisted throughout all three stages of the revival 
movement. All my informants involved in the reconstruction of the YYG temple claimed that 
they rebuilt the temple because YYG is very efficacious. When I asked my informants what 
made them believe in the magic power of the YYG throughout the Maoist period, they 
recollected stories of wealthy overseas Chinese receiving blessings from the YYG in the 
republican period. YYG was memorized as a deity of fortune and luck. Although only some bold 
villagers secretly worshipped the YYG in the Maoist period, the belief in the efficacy of the 
YYG did not fade.   
I view the reconstruction of the YYG temple as a way for villagers to react to uncertainty 
and new opportunities that might follow by the death of chairman Mao. My informants did not 
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construction project, which was right after the death of chairman Mao. The YYG was revived to 
cope with the sense of uncertainty at the time, and although this construction project was 
collectively mobilized, none of my informants mentioned community order or collective identity 
as their motivation for the project. The motivation was to seek blessing from the YYG for 
individual households, even though it was a collective project.  
Under this context, it is no wonder no community-wide organization was formed after the 
construction project. Nothing changed at the community level. The only difference was that after 
the restoration of the temple, villagers began celebrating anniversaries, and people in nearby 
areas came to participate in the festival. During this time, people were poor and could only offer 
rice cakes in sacrifice to the deities. Although the festival attracted more and more people, the 
celebration was limited to sacrifices provided by individual households. Organized celebration 
with rituals performed by Daoists and opera performance did not start until the early 1990s. 
Throughout all these years of revival movements, the YYG had very little association 
with community order. I will further elaborate on this point in the next section. For now, I would 
like to turn to the other deity that was revived around the same time. That is the great emperor of 
Baosheng. In my informants’ recounting of the revival movement of Baosheng, the individual 
concern of household well-being, and the concern for local traditions were both mentioned. The 
individual concern of household well-being persists, while Baosheng is considered the main 
deity to maintain community order among all the deities worshipped in the community. In what 
follows, I discuss the revival of Baosheng at this early stage.  
Baosheng was revived first by residents residing near the temple, and it took a few years 
to become a community-wide activity. This long process reflected the political risk at the time. 
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requiring a Daoist to perform) were largely neglected to further lower the political risk. With 
donations from a few overseas Chinese, the statue of the great emperor of Baosheng was restored 
in 1981 without any ritual following the installation. On the eleventh day of the first lunar month 
of 1982, four villagers decided to take a visit to the primordial temple of great emperor. Because 
they did not hold an initiation ritual for the statue, they brought back ash from incense burners of 
the mother temple to symbolize the revitalization of magic power. The next year (1983), six 
persons went on pilgrimage by bicycle. Since the activity was well known by other villagers, in 
1984 villagers of Du village voluntarily joined the pilgrimage by word of mouth. People who had 
cars or were able to borrow cars brought their cars. For that trip, they gathered twenty cars. Since 
then, a trip to the mother temple of Baosheng on the eleventh day of the first lunar month 
became a regular community activity. However, because they did not carry the statue of 
Baosheng with them and no corresponding communal ritual was performed, the trip was more of 
a tourist trip than a religious pilgrimage.  
Informants attending the pilgrimage in the late 80s said that their primary reason for 
joining the pilgrimage was to seek blessing from Baosheng for their household. The original 
temple was more efficacious than the village temple, according to my informants. In answer to 
my question why they went on pilgrimage together as a village and chose to go on the date set in 
the republican era, my informants claimed it was a good thing to follow local custom. 
Furthermore, they were generally interested in reviving local tradition. In these conversations, 
the connection between Baosheng and community order was not clearly articulated. Rather, what 
was fully articulated was the concept of local tradition as a shared past based on practices in the 
republican era.  182	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
The concern with local tradition further pushed the revival movement. In 1990, Du 
villagers carried a statue of Baosheng in a sedan chair and a Daoist was hired to perform proper 
rituals. In 1991, Du village played a Chinese opera for the first time after returning from the 
pilgrimage in order to thank the great emperor for safeguarding the community. Although not 
clearly articulated, the construction of the collective identity and the maintenance of community 
order stood behind the idea of local tradition. Song, one of the four persons starting the 
pilgrimage in 1982 and serving in the OCC since 1987, expressed it best when he explained the 
rationale behind reviving Baosheng: 
Baosheng was the first and only temple in the territory of the residential area of Du village that was fully 
revived, and which prospered in the 80s. This was because Baosheng was the deity who was in charge of 
the community order. Baosheng safeguarded the territory of Du village and blessed the village. In 
comparison, the other deity temples had specialized functions where believers went for special request, 
such as to cure sick child…   
This articulation is close to the understanding of Baosheng by ordinary villagers. That is, 
Baosheng is the most important deity to maintain community order. However, there are two 
questions about Song’s statement. The first is whether what he said truly reflects what villagers 
thought back in the 80s, or is a reflection of today’s interpretation? The second question is 
whether the image of Baosheng as the deity of community order is really a legacy from the 
republican period, or is it a new interpretation in the reform period? Both questions are hard to 
answer. No matter the answers, there has been a movement toward the construction of the 
collective identity, where the consolidation of community order is accomplished through the 
symbol of Baosheng. This movement was not as clear in the 80s (through my interview), yet it 
was clear in the next stage. 
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B) Stage Two, 1994-2003—Reviving the Territorial Cult 
The early 90s was the turning point for revival of deity worship. This turning point 
resulted from the change of attitude and policy of the district and provincial governments on 
traditional practices. On the one hand, the local government gave up the use of ancestral worship 
to attract overseas investment and shifted to infrastructure construction. On the other hand, the 
economic development resulting from the improvement of infrastructure gave the local 
government more confidence in releasing control over the territorial cult. Especially when 
businessmen and investors were believers of deity worship (referring mainly to Taiwanese 
businessmen), the local state further tolerated practices of deity worship. 
In addition to the change of government policy over traditional practices, the locality had 
more money to support the revival movement. In 1987, the Xiamen government designed a 
special industrial zone for Taiwanese businessmen that covered Du village and a nearby area. 
With the compensation for land expropriation and opportunities to work in the local factories, 
villagers of Du village economically benefited from the industrial zone. As Du villagers grew 
wealthier, they were willing to contribute more to revival movements. In addition, these 
Taiwanese investors and businessmen were all traditional believers. They donated to local 
deities, who they held would help factories in the local area. The major temple donors shifted 
from overseas Chinese immigrants to factory owners (mainly from Xiamen and Taiwan) and 
local people.   
Finally, in 1994, the OCC of Du village elected a new president, Congfa, who started a 
ten-year project of reviving deity worship. During his term as president from 1994 to 2003, he 
restored ten temples, revived corresponding temple festivals, and revived pilgrimage and 
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regularized, standardized, and expanded. Deity worship became part of the regular responsibility 
of the OCC, as did bi-annual ancestral worship.  
Under Congfa, the revival of deity worship had two guidelines: to restore tradition and to 
show off wealth through extravagant temple style. In what follows, I discuss these two guidelines 
respectively. At our first meeting, Congfa told me that during his term as president of the OCC, 
his guiding principle was to restore tradition (fugu). According to Congfa, the term—fugu—
meant to practice local tradition according to what it was in the republican era. This local 
tradition included buildings and mnemonic objects of the local deity, and also community rituals 
relating to the local deity, such as temple festivals, procession and pilgrimage. The term—fugu—
also became a slogan for Du villagers. Every time I inquired about why the OCC revived a 
practice or reconstructed certain temples, my informants unanimously claimed these practices 
and temples were part of local tradition, and that they simply acted to restore tradition.   
The slogan of fugu cannot be taken literally. When I inquired how Congfa reconstructed 
deity temples and revived community rituals, another guiding principle of the revival movement 
showed up: the use of extravagant temple style to show off wealth. Congfa considered old 
buildings of the local deity too shabby, and he wanted to replace old buildings with new and 
extravagant styles. During his term as president, Congfa organized trips for representatives of the 
OCC to visit famous deity temples in south China once a year. He paid particular attention to the 
decoration and costs of the buildings, rather than the meanings and symbols of Chinese 
traditional temple compounds. Neither was he interested in how buildings were constructed with 
different symbols and styles according to different types of deities.    
Supervising their own construction projects of the village deity temples, Congfa and 
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advice from construction workers on how to make it look grandiose and expensive. Except for 
two OCC representatives, Congfa and the rest of the OCC did not pay attention to the details or 
adhere to the traditional style of the deity temples. These two representatives often raised 
questions on the decisions of Congfa and the other representatives, but they were not taken 
seriously.  
The first project under Congfa’s turn was the enlargement of the YYG temple. The YYG 
temple was considered the most efficacious temple among all deity temples in Du village, and 
Congfa chose the YYG temple as the first project to reinforce this point, even though the 
building of the YYG temple was usable at the time, compared to most of the other deity temples 
which had been destroyed. “The size and decoration of a temple demonstrates its efficacy,” 
Congfa said. “The bigger a temple, the more efficacious it is.” The new temple was finished on 
April 8, 1995, having spent 320,000 RMB to expand to 240 square meters. The style of the 
newly constructed temple was based on that of the local deity, which violated the original style 
of the YYG—that of a ghost temple.  
Interestingly, Congfa and most other representatives of the OCC did not think 
extravagant temple styles to show off wealth contradicted fugu. Not only did they not spend 
much effort in investigating traditional forms of local practices in the republican era, but they 
also were very honest in pointing out revived practices that were not grounded in past practices. 
The reason for this, I argue, is that these two guidelines of the revival movement spoke to 
different concerns of community members: the extravagant temple style expressed individual 
concerns with economic uncertainty, and fugu was associated with the construction of 
community identity. Next section will further discuss the coexistence of these two principles and 
what this coexistence means to community building.  186	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The base for traditional practices, including the two principles of the revival movement 
and routinized annual ritual practices, was fully developed under Congfa. In addition, the OCC 
was transformed from a semi-official organization to a grass-roots organization that responded to 
community members instead of the local government. The OCC monopolized the culture sphere 
and was only in charge of community traditional practices. It was completely separate from the 
local government at the administrative unit and had nothing to do with the economic sphere.  
 
C) Stage Three, 2003 to the Present: Developing Self-governing Capacity 
  Traditional practices exhibit great continuity from the mid-90s to the 2000s, while the 
responsibility of the OCC expanded in the mid-2000. Traditional practices were routinized and 
standardized under Congfa, and continue into stage three. The two guidelines of the revival 
movements continue. Fugu is the slogan for practicing traditional rituals and to show off wealth 
continues being realized in endless construction projects. The OCC operations expanded from 
only being in charge of traditional practices to community affairs irrelevant to traditional 
practices. In specific, it takes on political and social responsibilities left over by the Cape Crab 
government. To illustrate the expansion of the OCC to arenas other than religious practices, this 
part will discuss the community background of this expansion, the resigning of Congfa, and a 
discussion on the responsibility of the current OCC.  
  Community life entered a new stage at the turn of 2000, when a large number of migrant 
workers lived in the residential area of Du village. Before 2000, factory workers lived in dorms 
in the factory, and they had limited interaction with villagers in everyday life. By the turn of 
2000, with a mass expansion of local factories (more factories were built and the scale of these 
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rooms from local residents. Renting out rooms increased the income of local people, but conflicts 
and resentment between migrant workers and local people intensified. In addition, the 
composition of migrant workers also changed. Before 2000, migrant workers mostly came from 
South Fujian and they spoke the same South Fujian dialect as Du villagers. At the turn of 2000, 
the majority of migrant workers came from inner provinces or northern China. These workers 
did not speak the local dialect and had different eating and living habits. Mistrust mounted 
among local people and migrant workers.  
  The formal political institution is underequipped to deal with migrant workers. For 
example, only two policemen are in charge of the Cape Crab administrative unit. These two 
officers are responsible for all criminal cases, monitoring illegal migrant workers and all other 
cases relating to public security. By 2005, migrant workers outnumbered local residents by more 
than five fold, meaning that the two policemen were in charge of eight thousand regular residents 
and forty thousand migrant workers in their jurisdiction. Villagers reported many burglaries and 
thefts, but unless the case involved violence, the police simply ignored the reports.  
Du villagers expected the OCC to step in to control community order since the turn of 
2000. This request led to disputes among representatives of the OCC. The majority of 
representatives of the OCC were over seventy years old, and they were only interested in 
traditional practices and were reluctant to take a strong lead in other arenas. Representatives of 
this older generation thought that young people in the Cape Crab government did not respect 
them, and they did not want to get involved in village affairs with the Cape Crab government.  
Congfa’s capability as the president of OCC was challenged after a car accident on a trip 
to an allied ancestral temple in March 2003, which involved twenty representatives. Six of those 
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Although the fault was on the other side, families of the deceased got very little compensation. 
Congfa was accused of not having the necessary skills and connections to handle issues outside 
the community. In August, Congfa stepped down as the president of the OCC.  
The OCC has undergone a transition to younger generations. A new president at the age 
of fifty was elected. In addition, people in their fifties and sixties replaced those representatives 
who passed away from the car incident, while existing representatives in their seventies or 
eighties are gradually replaced with younger generations. People in their fifties and sixties are 
the generation of the red guards in the Cultural Revolution. In particular, successful persons of 
this generation were those who were active and smart, and were selected to attend socialist 
education. After attending socialist education, these people were assigned to be local officials or 
village cadres. With this background, they have better leadership and communication skills, and 
are more adventurous in taking risks in the new market economy. Even after retirement, they 
have good relations with the local government. This generation started to participate in the OCC 
after 2003. Thereafter, the government of the Cape Crab administrative unit and the OCC have 
had more interactions and coordination over village affairs. Before 2003, the OCC avoided 
interaction with the Cape Crab government, and there was no coordination. 
The transformation of the relations between the Cape Crab government and the OCC is 
best demonstrated by the current deputy president of the OCC, Wuyi. Wuyi is from the red guard 
generation. Since serving as the deputy president in 2008, he has worked with the Cape Crab 
government to coordinate disputes among villagers. In specific, there were disputes over the 
compensation of governmental land acquisition in 2006. Because these disputes related to land 
distribution at the end of collectivization period, current village cadres, who are mostly in their 
thirties or forties, have had a hard time settling these disputes. Wuyi and three other new 189	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representatives of his age have participated in coordination meetings, and are invited to meetings 
of the Cape Crab government on village affairs. Wuyi represents a new form of authority. 
Instead of being subservient to the Cape Crab government, Wuyi is an emerging patriarch who 
provides leadership and coordination skills lacking in the Cape Crab government.  
The entering of the Red Guard generation into the OCC marked a turning point in the 
involvement of the OCC in administrative affairs, and led to an expansion of OCC authority in 
social and political arenas. In 2006, the OCC forbade after-funeral-banquets. This began because 
prior to 1990 the crowd was dismissed after the funeral, but in the 90s some wealthier families 
treated people who attended the funeral with extravagant banquets as a way to show off their 
wealth. In the 2000s, every household had pressure to hold a banquet after the funeral. Elders in 
the village thought that this was a bad custom and wanted to forbid it. Finally, in 2006, the OCC 
passed a ban of after-funeral-banquets. Since then, this rule has been enforced. With support 
from almost every patriarch, patriarchs of the household holding the funeral will chat with the 
family before the funeral and monitor that they are not preparing a banquet.  
In addition to the ban of after-funeral banquets, the OCC also organized patrols to 
safeguard the community. In the mid-2000s, with overflowing migrant workers living in the 
community, cases of disputes, burglary and thefts by migrants increased rapidly. The police were 
incapable of dealing with every case. Du villagers proposed to organize patrols in the community 
every night from 8pm to 6am. In total, they gathered 150 male villagers aging from eighteen to 
seventy to take turns in patrolling the community. This was very effective in the first two 
months, but then people started slacking off. The entire mobilization was not sustained for more 
than half a year. But, the community order has improved since then, for it demonstrated to 
migrants that Du villagers were capable of organizing and safeguarding their community, 190	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keeping migrant gangs out.  
  In responding to the new challenge of the community—overflowing migrant workers 
living in the village, the OCC has developed into a strong community organization that leads 
traditional practices, manages social order, and coordinates with the Cape Crab government to 
deal with community affairs.  
 
Conclusion 
This section documented the development of revival movements in Du village. Different 
practices and arrangements in the three stages developed the local practices of today. The bi-
annual ancestral worship revived in the first stage, practices of deity worship standardized in the 
second stage, and the new responsibility and capacity of community management of the OCC 
developed in the stage three make up the activities and responsibilities of the OCC today. In 
addition, the two guidelines of traditional practices formulated under Congfa’s term as the 
president of the OCC continue to guide traditional practices to the present day.   
This section focuses on historical development in the reform era, and the next section 
turns to what it is today. Accumulated traditional practices become a set of new local traditions. 
The next section addresses the following questions: how does this set of new local traditions 
work together, and what kind of community order is formed through this set of new local 
traditions?  
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[Ill] The New Local Tradition 
 
  “This is our local tradition” was the sentence that repeatedly came out from my 
informants’ mouths when I talked to them about present traditional practices. With dense temples 
in a small residential area and frequent annual ritual practices, the statement about local tradition 
is very convincing. Du village seems to be a traditional village revived from the republican era.  
  What is understood to be local tradition is actually a new synthesis. Old symbols are 
attached to new meanings, and old ritual practices are modified to deal with new community 
issues and changes in the social structure. Moreover, new local traditions establish the 
distinctiveness of the village by creating traditional space and ritual cycles. This image of a 
traditional village in the republican era stands out as a strong oppositional image to the modern 
era within which members live. It is this image that is the base of the collective identity. This 
section examines how these symbols and practices fit together and construct Du village as an 
effective community with intensive traditional practices and strong traditional authority. To do 
so, this section starts from exploring arrangements of the new local tradition of today, and then 
moves to symbols and meanings of the new local tradition. 
   
A) Present Traditional Practices  
Informants claimed that the OCC was equivalent to the lineage council in the republican 
era, and that the OCC was in charge of the same traditional practices as the lineage association in 
the republican era. The current responsibility of the OCC is the following: The OCC manages the 
ancestral temple, seven deity temples, and three temples of earth god. It annually hosts two 
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Heaven), three processions, and two pilgrimages. In addition, every four-years the OCC hosts 
another temple festival, a pilgrimage, and a procession.  
It is not hard to see that the claim about being the same sets of traditional practices is not 
accurate. The lineage council in the republican period managed the ancestral temple, at most four 
deity temples, and no temple of earth god.2 It annually hosted two ancestral worships, four 
temple festivals, two public worships, two processions, and one pilgrimages. Every four-years, it 
hosted another temple festivals, but no pilgrimage or procession. The comparison shows that the 
OCC manages three more deity temples and three more temples of earth god than the lineage 
council of the republican era, and the OCC hosts six more temple festivals. The other six temples 
existed in the republican era, but they were not run by the lineage council, neither were they 
community-wide temples. The OCC created two new processions and two new pilgrimages. In 
short, the community as a whole has more community rituals now than in the republican era, and 
the OCC now is in charge of more traditional practices than the lineage council of the republican 
era.  
 Temple rituals have been highly standardized so that rituals of a similar kind are 
practiced almost similarly with slight variation according to different deities. In addition, ritual 
practices are simple and do not require much collective efforts from all social groups of the 
community. These points can be shown through the responsibility of the OCC, and the 
responsibility of individual household toward ritual practices. The responsibility to prepare and 
host rituals is placed mostly on representatives of the OCC (around twenty persons); very few 
non-representatives are involved. Usually those non-representatives are sons of representatives, 
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and they are in charge of heavy lifting work, such as lifting the sedan chair on the procession. 
The main responsibility for the individual household is to provide sacrifices at the appointed 
place and time for processions, temple festivals, and public worship. Mostly women prepare 
food, carry sacrifices and offer incenses to the deity. Old men also visit temples, although usually 
they travel separately from their wives. Very rarely do young people show up, unless it is 
daughters or daughters-in-law helping food preparation. For pilgrimage, villagers only need to 
show up and take the bus at the appointed place and time. It is more like a tour trip, as villagers 
do not take any ritual responsibility, such as carrying banners or performing dances. When 
arriving at the destination, villagers go on and worship the deity on behalf of their own 
household, while a Daoist is hired to perform ritual on the behalf of the community. 
The goal of these traditional practices is not to collectively mobilize community 
members, neither is it to create a shared experience of ritual practices, as in Zhu Stronghold and 
West Mountain. In Du village, traditional practices do not require participation from every 
member of the community, and traditional practices are not designed to show collective strength 
by having complex and extravagant rituals. Only old people are involved in traditional practices, 
and according to the community norm, only old people have the responsibility of traditional 
practices. Young people might make a voluntarily donation to community temples. Traditional 
practices reach to individuals through everyday interaction and work at the level of cognition. 
Traditional practices do not rely on collective action and mobilization to provoke cognitive and 
psychological effects, as in Durkheimian’s tradition.  
Let me take Guomei, my host’s son and a workshop owner in his forties, as an example. I 
ran into him once after attending a temple activity. He was drinking tea with three other Du 
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he has not been to any Du village temple for years. He then asked his friends if they could recall 
the last time they went to a temple in the community. None of them could. They then made jokes 
to each other saying that before they retired, the only time they were obligated to go to the 
community temple was on the day of their wedding. (He refered to the YYG temple and the 
ancestral hall.) They then started to talk about temple activities in the community, and they 
appeared to have a basic idea about traditional activities going on in the community, although 
they did not physically attend these activities. Actually, three out of these four middle-aged 
men’s fathers were representatives of the OCC. Local tradition for these four men exists in their 
daily life and in their conversation with their fellow villagers and their parents, but not in ritual 
events. 
If this is the case, what is the goal of traditional practices in Du village? The rest of this 
section will show that the goal is to create an ideal local tradition. These distinct temple 
buildings and the ritual cycle cast Du village as a traditional village, and local tradition is 
represented through temples, and the ritual cycle is the core of the collective identity of Du 
villagers. In other words, the collective identity in Du village is a cultural construction seen 
through a set of symbols and an image of Du village as a traditional village.   
In further exploring the cultural construction of Du village, I find three key symbols 
constituting the ideal of local tradition: the founding ancestor, the great emperor of Baosheng, 
and the YYG. These three symbols form the base of the ideal community, determine the 
community order, and shape patterns of social relations. In what follows, I turn to these three 
symbols.  
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B) Three Symbols & Temporal Continuity 
  In exploring the effects of new local tradition on Du village, the three temples first 
revived shape the understanding of the community and the formation of a new community order. 
Symbolically, these three symbols provide a temporal imagination of the community: the shared 
past created by a common ancestor, the present guarded by the local deity Baosheng, and the 
future guaranteed by the magic power of the YYG. This symbolic understanding of the 
community is the basis of the ideal community. In addition to providing symbolic meanings of 
community continuity, these three symbols also guide different dimensions of community life. 
Namely, through ancestral worship a social hierarchy is established based on the system of the 
patriarch. With its jurisdiction, the great emperor of Baosheng defines community boundaries 
and orders social relations with non-villagers living in the village territory. The YYG promotes 
the individualistic economic model. Together these three dimensions of community life form the 
base of community order. This part explores meanings and functions of each symbol in 
community life.  
 
The Ancestral Temple: the Shared Past and the System of the Patriarch 
  Although villagers are not enthusiastic about ancestral worship, the common ancestor is 
the basis for villagers to imagine a community. The common ancestor generates a shared past. It 
is not nostalgia, but rather about rights and entitlement. The common ancestor entitles villagers 
to claim their right over the land of Cape Crab. This concept is particularly strong when 
informants talked about migrant workers. “We are hosts of Cape Crab. The piece of the land is 
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are only temporary residents, and no matter how long they live here, they have no right over the 
land of our ancestor.”  
  In addition to their land rights in Cape Crab, current members claim their entitlement to 
participate and manage community affairs. The particular community rule for community 
participation is named a system of the patriarch (jiazhan zhi), which can be traced back at least in 
the republican era. The system of the patriarch is a social hierarchy based on one’s fulfillment to 
the ancestor by carrying the lineage line. Young and middle-age men should take responsibility 
to raise their own families, and they are not expected to get involved in community affairs. Upon 
having a grandson the person fulfills his responsibility towards ancestors by having a male heir 
to carry on the family name. That individual can now rely on his son to take care of the family. 
Being released from family obligation, he now has time to serve the community and is entitled as 
a patriarch. Being a patriarch is a transition from an individual family obligation to an obligation 
toward the community and the lineage. 
The local convention of the republican era states that the hierarchy of the patriarchal 
system only counts male members. The hierarchy, from the lowest to the highest, is as follows: 
unmarried male members, married male members, the patriarch (jiazhang), and the head of 
patriarchs (jiazhang tou). Male members are not given full membership until marriage. Married 
male members are allowed and obligated to participate in the lineage branch. Later on, when the 
male head of the family has a grandchild,3 he is promoted to patriarch. Only when one becomes a 
patriarch, does one have the right and the responsibility to participate in community affairs and 
enter the ancestral temple. Above the patriarchs is the head patriarch, which refers to leaders of 
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3 The local convention of the republican era held that one must have to have a grandson be promoted to a patriarch. 
At the time, it is only a boy who can carry on the family line. With the implementation of the birth control policy in 
the 80s, not every family can have a male heir. To deal with this problem, Du villagers employ uxorilocl marriage. 
With the economic well being of the local area, Du families have not had a hard time finding marry-in son-in-laws 
from the interior. Thus, the local convention of grandson changed to grandchild, regardless of gander.  197	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the descent group. In the republican era, the head patriarch from strong descent groups managed 
the lineage council. Currently, villagers call representatives of the OCC the head patriarchs.  
  Participation in community affairs and the ancestral temple continues the patriarchal 
system in the reform era. It is under this system that we can explain why traditional practices in 
Du village do not involve mass mobilization of ritual practices. Instead of emphasizing 
individual participation, Du village emphasizes orders of social status according to one’s age and 
family situation. Thus, regular community issues are discussed in the OCC, and tasks in carrying 
out traditional practices are distributed among representatives of the OCC. If there are any 
important community issues that need to be discussed among community members, the OCC 
calls on a meeting of patriarchs, and only the patriarchs are invited.  
 
Baosheng: the Present Community Order and the Community Boundary 
The temple of great emperor Baosheng is believed to be the major guardian of the 
community that maintains the safety of the community. This is the main deity that informants 
associate with community order and morality. People do not go to the temple to wish for fortune, 
but for family safety and health in community order. The membership of this temple is exclusive, 
and only Du villagers worship in the temple of Baosheng.  
  The community boundary is defined by the annual procession of Baosheng on the twelfth 
day of the first month of the lunar year. On this day, the statue of Baosheng sits in a sedan chair 
and is paraded through three nearby villages (Silver village, Back Mountain village, and Pottery 
village) and then back to Du village. In addition, the procession also includes tours to Taiwanese 
factories within the boundary of Du village. Ritually, the activity is meant to purify the territory 
and maintain cosmological order within the boundary, and also to demonstrate ritual alliance 198	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with nearby villages. As factories are also included, the procession provided an opportunity for 
these factories to establish relationships with the local community.  
Participation in the procession is voluntary for factories within the territory of Du village. 
Every year, a week before the procession, OCC representatives will invite factories within their 
boundary to join the procession. Factories need to make a 1,000 RMB donation for a deity’s 
visit. The understanding is that these factories gain a blessing from Baosheng. The first three 
factories built in Du village have participated in the procession since the 1990s. One time a 
factory unceremoniously rejected the OCC invitation and two years later it went out of business. 
A representative of the OCC said, “By rejecting us, the owner gave his factory a hard time to 
settling in our territory. Those factories built in Du village are also ruled by our deities.”  
Instead magic power, the failure of the factories that declined participation in the 
procession is explained by locals as a lack of social connections. “It is important to build good 
relations with the locality, because you will need them to help you to solve trouble issues, such 
as indocile workers, local gangs, and the police,” the owner of Yi factory commented. Yi factory 
was the first factory built in Du village, and it was also the first factory that participated in the 
procession. The owner of Yi factory was invited to the banquet after the procession in 1995 and 
1996. He made a joke saying that “I should invite your deity to pass through my factory next 
year.” The friend who invited him to the banquet talked to representatives of the OCC and they 
started to include Yi factory in the route of the procession. By joining the procession, a factory is 
ritually recognized as part of the community.  
  No matter how much these Taiwanese factory owners believe the magic power of the 
local deity of Du village, the procession marching through local factories reiterates the 
relationship between Du village and factories located within the former village territory. Du 199	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villagers claim their position as the host, and factories are conceived as guests. Even though Du 
village has no legal rights on the land occupied by the Taiwanese factories, the procession 
symbolizes a local order that these Taiwanese factories need to follow to survive and prosper in 
the locality. This mentality is very crucial in the confidence of Du villagers in their community 
and in dealing with outsiders, including Taiwanese factories and migrant workers in their 
territory.  
  The meaning and corresponding ritual practices of Baosheng is the basic model for other 
community deities. In the republican era, Basosheng was the only deity to have a procession and 
pilgrimage. Currently, two other deities also have a procession and pilgrimage, and these 
practices are modeled after the practice of Baosheng. The only community deity that is not 
modeled after Baosheng is the YYG.  
 
The YYG4: Shared Future and Individuality 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4 The YYG should be categorized as the ghost temple, for two dead bodies are worshipped there. It is said that in 
Ming dynasty, fishermen of Du village found two dead bodies on the location of the current temple. Fishermen 
buried these two bodies. Afterward, villagers reported that the island no longer flooded, and at night, fishermen 
could see lights indicating the direction back to the island. Villagers started to worship at the tomb and later built a 
house that covered the tomb.  
A ghost temple is rarely a communal temple. A ghost temple usually comes with rapid economic 
development and is associated with an amoral request, such as gambling or prostitution. For example see Weller 
(1996, 1999). The YYG presents an interesting case in the way that it should be categorized as a ghost temple, but 
the YYG is no different from other local deities of Du village. Apart from the tomb in the middle of the temple and 
no deity statue, the ghost aspect of the YYG is gone. I collected very little information on the ghost aspect of the 
YYG, and therefore I simply treat the YYG the same as my informants: as a local deities.  
In the Republican era, the YYG temple was a marginal temple, and certainly not a community temple. As 
elders recalled, the YYG temple was very small and could hold less than ten persons. No one managed the YYG 
temple, and no donation box was placed in the temple. People dropped by randomly to offer sacrifice and make 
prayers, and they offered rice cakes on the anniversary. Other than individual sacrifice, no public ritual was held and 
no opera was played to celebrate the anniversary.   
The YYG temple as a community temple was a new creation in the post-Mao era. Choosing to revive the 
YYG as the first project in the 1976 is unusual from an outsider’s perspective. Informants told me that they 
reconstructed the temple because the YYG was very efficacious. When I asked for more stories, no one had 
anything from the Maoist period, which I attribute to the marginality of the temple. The marginality includes two 
facets: the location and the type of the deity. The YYG temple was located in the marginal area of Du village. It was 
located on an island, not the residential area of Du village, where the rest of deity temples were located. This 
location provided protection from political authorities, namely, the district government. In addition, the type of 200	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
  Informants emphasize the magic power of the YYG and believe the YYG blesses local 
development and individual fortunes. The YYG is a symbol employed to deal with uncertainty in 
individual life, as discussed in the second section. The YYG represents a symbol with both 
collective and individual meanings, and these two sides, I argue, correspond to the two sides of 
the economic situation that Du villagers face. On the one hand, villagers benefit from a state 
policy that no individual can control. For example, the local area was turned into industrial zone 
in 1987, and the overall economic well-being of villagers has improved since then. On the other 
hand, how much an individual can benefit from new economic opportunities varies according 
one’s capacity and luck.  
The YYG symbolizes individuality in the new market economy, as the YYG blesses 
individual households different fortunes according to the different relationships one accumulates 
with the YYG. On the anniversary of the YYG temple, individuals offer sacrifices and donations 
to the YYG. Donation is based on the individual—no community norm regulates how much each 
household should donate. The main motivation for the donation is individuals’ wish for good 
fortune. In addition, non-villagers of Du village can also make offers to the YYG, and it is said 
that the YYG equally blesses non-villagers and villagers with good fortune. An individual’s 
relationship with the YYG is based on a patron-and-client relationship.  
There is no given reason why the YYG decides to bless some more than others. 
Informants said that the more you believe, the more likely the YYG will grant you a big fortune. 
A villager who owns a construction team has given at least one night of Chinese opera every 
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deity—the ghost—is himself a marginal deity that is a symbol of resistance against the totalitarian power of the 
communist state.   
When I conducted my research, the YYG was treated no different from the other deities of Du village. The 
YYG is seen as a temple of wealth, but immorality is not associated with the YYG. No one ever mentioned seeking 
blessings for gambling, which is a typical request at a ghost temple. Indeed, sacrifices offered to the YYG were no 
different from other deities.  201	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year since the community resumed to perform Chinese opera at the anniversary in the early 90s. 
“It has become a custom for me,” he claimed. He further commented that it was hard to prove if 
his success had anything to do with the YYG or not, as he considered himself to have benefited 
from the good economy in general. But, he said, he believed it was a blessing from the YYG. 
“You just have to believe it, and the YYG will pay you back, even though you have no direct 
proof.” There is another story about a non-Du villager who owns three big restaurants. The 
owner lived in a nearby village and started worshipping the YYG in the early 90s when he 
owned a small shop selling noodles. Over these years, his business grew better and better and he 
comes back to make donation every year at the anniversary of the YYG temple. None of stories 
of wealthy persons blessed by the YYG is about a sudden one time big fortune that a believer 
gained. Instead, all stories are about long time commitment with the YYG and how these 
believers gradually accumulated their wealth through their own hard work.   
In addition to the YYG’s blessing of individuals, informants believed that the overall 
development and prosperity of Du village is under the blessing of the YYG because Du village is 
where hosts the temple. This perspective is the collective aspect of the YYG. The efficacy of the 
YYG is a collective construction of Du villagers. This construction started from the first 
construction project of the temple in the 1976. Since 1993, the YYG temple has been formally 
managed by the OCC. Over these years, the OCC pays particular attention to the YYG temple. In 
1993, when Du village started the ten-year construction project of the local temples under 
Congfa’s term of the president, the YYG temple was chosen to be the first project, even though 
the temple was still usable. After all the community temples were rebuilt in 2004, a renovation 
project of the YYG temple began. The project placed more extravagant decoration on the roof of 202	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the YYG temple, built more compounds attached to the central part of the temple, and 
constructed a garden area.   
Given the dual sides of the symbolic meaning of the YYG, the link between these two 
aspects—individual fortune and the community future—is weak and unclear. The collective 
effort in the construction of the YYG is based on individual effort to build patron-client relations. 
In other words, in the collective project of the YYG, individuals claimed to be motivated by their 
own quest for the YYG’s blessing. They did not have a clear collective goal in these collective 
projects. In contrast, in Zhu Stronghold, individual fortune and the community future are 
intimately intertwined together. Later on, I will further elaborate the feature and arrangement of 
the link between economic uncertainty and traditional practices of Du village.   
 
Conclusion 
  These three symbols and their corresponding practices provide basic structure for 
community life under the market economy. The community is structured with a social hierarchy 
based on seniority. While the elder is responsible for the community affairs, the rest are free to 
focus on their personal pursuits. Personal interests, however, do not threaten the community 
order. Instead, personal interests are connected with the collective through the magic power of 
the YYG who guards the prosperity of the community and individuals. Last, but not least, a 
collective identity based primary on Baosheng holds the community together especially with the 
community being open to outsiders.   
  These practices originated from local tradition and work to knit together a locality with a 
flowing mass amount of out-migrant workers that threaten the identity and boundary of the local 
community. These practices are in response to socio-economic developments since the 203	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collectivization period. That is, the three conditions discussed in the first section: the breakdown 
of the lineage structure, the emerging village identity, and the economic model based on 
individualism. Du villagers do not fight against the basic conditions laid out by the state. They 
work with it, and even with revival movements in the reform era they are not risk adventurers. 
They work with available cultural resources. In this way, revival movements and current 
practices are all culturally logical, but it is practicality that guides the development of the new 
local tradition rather than adherence to cultural ideology. Different elements are used to deal 
with different issues. As a consequence, there is contradiction in the new cultural synthesis. In 
particular, villagers mix up elements of the territorial cult and the lineage, and this results in an 
unstable structure of social relations and power. To which, I am turning to. 
 
[IV] Community Authority in Contention (the OCC) 
 
Du village represents a case where a community constructs and reproduces collective 
identity through synthesizing a number of cultural resources. I have so far demonstrated Du 
village as a successful case in constructing an effective new local tradition. This local tradition is 
a cultural construction that responds to various community issues and individual interests. In 
benefiting from the integrity of the community, Du village uses cultural resources strategically 
and leaves out issues that are hard to fix. The pattern of social interaction is left out. As the 
lineage structure broke down in the collectivization period, social relations became vary 
complicated and lacking in clear instruction. In their revival movements, Du villagers do not deal 
with this problem; they further mix elements of the territorial and ancestral cults, which make the 
problem of social relations become even harder to deal with.   204	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The mixed use of the territorial cult and the ancestral cult leads to an unclear rule for 
social relations. These two kinds of social organizations prescribe different logics of social 
relations. The ancestral cult emphasizes the glorious past of the ancestor, and social relations are 
organized through a genealogical order. In contrast, the territorial cult emphasizes the locality 
and magic power of the deity. The social relations are formed through a nested temple hierarchy 
of residing neighborhoods. In the reform era, the collective identity of Du village is based on the 
territorial cult, while the descent group persists as the basic unit of grouping. There is no nested 
temple hierarchy of residing neighborhoods, as three temples to the earth god are run by the 
OCC. On the other hand, agnatic groups above the descent group have no effect in organizing 
people. The descent group and the whole community lack a link in-between.  
Not dealing with social relations has a downside on community-building, especially the 
coherence of the community. This problem is most clearly observed through the power struggle 
in the OCC. Through investigating the development and transformation of the leadership in the 
OCC, I show that factions and corruption are prevalent problems in the OCC. Because of an 
unstable power structure, the OCC has limited capacity to deal with the problems of factions and 
corruption. Instead, the community developed informal sanction mechanisms, such as gossip, 
blackmail, and anonymous posters to monitor problems in the OCC. Although these informal 
sanction mechanisms worked in the past thirty years to hold the OCC accountable at the moment 
of crisis, the authority and legitimacy of the OCC was undermined. In what follows, I start from 
discussing the structure of leadership of the OCC, and then turn to the development and 
transformation of the OCC leadership.  
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The Structure of Leadership 
  The power structure of the OCC is unstable, and alliances within the OCC are 
unpredictable. Alliance is a personal choice decided by each individual representative, and it is 
subjected to change in each event. This situation has two causes: the selection of representatives, 
and unstructured group relations above the descent group. I start with the first cause. There is no 
clear rule for selecting representatives. The decision is not a collective one, but a personal one—
the leader of the OCC makes the decision. Within the OCC, the grouping is divided according to 
the production team, instead of lineage branch. As such, each production team has an equal 
number of representatives. The inner structure of the OCC does not directly reflect the social 
structure of Du lineage. For example, some strong descent groups do not have any member 
serving the OCC.  
  Once one becomes a representative, he is very much his own man in making a decision 
concerning traditional practices. There is no structural constraint on one’s position in the OCC. 
The production team has no binding power toward representatives of the same production team. 
In addition, with unstructured group relations above the descent group, there is no rule on who 
one should ally with. Foremost, goals in serving in the OCC are unclear. No one in the OCC 
considers himself having the responsibility to guard the interests of his decent group. This 
situation is very different from the setup of the lineage council in the republican era. At the time, 
the Du lineage council was equally managed by five branches. Each representative represented 
his branch. With this kind of structure, it did not necessarily end up with less inner competition 
and conflict. However, competition and dispute were easier to predict and deal with. With these 
general situations of representatives in mind, I discuss power struggles in the OCC over the past 
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The Development and Transformation of the OCC Leadership 
The OCC was incubated by the district government. In the formation stage, the district 
government approached Huiluan, an elite in the locality and asked him to organize the OCC. 
Thereafter, the OCC was dominated by him. He had the final say on every issue in the OCC, 
from the presidential candidate and representatives of the OCC to how to practice 
commemorative rites. His qualification, experiences, and character made him the first choice for 
the district government. After 1949, he was an elementary school teacher, a ghostwriter for his 
work unit, and had good relations with his leaders. He knew how to interact with officials. 
Because he was a member of KMT before 1949, he became a cautious and obedient person in the 
later political movements. Meanwhile, he used to write letters for villagers to send to their 
overseas families, and he knew how to contact overseas Du villagers. He also had strong 
personal ties with overseas Chinese because more than half of his own siblings and close 
relatives in the same descent group had migrated to Hong Kong and other countries in Southeast 
Asia in the republican era. 
  Before 2000, there was no rule for elections, and no terms of office. People served until 
they died. The president and representatives of the OCC were appointed by Huiluan. There was 
no division of labor among representatives. This formal organization had no clear rule. In this 
situation, there was no mechanism to supervise and regulate problems of fractions or corruption. 
These issues faced a big challenge when the first president passed away in 1991. From the end of 
1991 to 1994, because of inner fractions, no one could call for an election meeting. The five most 
influential representatives of the OCC co-ruled the council.  
  To explain the problem of inner fractions, I have to go back to the YYG temple. Control 
over the donation of the YYG temple was the core of communal politics. As local people were 207	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economically better off, each year at the annual festival significant donations were made by Du 
villagers and other believers from neighborhood areas. The OCC in the 80s did not manage 
temple affairs. Individual representatives who were patriarchs were requested by local people to 
handle temple affairs. Without a formal organization, financial management became a black 
hole. By the end of the 80s, donations for the YYG temple were in the hands of Chide and his 
two other counterparts, who were all representatives of the OCC. I do not know how these three 
persons gained control of the YYG temple, as none of them were alive when I did my fieldwork. 
Some villagers commented that they were aggressive and bold, and this point was demonstrated 
by the fact that Chide and his two other counterparts hindered the reelection of a new president 
after the first president passed away in 1991. These three corrupt individuals, Huiluan, and one 
other person made up the five-collective-lead of the OCC. By the end of the 80s, their corruption 
was an open secret in the village, and discontent mounted. This issue caused tension within the 
OCC, but no one dared to challenge Chide and his corrupt behavior.  
The whole situation changed when an anonymous poster appeared in front of the YYG 
temple one day in 1993 after the annual festival of the temple. The poster accused Chide and his 
other two counterparts for misusing donations, and for using public funds for private use. Later, 
Chide confronted Huiluan, who claimed false accusation and left the accountant book and money 
on the table. These three persons resigned from the OCC. A new election of the president of the 
OCC was held and Congfa was elected as the second president of the OCC. This event 
demonstrates the sanction power of the public discourse over public affairs, especially when the 
organization was not well formalized. In addition to the discontent toward the corrupt behavior 
of representatives of the OCC, the public was also in a great need of revivals of the territorial 
cult. Congfa in office was a response to this need.   208	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In Congfa’s ten-year term disputes and conflicts within that OCC were not any less. In 
his position, Congfa focused on the revival of the territorial cult. His policy contradicted 
Hualaun’s policy, which emphasized connections with overseas Chinese. Not long after Congfa 
took office, conflict began over the main task of the OCC. In his ten-year term, Congfa 
reconstructed ten temples in the community, and expenditures totaled around two million RBM. 
With such huge expenditures, commissions from these projects became targets of public 
discourse. In contrast with corruption in the previous stage, the corrupt behavior at this stage was 
institutionalized with more representatives of the OCC involved. There were unspoken rules that 
those in charge of public events or construction projects could take commission. Compared to 
the previous stage, when other than the three of the YYG, no one had any idea about the amount 
of the donations, at this stage, corrupt behavior was collective and had some constraint.  
The conflicts among representatives around 2000 became very complex, with a number 
of issues happening at the same time, including villagers’ discontent over the corruption of the 
OCC representatives, the conflict between Congfa and Hualuan over the main tasks of the OCC, 
and villagers’ increasing demands for the OCC to take charge of community affairs beyond 
traditional practices (as discussed earlier). From 2000 to 2003, there were three unsuccessful 
attempts to reelect the president of the OCC. The conflicts between Congfa and Hualuan became 
more open, and talk of corruption in the public discourse was more intense. In the 2000s, 
Hualuan supported Yuanlan to compete for the position of president of the OCC against Congfa. 
In these three elections, Yuanlan earned more votes than Congfa, but he refused to take the 
position. He did not want to take the position from Congfa. He saw the complication of the OCC 
and its problem of fractions. It was not only about Congfa. In a lineage organization, unless the 
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connections within the group. Therefore, Congfa stayed in the position until an incident that 
provided a greater chance to challenge his capability. 
As discussed above, Congfa finally stepped down after a car accident on a trip to an 
allied ancestral temple in March 2003, which killed six of representatives. Here, I further discuss 
details behind Congfa’s resignation. In August, a letter appeared in Congfa’s son’s mailbox. The 
letter advised Congfa’s sons to discourage his father to continue serving as president. After 
briefly praising Congfa in the position, the letter pointed out two main problems of the OCC: the 
non-transparent handlings of the income from the YYG donation, and the two factions within the 
OCC. It pointed out that four months had passed since this year’s annual festival of YYG and the 
OCC had not announced the donation amounts. In addition, there was no explanation on how the 
OCC was going to deal with the donation for this year. Again, the financial management was a 
black hole.    
  This letter also brought up the problem of factions in the OCC. It first pointed out that 
there were two factions: the faction of the lineage temple, and the faction of the YYG temple. 
These two factions represented two different ideas of the primary task of the OCC. One was to 
revive lineage activity, for which Huiluan was the leader. The other one was to revive the 
territorial cult, and Congfa was the leader of this fraction. The fraction of the lineage temple 
emphasized following the tradition of the ancestors, while the fraction of YYG focused on 
demonstrating the wealth of the community through extravagant temple buildings and rituals.    
This event again demonstrates the lack of a formal sanction mechanism within the OCC. 
Although there had been attempts to formalize a mechanism of checks and balances since 
Congfa took office in 1994, none of these mechanisms were fully enforced. For example, four 
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all four of them to be on the spot to open the donation box to take out money. Wudong—one of 
these four—said that on April 14
th 1996, before he left home for dinner at 5pm, they agreed to 
come back at 7pm to open the donation box. He returned at 6:30 pm, and found that the other 
three had already opened the box and finished counting money. He got into a big flight with the 
other representatives. That was not the first time that he got into a flight at an OCC meeting. 
Still, nothing changed. “There was very little I can do,” he said. He felt isolated by his fellow 
representatives because he refused to join their corrupt behavior. He stopped attending the OCC 
after this event. In the end, he left the OCC in 1998.  
After the resignation of Congfa, the OCC underwent a number of transformations. First, 
the dispute over the primary task of the OCC is not as extreme as it was under Congfa, and the 
task of the OCC over traditional practices have been well routinized to include both ancestral 
worship revived under Huiluan in the 80s and deity worship revived under Congfa in the 90s. In 
addition, Huiluan was gradually removed from his involvement in the OCC. Currently, 
representatives of the OCC have a consensus on formalizing organizational rules, such as regular 
elections for the president and other positions, and a clear inner division among representatives. 
Issues of corruption and factions still exist but are not as severe as ten years ago. Furthermore, 
the recruitment of new representatives focuses on younger generations in their fifties and sixties, 
and with the involvement of this red guard generation, as I discussed earlier, the leadership of the 
OCC expanded to community affairs outside cultural arena.  
From the thirty-year history of the OCC, representatives of the OCC can be categorized 
into four kinds of people. The first kind are local elites serving as governmental agents to carry 
out tasks designed by the state (such as Huiluan). The second kind are relatives of successful 
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kinds of board members are allied to the local government and reluctant to take risks to violate 
state policy. The third kind are prestigious patriarchs who respond to the interests of the people, 
and have charisma to mobilize the masses (such as Congfa). The last kind are intellectuals who 
are interested in practices and knowledge of tradition (such as Song and Wudong). The last kind 
have served as gatekeepers for authenticity of the past and legitimacy of the present. Recently, 
the second kind of people are less important to the OCC, and there is no new representative that 
fits into this category. The new emerging trend as seen in Wuyi’s case (the current deputy 
president of the OCC, see the third section part C for detailed discussion) is the combination of 
the first and the third type of people.   
The benefits of being a representative of the OCC varies from person to person. The 
material benefits of being a representative is that they and their spouse receive compensation of 
600 RMB when they pass away. Although this might not be much from today’s standard, it was 
a significant deal of money in the 80s. As for prestige and reputation, people do not gain a 
reputation because of their position as representatives of the OCC. Instead, people who have a 
good reputation are more likely to be invited into the OCC. For these people, they can reinforce 
their reputation if they have done things for the community. There is another kind of persons in 
the OCC that cannot be categorized into any of the four types outlined above: the doorkeeper. 
These people have low social status, and their social status stays the same after they join the 
OCC. They do not have any say over public affairs, and they do not have an opportunity to be in 
charge of activities that involve money. All they do is provide free labor for dirty work, such as 
cleaning, cooking, taking out garbage, and watching community temples and the ancestral 
temple. As one representative commented, “They are like free servants that are used by 
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from a strong descent group, or being politically influential. These people could then use their 
position in the OCC to benefit themselves.   
The OCC is an oligarchy. One or two most influential persons make important decisions. 
Huiluan and Congfa are the two persons dictating traditional practices and the organization of the 
OCC. Although these leaders claimed that their decisions reflected popular opinions of the 
community members, there is no formal mechanism in the OCC to debate or negotiate different 
views of traditional practices.  
  This section has given a conflicting image of the OCC to the one portrayed in Section 
two. Section two showed the OCC as a strong organization directing the path of revival 
movements since 1994. This section, in contrast, shows the inner conflicts and issues of the OCC. 
The OCC is not a coherent organization; nor does it represent social groups of the village. Given 
this situation, why does an under-represented organization still have such authority for leading 
revival movements?  
  In answering this question, it helps to understand the strict state control since the 
collectivization period, which Du villagers tend to acquiesce and avoid confrontation. The OCC 
gains its legitimacy primarily from the sponsorship of the state. Conversations with Du villagers 
(the past and current president of the OCC, the representatives of the OCC, and ordinary 
villagers) indicate that in the reform era no one attempted to challenge the authority of the OCC 
by establishing a parallel organization to lead revival movements. Even in the 80s, when the 
OCC refused to take part in any activity relating to deity worship, some patriarchs of the strong 
descent group who also served in the OCC took up the responsibility to organize community-
wide activities without challenging the legitimacy of the OCC. The president of the OCC from 
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  The OCC oligarchy was supported by the local state, for it was the most effective way to 
control the OCC. This structure continues to today, even when the local state no longer 
intervenes. The continuity of the oligarchy structure is a result of unstructured relations among 
the descent group and diffused interests of individuals. Foremost, no one has a vision on how to 
deal with the inherent structural and organizational problems of the OCC. Although the numbers 
of villagers openly complained and criticized the problems of the OCC and were dissatisfied 
with the current structure of the OCC, not even one informant had a vision on how to reorganize 
it.  
  Discontent villagers mostly chose to distance themselves from the OCC. The case of 
Mingdong speaks to this point. Mingdong is the current head patriarch of the strongest descent 
group, the Gutter descent group, and has devoted himself to consolidating the strength of the 
Gutter descent group through the reconstruction of the ancestral hall and periodically hosting 
activities in the name of their common ancestor. His family is also involved in political arena of 
the Cape Crab administrative unit. One of his younger brothers served as the party secretary of 
the Cape Crab administrative unit in the 80s and 90s, and his son is the current head of the Cape 
Crab administrative unit. Mingdong manages a construction team and he is economically better 
off than most of Du villagers. He has been invited to serve in the OCC by Congfa and the current 
president. He excused himself by saying that he was too busy. He told me that he did not want to 
be involved in the OCC because the politics within the OCC was too complicated and he did not 
see he would make any difference. He is more concerned with his own business, the solidarity of 
his own descent group and the career of his son. He does not think that serving in the OCC will 
benefit him or his concerns.  214	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  The example of Mingdong also points out one other feature of Du village. That is, the 
differentiation among the political, cultural and economic domains. The political administration, 
traditional organization, and economic organization separate from each other. Capital in one 
domain cannot be directly translated into the other domains. Therefore, villagers who are 
unhappy with the OCC or traditional practices simply need to remove themselves from the 
involvement, as the non-involvement does not hurt their activities in other domains.  
In the 2000s, the interaction among the three domains—political, cultural and 
economic—was more common with the change of political and socio-economic situations. The 
election of the village head costs money to buy off votes, and therefore, financially better-off 
persons have more chance to win. In addition, as I discussed earlier, some representatives of the 
OCC coordinate with the Cape Crab government to deal with community issues the village 
cadres cannot handle. However, each domain still works under its own logic. (In contrast, in Zhu 
Stronghold, the three domains work under the same logics—lineage.) 
 
Conclusion 
  This section illustrated the problem of the OCC, namely corruption and factions. These 
issues originated from an unstable structure of social relations and the lack of a formal 
mechanism to sanction the OCC representatives. The OCC representatives do not reflect the 
power structure of the descent group, as influential patriarchs might refuse to take part in the 
OCC. With all these above issues, the authority of the OCC is undermined, although the OCC is 
still the only organization having authority to lead community-wide traditional practices. 
  The OCC representatives have ambiguous opinions on the issue of unstable group 
alliance. On the one hand, they recognize it is the cause of the complex politics of the OCC. On 215	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
the other hand, they hesitate to revive the hierarchical genealogical structure. In the 80s when the 
OCC was established, the local state clearly denounced reviving the hierarchical genealogical 
structure and considered organizing people according to one’s branch or sub-branch affiliation. 
As a consequence, revival movements at the community level in the 80s and 90s did not touch on 
patterns of social interaction. The OCC focused on building a village identity and ignored the 
social structure. At the time when I conducted my research, the hierarchical genealogical order 
was fading from a villager’s memory with young generations not knowing it at all. It is very 
unlikely to revive the hierarchical genealogical order. Currently I observe traditional practices in 
Du village as a cultural construction focusing on the village identity and disjointed from the 
social process. The next section discusses what does this feature of traditional practices means to 
community life.   
   
[V] Three Features of Community Life 
 
  This section discusses the three main impacts of new local traditions on communal life in 
Du village. The impacts involve three aspects: group affiliation, community management, and 
the cultural framework. First, unclear instruction of group alliance evolves into strategic choice 
of group affiliation by individuals. Second, communal management does not involve collective 
mobilization. It only involves a small portion of community members. Third, new local traditions 
build on a cultural framework distinguishing traditional practices from modern life. In what 
follows, I discuss these three impacts of new local traditions on communal life.  
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A) Flexible Group Affiliation 
Although the descent group is clear and functions well, individuals in Du village have 
flexibility in choosing affiliation if their mother or wife belongs to another descent group of Du 
village.5 In the convention of Chinese lineage, only with an uxorilocal marriage arrangement 
does a man need to switch to his wife’s descent line. In Du village, even without uxorilocal 
marriage arrangement, however, there are increasing cases of individuals switching to their 
mother’s or wife’s descent group, starting from 80s and prevalent in the 90s to the present. 
Reasons they give are all the same: being from a strong descent group makes life in the village 
easier socially, politically, and sometimes economically. In other words, self-interest becomes 
the primary reason for people to chose the primary descent group that they want to affiliate with.  
Although the lineage ideology in Du village is not different from the cases of Zhu 
Stronghold and West Mountain, villagers of Du village have the most flexibility in making 
decisions in their affiliation. (In contrast, Zhu Stronghold and West Mountain, although also 
have inter-lineage marriages, do not have cases in which villagers switching their descent group 
affiliation out of functional utility.) Individual calculation over the use of one’s descent group 
affiliation in Du village is not common under Chinese lineage convention, and it seconds my 
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5 There are two kinds of alliance through marriage:  uxorilocal widow marriage and marriage within a lineage. I will 
discuss these two trends respectively. Uxorilocal widow marriage is an unusual practice to solve a great number of 
no-male-heir widow families from the Japanese invasion (1937-1945) and the civil war (1945-49). The conventional 
way to deal with a no-male-heir widow family adopting a male heir from sons of the deceased person’s brothers did 
not work because of the great number of these kinds of families. In addition, families struggled to afford the cost of 
a marriage. The best solution was that widows got married to some other family in Du village. Pre-marital 
agreement between her new husband and her deceased husband’s family was usually that one of their future sons 
had to carry on the incense of her deceased husband (meaning, worshiping the deceased husband as his father). 
Because the first and the second husbands belonged to the same lineage (usually belonged to different descent 
groups), this kind of arrangement prevented regret and violation.  
  The second trend of marriage alliance is marriage within a lineage. The introduction of the modern civic 
law in the republican era legalized same family-name marriage as long as the two parties are not immediate blood 
relatives of three generations. In contrast, the conventional practice of marriage was that people with the same 
family name, no matter their ancestral relation, should not get married; while cousins with different family names 
are preferable. From the 1970s onward, same family-name marriage became popular, not just in Du village but also 
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earlier argument of Du village strategically using cultural resources and elements the most 
among the three cases. The reason for the flexibility of culture in Du village has a deep root in 
the collectivization period. Traditional practices and the social structure of Du village were 
undermined more severely in the collectivization period than most other rural communities. 
Villagers had tried to accommodate the political control and maintain minimal traditional 
practices. In this way, villagers accepted more changes in the fundamental rules of traditional 
practices. This attitude continues into the reform era.  
 
B) Communal Management: Low Social Mobilization 
  The second impact of traditional practices on community life is that traditional practices 
are not designed to involve collective mobilization or mass participation. Only the elder is 
obligated to partake in ritual practices. The only involvement of young people is a donation 
based on individual will. In other words, traditional practices do not involve patterns of social 
interaction.  
  This kind of setup raises the question of generational transmission. As young people do 
not participate in community-wide ritual, will traditional practices fade away when the old 
generations die out? In Du village, I did not observe a breakdown or a potential breakdown in the 
collective identity of young people. Community building in Du village works at a cognitive layer 
through everyday interaction, as pointed out earlier. Although young people do not take part in 
traditional practices, they are embedded in a community associating collective identity with 
traditional practices. Migrant workers living in the village are the reference group for the 
maintenance of collective identity.  218	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  In the past thirty years, there has been no problem on transmission. The YYG is the main 
symbol that connects young people. The majority of donations come from young or middle-aged 
people. This kind of participation adversely effects the socialization of the young generation to 
community affairs and leadership, but it is effective in sustaining individual identity. Young 
people no longer learn their leadership skills by participating in ritual practices and community 
affairs. Instead, they learn their leadership skills in secular life and bring these skills to the 
community once they become the patriarch. This is the path of the red guard generation. This red 
guard generation are in their fifties and sixites, and they did not participate in revival movements 
in the 80s and 90s. In 2000, they gradually began taking over the OCC leadership.  
  This kind of model works in communities where members mostly stay in the community. 
It probably will not work in communities where most members migrate to big cities for jobs or 
business, as in my other two cases. In this aspect, Du village is lucky in the way that it does not 
need to deal with the problem of out-migration, as do the other two cases.  
 
C) A Cultural Framework Distinguishing Traditional Practices from Modern Life 
The ideal community of Du village lies in a new local tradition that is separate from 
modern life. The ideal community provides a distinction from modern life through a distinctive 
traditional space and the ritual cycle. The traditional buildings, such as the ancestral temple, 
ancestral halls and deity temples, are exclusive space for Du villagers to gather. Migrant workers 
do not gather in these places. The market for Du villagers is held in the plaza for Chinese opera, 
while the market for migrant workers is held on the road connecting the residential area and the 
factory area. Other than the YYG temple, the rest of the traditional practices are exclusive for Du 
villagers, and the ritual calendar using the Lunar calendar is distinct from the solar calendar of 219	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secular life. In this way, these traditional places and the ritual cycle create a distinction for Du 
villagers.  
This distinction through traditional practices does not alienate these villagers from 
modern life. Du villagers are not losers or escapists of the modern world, as are the subjects of 
the shelter enclave theory (e.g. Berger 1967; Hunter 1987), although there is similarity in the 
way using traditional religion to construct a distinction from modern life. Du villagers are 
successful in the new market economy. The distinction or shelter enclave is in relation to 
outsiders in the village. Traditional practices are not incompatible with modern life. Moreover, 
the new local tradition is not traditionalism, meaning that everything is based on the model 
provided by the past. Innovation and a vision of the future are inherent in this new local tradition.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter speaks to three general issues of this dissertation: the malleability of culture, 
the disjoint between the cultural and social processes, and the compatibility between tradition 
and the market economy. I here briefly summarize the case of Du village in light of these three 
general issues.  
On the malleability of culture, Du villagers demonstrate more flexibility in manipulating 
cultural resources, compared to the other two cases. The discussion of the new synthesis 
emphasizes that symbols and practices today do not have coherent cultural logics, although Du 
villagers only have a limited number of choices and these choices are originated from its cultural 
past. The case of Du villager leads to the question, why some pasts are more flexible than the 
others. I will address this question in the conclusion chapter.  220	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On the cultural and social process, my position is that revival movements need to be 
examined through these analytically separable processes. As for how these two processes work 
together, each case has its own path, and the intersection between these two processes affects the 
strength of the community. Du village is an example where revival movements work mostly on 
reframing culture, and neglecting the pattern of social interaction. As a consequence, Du village 
ends up with an unclear rule of social alliance and an unstable power structure, which 
undermines community authority.   
On the third issue of the compatibility between tradition and the market economy, my 
general position is that a local community does not lose traditional authority in the face of the 
market economy. In contrast to Zhu Stronghold, where tradition is framed as an integrated part 
of the market economy, Du village provides a distinct example showing a local tradition in 
contrast to modern life. Traditional practices of Du village are what distinguish Du villagers 
from neighborhood communities and migrant workers residing in the village. This cultural 
construction, however, does not cast tradition against modern life. Du villagers are not escapers 
or losers of the market economy. Instead, this cultural construction aims to preserve and promote 
their advantage in the market economy.  
The concluding chapter will further discuss and elaborate my position on these three 
issues, which are based on the three cases. I will also compare the three cases and engage 
existing theories on these issues.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion—Comparing and Summarizing 
 
  This study has shown that the same sets of cultural practices and symbols with different 
arrangements can produce different degrees of community solidarity and strength. Five forces 
shape these arrangements of social and cultural processes of traditional practices: the cultural 
legacy, new demographic process and living mode caused by market economy, the state 
intervention on traditional practices, political institution, and community issues. This study 
refutes a simple causal relation among independent variables (i.e. the cultural legacy, the state, 
market economy) and dependent variable (the community strength). Instead, I emphasize 
interactive relations among all the above-mentioned variables. For example, a strong community 
can buffer the impact of the state and the market economy, as shown in the case of Zhu 
Stronghold.  
This study emphasizes that traditional practices are at the center of community building. 
A sense of community motivates community members to practice local tradition, and practicing 
local tradition is still the most effective method to produce and reproduce community identity. I 
do not deny that there are rural communities failing to revive traditional practices and losing 
community solidarity. These communities are on the edge to dissolve, although this is not what 
my study deals with.     
My study also argued that economic success in Chinese communities cannot be attributed 
to the general Chinese culture, as there are more communities failing in market economy. 
Instead, my study showed that local people using traditional practices to deal with community 
issues, and risk and uncertainty in the market economy is only one dimension. There are 
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faced by all three of the communities studied above. As for which method one community is 
capable of employing, it depends on complex local situations. My study shows that a collective 
approach, as in the case of Zhu Stronghold, requires more sophisticated ritual arrangement and 
results in better economic achievement for community members as a whole. An individualistic 
approach, such as Du village and West Mountain, does not necessarily mean that members of 
these communities are failures of market economy, only that the traditional authority in this 
approach has less impact on the economic sphere.   
  My study does not counter the argument of new institutionalism in explaining economic 
development in China. Rather, it supplements new institutionalism by posing the question how 
individuals mobilize family and lineage networks in their economic ventures. Nee and Opper’s 
most recent work—the representative work on new institutionalism—argues that the economic 
miracle in China is not a state engineered program, but rather is supported by informal norms 
and social networks within close-knit business communities (Nee and Opper 2012). 
Entrepreneurs of his study rely heavily on collaborative networks, guided by the reputations and 
governed by informal sanctions. The private sector is able to respond effectively to changing 
market incentives and opportunities through such institutional arrangements. I show that using 
family and lineage networks in economic ventures requires sophisticated cultural and social 
arrangements, and it is neither universally shared by all Chinese nor an individual choice.     
  Throughout the study, I use the term community identity and emphasize the importance 
of community solidarity. Community solidarity, as I have shown, coexists with individuality. As 
in the case of Zhu Stronghold, community solidarity and individuality are dual facets of the 
community. In the case of Du village, the economic model is based on individualism, while there 223	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is a strong collective identity toward local tradition. I avoid the term collectivism, because 
collectivism is commonly connoted as opposite to individualism.  
The rest of this concluding chapter goes into detail to compare the findings of the three 
cases and discuss further implication for our understanding on community building and cultural 
adaptation. The first section recaps difference in the three cases. The second section discusses the 
interaction model to explain differences in the three cases. The third section discusses how the 
arrangement of traditional practices in each community contributes to community building. The 
fourth section examines the malleability of the past in the three cases.  
 
[I] Three-case Comparison 
 
This study compared three rural communities of different village types—village-in-the-
city, the village of out-migrant workers, and the entrepreneur village—through an ethnographical 
approach. The previous pages showed that revivals of ancestral worship and deity worship in 
these three communities is an effort to construct a strong community by the community members 
to deal with uncertainty and difficulty in the face of a period of rapid transition. This finding 
echoes my earlier claim that ancestral worship and deity worship are the means of forming the 
moral community providing principles and norms for collective cooperation. In addition, 
informants were very aware the need for a sense of community and could clearly articulate this 
need. This finding is contrary to contrary to Durkheim’s thesis in the elementary forms of 
religious life (1995), suggesting that the need for a sense of community is hidden.  
In addition to the general trend of revival movements, this study aims to have a 
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resources to respond to the retreat of state control and the new market economy. Based on the 
existing literature, this study was designed to emphasize the relationship between the mode of 
living and the functional utility of traditional practices. Cases were chosen with similar 
characteristics of traditional practices that might affect community strength, such as single 
lineages, a long inhabitation history, and strong presence of traditional practices. The findings, 
however, show that there is not only variation in functional advantages, but also great differences 
in community strength, power relations, and the cultural ideas of community building. Table 6.1 
recaps differences in all these aspects.  
 
[Table 6.1] Major Differences among the Three Cases 
 
  Du village    Zhu Stronghold  The West Mountain 
The key utility 
of traditional 
practice 
Social distinction  Lineage network for business 
practices  
A new hometown identity 
Cultural 
repertoire in 
community 
management 
The OCC is in charge of 
community affairs  
The Zhu Stronghold temple 
council mediates all aspect of 
community life, including 
public and private, as well as 
religious, social, economic, 
and political activity 
The local cadre utilizes 
traditional practices to gain 
legitimacy and moral ground 
for their ruling 
The cultural 
authority 
No structuring power and 
authority is limited to cultural 
and social domains 
Strong structuring power in 
determining power relations in 
economic, political and social 
domains  
No structuring power and the 
authority is limited to cultural 
domains 
The cultural 
idea of the 
community 
Temporal continuity (the 
image of a traditional village)  
Codependency (the pre-
existence of the community 
before the individual) 
Affection and belonging 
(egalitarianism)  
 
  The rest of this section deals with two issues that arose in the three-case comparison. The 
first issue is about the treatment of the differences in the starting point of comparison among the 
three cases. The second issue concerns the factor determining different degrees of community 
strength and the cultural authority among the three local communities.  
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  The starting point of the inquiry of this research is the first public activity devoted to 
traditional practices. In the initial design of the research, I chose cases with similar 
characteristics of traditional practices and expected to narrow the difference of lineage and social 
composition among the three cases. In the field, I discovered that the social structure and social 
composition of the three cases in the republican period and the Maoist period depart from each 
other a great deal. The differences are more significant than what existing literature on the single 
lineage community suggests.1 This is not a consequence of wrong research design. Rather, it 
reveals that in real life, local communities are more diverse than what the theory can predict, and 
it is impossible to find cases with the exact same social structure and composition. The diversity 
of the three cases presents two challenges. The first is the question about the need to extend the 
time period of inquiry back to the republican period and explain the events prior to the intended 
period of the study, i.e. the reform era. The second challenge is whether the difference among the 
three cases is determined by the difference of the starting point of comparison.  
Before addressing these two questions, I first summarize the difference among the three 
cases in the Republican period and the Maoist period. In the Republican period, Zhu lineage was 
a strong, unified lineage that included all Zhu surname villages of the same ancestral origin, and 
which was organized around activities of the Zhu Stronghold temple. In the Maoist period, 
although the Zhu Stronghold temple was abandoned, the basic lineage structure was sustained. 
All local cadres and leaders of the production team in the Maoist period came from strong 
descent groups, as defined in the Republican period. In addition, the most important ritual of 
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1 Existing literature distinguishes different stages and composition of the single lineage. Zheng (2001) provides the 
best typology of different types of lineage according to the size of the lineage and the management of collective 
properties. However, all these works only analyze lineage based on lineage structure. The complication of the single 
lineage community found in my cases is mainly from the intersection between lineage branch identity and village 
identity, and between using the ancestral worship and the deity worship as the base of the community. These 
variations have not been systematically analyzed.   226	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
deity worship in the community—spirit possession—was protected and continued to be 
performing, even in the Maoist period. To emphasize the point, no spirit medium was persecuted. 
In fact, the party secretary of the Sea-peace unit from the late 1950s to 1976 was a spirit medium 
himself. Throughout the Maoist period, he never stopped performing spirit possession. With such 
strong continuity in local practices and lineage structure, it is not surprising that Zhu Stronghold 
started reviving traditional practices much earlier than the other two cases. They began in 1971, 
way before the end of the cultural revolution in 1976. Therefore, I refer to the case of Zhu 
Stronghold as a case of strong continuity from the republican period through the Maoist period to 
the reform era. 
In contrast, the Lu lineage in the West Mountain area, which has a similar population size 
as Zhu Stronghold in the Republican period, was stratified into a number of cross-village 
alliances based on the agnatic relation and land control in the locality. There was no organization 
or ritual that organized all Lu surname villages into a unified community. In the Maoist period, 
land redistribution ended the material base of social stratification. However, the community was 
left with fragmented groupings. The revival movement, therefore, had to deal with this historical 
past, and had no ready-usable leadership structure to reorganize villages and surnames of the 
West Mountain area into a collective.  
Du village was a strong single-lineage community in the republican era. The community 
structure was based on a hierarchical genealogical order. In the Maoist period, because of the 
suppression of higher-order lineage organizations and the implementation of the production 
team, the hierarchical lineage structure was broken into fragmented descent groups. Out of 
functional necessity, descent groups allied with other groups of geographical affinity or affinity 
based on marriage. I call this kind of alliance a horizontal alliance because the higher-order 227	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lineage attribution no longer matters. A new alliance was not based on sharing an ancestor other 
than the common ancestor of the whole lineage, and the new alliance did not engage in 
practicing shared rites.  
The horizontal descent group alliance continued into the reform era, and is the base of 
social relations in the reform era. Each descent group of the allied groups is an independent ritual 
unit. The alliance fosters the exchange of human labor or political collaboration. Compared with 
alliances based on genealogical orders, these kinds of alliance have less bonding power, and the 
corresponding social structure is less stable in that the alliance could easily break down. 
Therefore, compared to the hierarchical genealogical order, the horizontal descent group alliance 
is not as stable or cohesive.   
In sum, at the beginning of the revival movement, the three communities had a very 
different social/lineage structure to begin with. Zhu Stronghold had a tight lineage structure and 
a coherent organization, while the West Mountain area was left with stratified social groupings, 
and it was stratified among villages of the Lu surname and ten different surname groups. Du 
village had to deal with the breakdown of the hierarchical genealogical order and worked in a 
less stable social structure of the horizontal alliance.  
  I treat the different starting points of the revival movement in the three communities as 
the background of this research. I point out the differences of cultural practices and lineage 
structure as the starting point among the three cases, but I do not explain differences. In my 
fieldwork, when I realized that there were a great deal of differences in the republican period and 
the Maoist period, I did all I could to collect data about communal life and lineage/social 
structure before the reform era. I did this through interviews of elders and gather local 
documents, such as genealogy. But to address the research question—how traditional practices 228	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enable and constrain local people to adapt to new socio-economic changes—I contend that it is 
sufficient to only focus on the revival movement. In the period of the revival movement, I focus 
on processes. That is, how a community responds to socio-economic changes through traditional 
practices.  
  Take Zhu Stronghold for example. Zhu Stronghold is a case of strong continuity, which 
raises the question of how it maintained the lineage structure and a strong collective throughout 
the Maoist period, contradicting what we know about that period. The case of Du village, on the 
other hand, fits the common understanding of the serious rupture of traditional practices in the 
Maoist period. For the purpose of this research, it is unnecessary to explain why Zhu Stronghold 
was able to keep its local tradition in the Maoist period. What is key for this study is to illustrate 
how Zhu Stronghold maintained and strengthened the community in the reform era, and how this 
process is intertwined with the emergence of businessmen. The maintenance of community 
strength throughout the Maoist period might be the same or it might be different from the reform 
era. Either way, it does not change the argument of this study.2  
  Having just addressed possible challenges to the choice of the time period, and stating 
why I do not need to explain the differences in the starting point among the three cases, I now 
turn to the second challenge: what if the differences among the three cases is determined by the 
differences at the starting point of comparison? 
  This appears evident in comparison compare Zhu Stronghold and the West Mountain 
area. Compared to that of Zhu Stronghold, the stratified community structure provided different 
ground for the West Mountain area to build the community in the reform era. The different paths 
of cultural development and adaptation in the reform era in these two communities might be 
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determined by the starting point.3  
  However, this answer is unsatisfactory in that it does not account for the possibility to 
initiate change. Why does a community with weak traditional authority not develop into a strong 
one, as in the case of Du village? Furthermore, the strong local tradition of Zhu Stronghold is a 
product of conscious reproduction requiring high maintenance. In addition, to maintain 
community strength Zhu Stronghold has undergone changes.  
  In brief, I overcome the challenge posed by the differences of the starting point by 
emphasizing process. This research is about how each community developed from the starting 
point to what it is now, and it is justifiable to treat different starting points as the cultural legacy 
or background. Nonetheless, the variation of the community structure and cultural practices 
among single lineage communities is worth further exploration as a question of Chinese lineage 
that has not yet been fully examined. 
 
B) Community strength 
  There are different degrees of community strength and cultural authority among the three 
cases. Zhu Stronghold is the most solidified community with the strongest consensus on 
community norms and rules, the strongest sanction power of violation, the strongest capacity to 
mobilize community members for collective action, and most integrated structure among lineage, 
political, economic and social spheres. In contrast, West Mountain is the weakest community, as 
the collective has no power over individual life other than collective ritual practices. The 
community strength of Du village is inbetween that of Zhu Stronghold and that of West 
Mountain. Du village has some authority over religious and social spheres of communal life, and 
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the community has a strong capacity to mobilize its members over activities in these two spheres.  
  These findings violate the general consensus in the literature on traditional practices. The 
literature assumes that communities with similar intensity of traditional practices have a similar 
level of community strength (e.g. L. L. Tsai 2007a). However, the three cases here all have 
extravagant traditional practices, in terms of the money spent, the people that are mobilized to 
participate in the rituals, and the degree of reviving traditional practices, compared to those in the 
Republican period. Contrary to what might be expected, therefore, my findings suggest that the 
intensity of community practices is not the determinant factor for the strength of the community. 
In order to understand communal solidarity, we need to inquire into the details of the ritual 
arrangement.  
  My finding also counters the prediction of the traditional authority from the general thesis 
on modernization. The common hypothesis is that the more urbanized and the wealthier a 
community, the less traditional organization is likely to have strong authority (Bell 1973; 
Inglehart 1990). That is to say, the remote, poor villages are more likely to rely on the traditional 
organization to provide social support and organize among themselves. Under this proposition, 
the local tradition in Du village was expected to have the least authority and to be least relevant 
to people’s lives. West Mountain, as the poorest community and the most remote, was supposed 
to have the strongest traditional authority and the highest level of solidarity.  
  From this proposition, it is expected that the degree of cultural authority is determined by 
the economic state of a community. My research suggests, however, that the relationship 
between the cultural authority and the economic state is more complex than a unilinear relation 
(similar argument see Portes 1973). The economic state of a community cannot be treated as an 
independent variable that is not affected by cultural authority. The economy and the cultural 231	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authority mutually shape each other (also see Patterson 2000). This becomes clear if we examine 
community strength across time. The wealth of the community could have been a consequence 
of the community strength, as shown in the case of Zhu Stronghold. The poor community could 
have been a consequence of a weak community, as shown in the case of the West Mountain. As 
for the case of Du village, traditional authority returns to deal with communal issues that are 
caused by the economic transition. In brief, the wealth and the degree of urbanization cannot 
predict the strength of the traditional authority.  
  In continuing the discussion on the strength of the traditional authority, I propose an 
interactive model with a number of factors jointly shaping the community strength. These are the 
local legacy, the state, the new market economy, and interests of individual community 
members. The following section explores this interactive model. 
 
[II] Cultural Legacy, the State, and the New Market Economy 
 
  This section discusses the relationship among cultural legacy, the state, and the new 
market economy. My findings do not support the deterministic historical view (i.e. Lerner 1958; 
Weiner 1966), whereby a force (usually assumed to be the market or industrialization) moves 
society in a determinant direction. In explaining the difference among the three cases on 
community strength, my analysis takes into account a number of factors: a series of cultural 
practices, successful and failed ones, efforts and agenda of the key leaders of these practices, the 
motivation of the ordinary participants, and the changing arrangement of the political, social, and 
economic structure.  232	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The position that no single force moves society in a determinant direction does not 
contradict the fact that in a particular time period one force might have a stronger impact on the 
development of a local community. In fact, in the past thirty years, a single force has had 
outstanding power in each of these cases in shaping the direction of the local community. In Du 
village, the state is the dominating force in the dynamic process of interaction among the 
political, cultural and economic domains. The revival of traditional practices and the 
reestablishment of the traditional authority have worked under the limited cultural sphere defined 
and permitted by the state. In Zhu Stronghold, the legacy of the local tradition is the dominant 
force in the interaction among the political, social and economic domains. Political and socio-
economic transition is navigated through existing cultural schema and framework. In contrast, 
the social structure and social composition of West Mountain are primarily dominated by the 
out-pulling force of the market that creates labor demand in the cities. The development of local 
tradition reflects the reaction of local tradition to this irresistible force of out-migration.  
  Throughout the dynamic process of interaction, three communities developed in three 
different levels of differentiation. Du village represents the most complete process of 
differentiation, which shows the separation among the political, economic, and cultural domains. 
This separation happens at the level of the organization among these domains and in the capital 
held by individuals. In the organizational level, the political administration, traditional 
organization, and economic organization separate from each other. At the level of the individual, 
the leaders of these three organizations lose connection among each other, and capital in one 
domain cannot be translated into the other domains.  
  West Mountain represents incomplete differentiation, as traditional rituals and symbols 
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leadership in traditional practices as a routine task in exchange for legitimacy in political and 
social control. In contrast, the patriarch is left with little authority other than instructing ritual 
practices.  
  Zhu Stronghold represents the least degree of differentiation, as economic organization, 
political administration, and traditional organizations are well integrated under the same rule of 
authority—tradition (although each domain has separate managing organizations). When it 
comes to communal affairs, business leaders, local cadres, and lineage leaders work together; 
they have sanctioning power over all domains of individuals’ daily lives. Leaders of these three 
domains are not only integrated but also overlap. Capital is interchangeable in all domains—
social, symbolic, political and economic. In addition, the highest social status is reserved for 
people who hold more capital in all domains. 
  Through a comparison of three cases, my study demonstrates complex interaction among 
the state, the market, and cultural legacy. Local tradition continues working in various situations, 
although the degree of cultural authority and community strength varies. Although Zhu 
Stronghold may represent the ideal of local tradition, different strength and various functions of 
the local tradition in all three cases demonstrate the vitality of the local tradition in facing and 
adapting to the new market economy. From the perspective of the well-being of the community 
members, some communities (such as Zhu Stronghold) provide more protection and advantage 
to members than others. In regard to the local tradition, however, it does not mean that the local 
tradition in the former is more successful than the later. As long as community members are 
working together as a community, and local tradition can provide cultural resources for 
community building, local tradition in these communities is successful.  
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the face of the market economy. Instead, there are more complex micro-processes happening in 
each community, and both structure and cultural elements need to be taken into account. As I 
show in the case of West Mountain, weak community solidarity and limited cultural utility is a 
result of the combination between the market economy and a problematic ideal of community. 
  To develop cultural repertoires for a business venture, as in the case of Zhu Stronghold, 
requires a sophisticated arrangement to link traditional practices with economic behaviors. This 
further necessitates a corresponding collective ideal of community to form a strong, solidifying 
community with floating boundaries. This kind of cultural arrangement cannot be developed 
overnight, and neither can it be developed simply out of rational calculation, as I show in the 
case of Zhu Stronghold. 
  In contrast to Zhu Stronghold, where tradition is framed as an integrated part of the 
market economy, Du village provides an example of another way to interact with the market 
economy. Traditional practices of Du village provide cultural identity that distinguishes Du 
villagers from neighborhood communities and migrant workers residing in the village. Local 
tradition is in contrast to, but not against to modern life. This new cultural construction preserves 
and promotes Du villagers’ advantage in the market economy.  
  These three different ways to interact with market economy are arranged and reproduced 
through traditional practices. The next section turns to the link between traditional practices and 
community building.  
 
[Ill] Community Building and Traditional Practices 
 
  As demonstrated in table 6.1, functional utility of local traditions, the community 
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all vary. These findings suggest that the causal relations assumed in the existing literature is 
inaccurate, if not completely wrong. The existing literature (e.g. Jordan and Overmyer 1986; 
Yang 1961) categorizes cases according to types of practices, and assumes that communities 
with similar practices, such as worshipping ancestors, should have more in common than those 
communities of different cultural practices or religious traditions. My finding suggests that the 
type of community practice is not important. The type of community practice does not determine 
the community strength, power relations or the cultural idea of the community. Instead, what we 
should pay attention to is the arrangement of traditional practices in each community. Chapter 
one identifies two analytical strategies to approach traditional practices: forms of traditional 
practices and the work of traditional practices. In what follows, I summarize how each strategy 
explains case differences.  
  Among the three forms of traditional practices—mnemonic objects, historical inscription, 
and commemorative rites—a careful reader might already notice that I discuss commemorative 
rites in almost each case. I do so because commemoratives rites have a stronger impact on 
individual cognition and behavior. Commemorative rites, such as temple festival and pilgrimage, 
involve most community members. Even in the case of Du village, where only elders partake in 
rituals, the rest of villagers are aware of community rituals and talk about community rituals 
more than other forms of traditional practices.  
  In contrast, historical records, such as genealogy, ritual manual, and stone steles at the 
temple only matter to local leaders. At the very early stage of the revival movement, surviving 
historical records played an important role in instructing how things should be revived. Once 
traditional practices were revived and practiced on a regular base, historical records faded into 
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matters little in day-to-day activity. For example, Du village and Zhu Stronghold have recently 
published new genealogies, and most households have a copy. Only very little people read it, 
however. In my fieldwork, most ordinary literate people did not even know where to find their 
own name. They admitted to me that they had never tried to find their own name before I asked 
them to do so.  
  The case of Du village also shows that when there is a discrepancy between the historical 
record and ritual, local people internalize ritual practices and ignore the historical record. For 
example, in Du village, sub-branches of the third branch that are currently sustained are treated 
in sacrificial rituals as if founders of these sub-branches are brothers. Most members of the third 
branch, therefore, think and act in this way. However, in genealogical records, not all founders of 
sub-branches of the third branch were brothers. In strict genealogical order, two sub-branches are 
supposed to be one sub-branch and further divided into two sub-sub-branches. These two sub-
sub-branches were prosperous with an equivalent number of members as the rest of sub-
branches, and were promoted into equivalent status with other sub-branches (probably in the 
ninetieth century). Today, members of these two sub-sub-branches do not remember this history, 
and they do not consider their relation with the other sub-sub-branch any closer to the rest of 
sub-branches, not to mention that there is no extra cooperation between these two sub-sub-
branches.   
  In addition to that different forms of traditional practices weigh differently in shaping 
member’s cognition and action, same traditional practices might work differently in community 
building. Chapter one identifies three different dimensions in which traditional practices work: 
through arousing individual’s affective state (psychological dimension), through reproducing 
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promoting particular social patterns (social dimension). In my analysis, I focus more on the latter 
two dimensions. The psychological dimension is found in all three cases. A successful practice 
must have aroused an individual’s affective state—although I did not find any obvious 
characteristics that further distinguish the psychological dimension.   
Different arrangements of the same type of traditional practices emphasize different 
dimensions of the work they do, and have different consequences for community building. The 
pilgrimage, for example, where villagers take a trip to the mother temple of the local deity to 
rejuvenate the spiritual power of the local deity by passing the statues through the smoke of the 
mother temple’s incense fire (Sangren 1987:87–91). The pilgrimage in Du village is arranged to 
work at the symbolic (cultural) dimension. The yearly trip to the mother temple of Baosheng 
aims to rejuvenate the spiritual power of Baosheng. What used to take a day, modern public 
transportation condenses to two hours. The rejuvenatation ritual in the mother temple takes about 
twenty minutes. The ritual is done by a Daoist priest, while the rest of participants pray for their 
individual households. In contrast to the simplification of pilgrimage in Du village, Zhu 
Stronghold retrains elaborate rituals that emphasizes not only the magic power of the local deity 
but also collective collaboration among subgroupings of Zhu Stronghold. A pilgrimage typically 
lasts between seven to fourteen days. In addition to two days spent on the trip to the mother 
temple of the local deity, the rest is spent on marching around the territory of Zhu Stronghold 
and neighborhood villages. Pilgrimages in Zhu Stronghold require sophisticated community-
wide coordination to make a pilgrimage possible. A pilgrimage exposes a community’s 
capability of fundraising, inner community coordination, ritual arrangement, and extra-
community communication. Through pilgrimage, particular social patterns and ways of 
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  From the above comparison on the arrangement of pilgrimage, differences in the 
community strength between Du village and Zhu Stronghold are partially revealed. In the field of 
Chinese religion and culture, I have not seen any work examining secular arrangements of 
traditional practices. The common approach emphasizes religious aspect of ritual and neglects 
community aspect of ritual. Therefore, the same kind of ritual is conceived to have the same 
effect on the community. For example, pilgrimage is done to rejuvenate the spiritual power of 
the local deity. In contrast, although I do not deny that the rejuvenation of the spiritual power is 
the core religious meaning of pilgrimage, I argue that different arrangements of the same ritual 
brings different effects on community building.   
  In examining a series of traditional practices in the reform era, my study shows that the 
three communities arrange traditional practices in identifiable different ways. The work of 
traditional practices in building the community has different emphasis in each community. As a 
consequence, the social and cultural processes work differently and have different interaction in 
each case. In what follows, I recap the social and cultural processes of traditional practices in 
each community.  
Zhu Stronghold exemplifies the most sophisticated and totalistic arrangement of 
traditional practices. Solidarity is built into the social process of traditional practices through 
emphasizing collective mobilization and mass participation. This social process is recognized, 
designed, and modified by members of community. Solidarity is not a psychological state 
resulting from a ritual that has nothing to do with secular life. In addition, the social and cultural 
processes of traditional practices develop hand in hand. Patterns of social interaction and the 
framework of expressive symbols and community norms are consistent and coherent. With the 
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high capacity to mobilize community members, and has strong sanction power toward 
transgression.  
In West Mountain, the Procession was revived to build a new local identity that 
emphasized egalitarianism among surname groups. To achieve the stated goal, the Procession 
emphasizes mass participation and represents egalitarianism among surname groups. In contrast, 
local leaders do not pay as much attention to the framework of expressive symbols. As a 
consequence of the detachment between the social and cultural processes, Lord Grace fails to 
carry the meaning of solidarity and provides little force to the maintenance of community order 
and solidarity. In emphasizing mass participation and egalitarianism of the social process, 
traditional practices are capable of maintaining basic community order and producing local 
identity, while local tradition has no utility in the economic sphere.  
Du village is an example where revival movements work mostly on reframing expressive 
symbols and community norms, and in neglecting the pattern of social interaction. Traditional 
practices of Du village involve no mass participation or collective mobilization. Only old people 
are responsible for traditional practices. Traditional practices reach individuals through everyday 
interaction and work at the level of cognition. In other words, the social process and cultural 
process do not develop together, and thus result in a disjuncture between social structure in the 
cultural idea and the actual social structure. Du village ends up with an unclear rule of social 
alliance and an unstable power structure.  
Community building is not just a sentiment. This study shows that community building is 
realized and reproduced through concrete traditional practices. With different arrangements of 
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on local people’s daily life. Traditional practices have their own inner cultural logic and are 
constantly modified to the current situation.  
Assisting local people in dealing with uncertainty in the market economy is one aspect of 
local tradition. In all three cases, the efficacy of the local deity is associated with the economic 
success of local people. However, there are two approaches to economic success and how the 
local deity chooses to bless one over the others: collective and individualistic.  
The collective approach emphasizes the collective effort and solidarity in dealing with 
economic uncertainty, as shown in the case of Zhu Stronghold. In specific, traditional practices 
emphasize collective mobilization, and are designed to be complicated and require collective 
effort to carry on. In addition, traditional practices are designed to be responsive to the economic 
needs of community members, e.g. I show that the local deity requests a pilgrimage periodically 
to respond to changes in market situations. In speaking about their opportunities and future in the 
market economy, businessmen of Zhu Stronghold seldom use the term luck. They show a high 
level of confidence to cope with economic changes through the strength of the community. The 
use of lineage networks in doing business is a result of such a high confidence on the community 
strength. Businessmen of Zhu Stronghold are also risk adventurers in their business ventures.   
The individualistic approach emphasizes patron-client relation between the local deity 
and individual. As shown in Du village and West Mountain, traditional practices are designed 
with little collective appeals in the face of market economy. My informants talked about luck 
that might be a result from worshipping the local deity. The term luck entails a sense of mystical 
power that is out of the control of any individual or community. For example, in Du village, the 
symbol of the YYG is not associated with community solidarity. One just needs to have faith in 
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demonstration. There is no community regulation for one’s obligation to the YYG. Individuals 
worship and donate money according to their own will. No one ever mentioned community 
sanctions for an individual’s contribution to the YYG. This aspect of traditional practices 
corresponds to the economic pattern in Du village. The economic unit in Du village is based on 
the individual household. There is very little collaboration among siblings, and no business 
collaboration beyond siblings. Du villagers only work within economic opportunities provided 
by the state, and they lack risk taking spirit. In West Mountain, the situation is very similar. Lord 
Grace has an ambivalent connotation with the community as a whole. Instead, what the symbol 
mainly conveys is that the more one offers to Lord Grace, the more blessing he can earn from 
Lord Grace. Individual utilitarian is the key message.  
 
Diverse paths to cultural adaptation 
  There is no doubt about various cultural resources that Chinese tradition can provide to 
the changing political landscape and socio-economic situations, as the existing literature and my 
study demonstrate. This study further explains diverse development in local communities 
regarding traditional authority and functional utility through carefully analyzing arrangement of 
traditional practices. How traditional practices are arranged to work in a locality determines the 
capacity and sets the limitation of community building and functional utility.  
Local tradition, on the one hand, provides resources for local people to deal with 
community issues. On the other hand, local tradition limits the collective vision of local people 
to deal with community issues. For example, as an outside researcher, I would like to know why 
Du village and West Mountain do not develop intense lineage networks as did Zhu Stronghold to 
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aware of successful stories of some villages using lineage network for business. When I raised 
the question why they did not use lineage network in such a way, informants simply told me that 
that was not how things worked here. Villagers of these two villages simply have no such vision 
about the local community and the use of lineage networks for business venture.   
In explaining the diverse development of cultural adaptation and community building, my 
study provides no simple causal link. Instead, I provide a framework identifying the most 
important factors that shape the path of cultural adaptation and community building. These 
factors are the cultural legacy, individual interests, the state, and the market. The cultural legacy 
can be further disaggregated into the cultural ideal of community building and the arrangement 
of traditional practices. My analysis pays particular attention to the arrangement of traditional 
practices and its effect on community strength. In this framework, community strength and the 
path of cultural adaptation are not randomly determined. Instead, they are consequences of a 
series of social and cultural processes of traditional practices.    
 
[IV] Malleability of the Past 
 
Restoring the past is commonly used as the slogan for bottom up revival movements in 
Chinese local communities. All my three cases demonstrate this phenomenon, which leads to an 
examination of an indigenous understanding of restoring tradition. Restoring tradition cannot be 
taken literally, even when informants said that it meant reviving traditional practices of the 
republican era. In a Chinese context, local tradition is an ideal that links people with their 
ancestors and a past with which they themselves do not have personal experience. Local tradition 
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practices that their common ancestors created and practiced. In understanding local tradition as 
an ideal, rather than literally, it becomes compatible with new elements and innovations. 
Traditional practices, as I have repeatedly shown in all three cases, are used to deal with current 
issues. Innovation and adaptation is an inherent part of local tradition. Moreover, in the 
beginning of the reform era, local tradition as an ideal is often used as an excuse to gain 
legitimacy and avoid government inspection. This is particularly evident in the case of Du 
village before 2000, when villagers still sensed the threat of political intervention of traditional 
practices.      
Changes are observed in the traditional practices and symbols in all three cases. The past-
and-present relation is constantly redefined, particularly in the face of rapid socio-economic 
changes. At the same time, local traditions are still important for local people to interpret the 
present state, and a sense of continuity provides stability in the face of a rapid transition. My 
cases show no major difference from the proposed relation between the present and the past in 
the current social memory studies, which treat the present-and-past relation in a dialectic 
(Schwartz 1996). On the one hand, the past encodes and reproduces class conflict, interest 
structures, and mentalities of the present. The past also provides a symbolic framework that 
makes experiences meaningful. On the other hand, the past is constantly made and remade 
according to the present concerns. 
  In this dialectical relation between the past and the present, the constraint of the past can 
vary. The degree of the malleability of the past, as shown in my cases, is determined by external 
forces. When the corresponding social structure and institutions of traditional practices are 
transformed or destroyed by external forces, especially the state, the past becomes more 
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breakdown of the lineage structure and the state economic policy promoting individualism since 
the Maoist period, Du village is the most malleable case among the three cases. The malleability 
is particularly seen in the new synthesis of the local tradition and the flexibility in choosing 
descent group affiliation if the mother or wife belongs to another descent group of Du village.  
  When the corresponding social structure and institutions of traditional practices are 
maintained the similar, the past is the model of the present, as shown in the case of Zhu 
Stronghold. In Zhu Stronghold, the model of the present mainly refers to patterns of social 
interaction and framework of expressive symbols that can be easily traced back to the late 
imperial period. The present is largely organized by these patterns of social interaction and 
framework of expressive symbols. With this great force of the past, however, it does not mean 
nothing can be changed. Instead, the model of the present is in itself under transformation. As the 
community further develops into a successful entrepreneur village, a new development is 
formed—namely, the honor system. Although deity-related activities are still an inevitable part 
of the honor system, new elements—mainly logics of the market—are introduced in structuring 
the community order.  
  In the case of West Mountain, the past is different from Du village and Zhu Stronghold. 
With a past carrying sin—stratification and suppression among surname groups—West 
Mountain struggles to build a new egalitarian community in the reform era. The practice of the 
Procession is reformulated into one that carries the message of egalitarianism. However, the past 
as collective memory is not easy to dispel. By denouncing the past surname politics without 
providing reconciliation toward group differentiation, local leaders turned lineage identity into 
the oppositional position of collective identity. This either-or framework, as I have shown, places 
surname groups into endless contestations and undermines community solidarity. In addition, by 245	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
ignoring the past history of the Procession, local leaders created a situation where symbols are 
open to interpretation and have little relation to the community. Together, the sacredness of the 
past is lost in the new formulation, and traditional authority is undermined. 
  All the three cases, no matter the degree of malleability of the past, share the same 
character of Chinese tradition. That is, Chinese tradition is a special class of tradition “whose 
‘traditionality’ is an explicit part of their legitimizing function” (Otto and Pedersen 2005:29). 
This quality, refers to “the past as a criterion of validation” (ibid). This is particularly evident in 
the case of West Mountain. On the one hand, community members want to build a new 
community that overcomes the past surname politics. On the other hand, community members 
cannot not use traditional practices that were associated with the past surname politics. This 
character of Chinese rural communities— the past as a criterion of validation—explains why we 
still need to pay attention to traditional practices and why the local tradition would not easily 
disappear as the individualization thesis claims.  
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